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Accidents · NTSB WPR13FA006 · Final report

Garlick Helicopters INC UH-1H accident near Shady Cove, Oregon, October 7, 2012

On October 7, 2012 at about 10:13 pm local time, a 1965 Garlick Helicopters INC UH-1H, registered N1577, was substantially damaged in an accident during enroute (cruise) near Shady Cove, Oregon. It was an external-load flight under external-load helicopter rules (Part 133). 1 person had minor injuries. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).

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The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged

The separation of the tail rotor gearbox and tail rotor assembly as a result of fatigue to the tail rotor gearbox input quill assembly attachment studs.

Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 4, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.

What the record shows

Date
October 7, 2012 · about 10:13 pm local time
Place
Shady Cove, Oregon · map
Type
Accident
Injuries
1 person had minor injuries.
Weather
visual conditions (good weather)
Aircraft
Garlick Helicopters INC UH-1H, built 1965 · all UH-1Hs on the register
Registration
N1577 · registry record · serial 65-09577
Damage
Substantial damage
Flight
External-load flight · external-load helicopter rules (Part 133)

The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record

The pilot reported that he was in straight and level flight over mountainous, tree-covered terrain when he heard a loud noise followed by an abrupt jolt and right yaw. The pilot initiated a descent into a valley when he heard a second loud noise followed by severe vibrations and activation of the low rotor RPM horn. The helicopter continued to descend before it impacted the trees and ground below. During an on-scene examination, control continuity was established throughout the helicopter with the exception of the 90-degree gearbox and tail rotor assembly, which were separated from the helicopter and not found. The gear box is positioned in between the tail rotor drive shaft and tail rotor assembly; it takes the input from the tail rotor drive shaft (through a quill assembly), and adjusts and transfers the energy to the tail rotor assembly. Because the gearbox and tail rotor separated in flight, the investigation was not able to examine them to determine their condition or their proper installation. However, the tail rotor gearbox input quill assembly, vertical driveshaft clamp, and two remaining gearbox attachment studs were removed for additional examination. Fatigue damage was noted along the fracture surface of the two gearbox attachment studs that were still attached to the vertical fin side of the mounting flange. The remaining four attachment holes were empty; however, helical rubbing marks were found around their perimeter along with an adjacent lip of deformed material, which is indicative of the studs being present at one point. Postaccident examination and a test run of the helicopter's engine revealed no anomalies that would have precluded normal operation. The helicopter's most recent tail rotor gearbox inspection occurred about one month prior to the accident; however, the investigation could not determine if the fatigued area would have been included in the inspection, or whether any evidence of fatigue would have been detectable at the time of the inspection.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

What happened, in order

  1. Part(s) separation from AC during enroute (cruise) defining event
  2. Off-field or emergency landing during enroute (cruise)

The NTSB's findings

  • cause Aircraft › Aircraft propeller/rotor › Tail rotor drive system › Tail rotor gearbox › Fatigue/wear/corrosion
  • cause Aircraft › Aircraft propeller/rotor › Tail rotor drive system › Tail rotor gearbox › Failure

Pilot

  • Certificate: commercial pilot
  • Ratings: rotorcraft: helicopter
  • Flight time: 2,959 hours in all; 744 in this make and model; 243 in the last 90 days; 24 in the last 30 days; 2,909 as pilot in command
  • Last flight review: January 17, 2012
  • Medical certificate: Class 2 (with waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: left
  • Injury: no injuries

The aircraft

  • Airframe total time: 6,267 hours
  • Last inspection: approved inspection programme, August 31, 2012; 38 hours since
  • Maximum gross weight: 9,500 lb
  • Seats: 2
  • Landing gear: fixed
  • Engine: Honeywell T53-L-13B (turboshaft); 750 hours total

The flight

  • Departed from: Grants Pass OR at 9:00 pm
  • Destination: Grants Pass OR
  • Flight plan: none

Weather at the time

  • Light: daylight
  • Wind: from 300° at 4 knots
  • Visibility: 10 statute miles
  • Sky: clear
  • Temperature: 82°F (28°C), dew point 27°F (-3°C)
  • Altimeter: 29.85 inHg
  • Observation at 8:53 pm from MFR, 12 miles away

Injuries

FatalSeriousMinorNone
Flight crew1

Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report

The docket, the folder of records gathered during an investigation (maintenance records, photographs, witness statements, examinations), has not been read from the NTSB for this case yet; the list appears here once it has. Open the docket at the NTSB.

About this page

Everything above comes from the NTSB's public accident database: the narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words, and the coded tables behind its report (pilot, aircraft, flight, weather, injuries, sequence of events) are written out in plain English. Pilots' ages, home towns and medical details are left out on purpose. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, the folder of records gathered during the investigation, shown as the NTSB released them (the NTSB redacts some personal details first) and listed under the NTSB's own titles. This site's own text never names pilots, passengers or anyone else involved. A preliminary report describes what is known soon after the event and can change; the final report, with the probable cause, usually follows one to two years later and this page is refreshed when it does. Case number WPR13FA006.