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Accidents · NTSB WPR12MA034 · Final report

Eurocopter EC 130 B4 accident near Pukoo, Hawaii, November 10, 2011

On November 10, 2011 at about 10:14 pm local time, a 2010 Eurocopter EC 130 B4 (helicopter), registered N11QV, was substantially damaged in an accident during maneuvering (low-alt flying) near Pukoo, Hawaii. It was flown under charter and air-taxi rules (Part 135). 5 people were killed. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).

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The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged

The pilot's failure to maintain clearance from mountainous terrain while operating in marginal weather conditions, which resulted in the impact of the horizontal stabilizer and lower forward portion of the fenestron with ground and/or vegetation and led to the separation of the fenestron and the pilot's subsequent inability to maintain control. Contributing to the accident was the pilot's decision to operate into an area surrounded by rising terrain, low and possibly descending cloud bases, rain showers, and high wind.

Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 4, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.

What the record shows

Date
November 10, 2011 · about 10:14 pm local time
Place
Pukoo, Hawaii · map
Type
Accident
Injuries
5 people were killed.
Weather
visual conditions (good weather)
Aircraft
Eurocopter EC 130 B4, built 2010 · all EC 130 B4s on the register
Registration
N11QV · registry record · serial 4909
Damage
Substantial damage
Flight
Flight · charter and air-taxi rules (Part 135)

The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record

***This report was modified on July 25, 2014. Please see the docket for this accident to view the original report.*** The helicopter impacted terrain during a sightseeing flight scheduled to fly from the island of Maui to the island of Molokai and return. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the departure airport; however, scattered rain showers and low clouds were forecast and reported along the helicopter's route of flight. When the accident occurred, the helicopter was flying over mountainous terrain and likely traversing down one of several ridges leading from Molokai's central peaks toward the lower terrain near the shoreline in marginal weather conditions. Several witnesses reported that the accident occurred between rain squalls, and one witness reported that it occurred during a heavy rain squall. All of the witnesses reported that heavy localized rain showers with strong gusting wind conditions existed around the time of the accident. Two witnesses reported that their attention was drawn to the helicopter when they heard a "whoop whooping" sound. One of these witnesses observed the helicopter descending from the ridgeline, and the other witness, who was closest to, and had the clearest view of, the accident helicopter, reported that the helicopter went "straight down" and impacted the ground. The debris field leading up to the main wreckage was about 1,330 feet long and consisted mostly of pieces from the fenestron, which is a shrouded tail rotor, indicating that the fenestron separated from the helicopter before the main wreckage impacted the ground. The remainder of the helicopter was accounted for at the main wreckage site except for the outboard portion of the right horizontal stabilizer, which was not identified in any of the recovered wreckage. A detailed examination of the wreckage indicated that the accident sequence of events likely began when the pilot failed to maintain sufficient terrain clearance, and the horizontal stabilizer and lower forward portion of the fenestron impacted vegetation and/or terrain. The upward and aft loading at the horizontal stabilizer, more pronounced on the right side, sheared the right attachment fittings, which allowed the right side of the stabilizer to travel aft. The combined loading from the horizontal stabilizer and the fenestron's impact with vegetation and/or terrain caused the stress in the forward flange of the junction frame to exceed its ultimate design strength. The forward flange of the junction frame fractured, which allowed the fenestron to separate from the tailboom. The torque input from the tail rotor drive shaft caused the separated fenestron to rotate counter-clockwise, which drove the lower portion of the fenestron into the main rotor disc, where it was impacted at least three times on the left side. After the fenestron separated from the tailboom, the helicopter lost yaw control, and its center of gravity shifted forward, which caused it to become uncontrollable and, subsequently, descend to the ground.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

What happened, in order

  1. Other weather encounter during maneuvering (low-alt flying)
  2. Altitude deviation during maneuvering (low-alt flying)
  3. Collision with terrain or object (not controlled flight into terrain) during maneuvering (low-alt flying)
  4. Aircraft structural failure during maneuvering (low-alt flying) defining event
  5. Collision with terrain or object (not controlled flight into terrain) during uncontrolled descent

The NTSB's findings

  • cause Aircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability › Performance/control parameters › Altitude › Not attained/maintained
  • Environmental issues › Conditions/weather/phenomena › Ceiling/visibility/precip › Low ceiling › Contributed to outcome
  • Environmental issues › Conditions/weather/phenomena › Ceiling/visibility/precip › Clouds › Contributed to outcome
  • Aircraft › Aircraft structures › Empennage structure › (general) › Damaged/degraded
  • Aircraft › Aircraft structures › Empennage structure › (general) › Capability exceeded
  • cause Personnel issues › Task performance › Use of equip/info › (general) › Pilot
  • factor Personnel issues › Action/decision › Info processing/decision › Decision making/judgment › Pilot

Pilot

  • Certificate: commercial pilot, private
  • Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instructor: helicopter; instrument: helicopter; rotorcraft: helicopter
  • Flight time: 4,861 hours in all; 306 in this make and model; 195 in the last 90 days; 95 in the last 30 days; 4,801 as pilot in command; 850 on instruments
  • Last flight review: November 9, 2011
  • Medical certificate: Class 1 (with waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: left
  • Injury: fatal

The aircraft

  • Airframe total time: 2,440 hours
  • Last inspection: 100-hour inspection, November 8, 2011; 9 hours since
  • Maximum gross weight: 5,350 lb
  • Seats: 8
  • Landing gear: fixed
  • Engine: Turbomeca ARRIEL 2B1 (turboshaft); 7,686 hours total

The flight

  • Departed from: PHOG Kahului HI at 9:44 pm
  • Destination: PHOG Kahului HI

Weather at the time

  • Light: daylight
  • Wind: from 070° at 12 knots, gusting 23
  • Visibility: 12 statute miles
  • Sky: broken clouds at 4,000 ft; scat at 2,500 ft
  • Temperature: 73°F (23°C), dew point 66°F (19°C)
  • Altimeter: 30.04 inHg
  • Observation at 9:50 pm from PHJH, 11 miles away

Injuries

FatalSeriousMinorNone
Flight crew1
Passengers4

Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report

The docket, the folder of records gathered during an investigation (maintenance records, photographs, witness statements, examinations), has not been read from the NTSB for this case yet; the list appears here once it has. Open the docket at the NTSB.

About this page

Everything above comes from the NTSB's public accident database: the narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words, and the coded tables behind its report (pilot, aircraft, flight, weather, injuries, sequence of events) are written out in plain English. Pilots' ages, home towns and medical details are left out on purpose. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, the folder of records gathered during the investigation, shown as the NTSB released them (the NTSB redacts some personal details first) and listed under the NTSB's own titles. This site's own text never names pilots, passengers or anyone else involved. A preliminary report describes what is known soon after the event and can change; the final report, with the probable cause, usually follows one to two years later and this page is refreshed when it does. Case number WPR12MA034.