Spectrum Aeronautical LLC 33 accident near Spanish Fork, Utah, July 25, 2006
On July 25, 2006 at about 10:06 pm local time, a Spectrum Aeronautical LLC 33, registered N322LA, was destroyed in an accident near Spanish Fork, Utah (Spanish Fork - Springville airport). It was a flight test under general aviation rules (Part 91). 2 people were killed. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).
The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
Incorrect installation by company maintenance personnel of the aft upper torque tube bell crank resulting in roll control that was opposite to that commanded in the cockpit. Contributing factors were the lack of maintenance documentation detailing the installation of the bell crank, the installing mechanic's incorrect assumption that the bell crank could only be installed in one position, and the failure of maintenance personnel and the flight crew to check the position of the control stick relative to the ailerons after the maintenance and during the preflight checks.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- July 25, 2006 · about 10:06 pm local time
- Place
- Spanish Fork, Utah · Spanish Fork - Springville · map
- Type
- Accident
- Injuries
- 2 people were killed.
- Weather
- visual conditions (good weather)
- Aircraft
- Spectrum Aeronautical LLC 33
- Registration
- N322LA · no longer on the register · serial 0001
- Damage
- Destroyed
- Flight
- Flight test · general aviation rules (Part 91)
The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record
The proto-type experimental light jet airplane was departing on a local maintenance test flight. Witnesses reported that the airplane entered a right roll almost immediately after liftoff. The roll continued to about 90 degrees right wing down at which point the right wingtip impacted the ground. During examination of the wreckage, the aileron control system was found connected such that the airplane rolled in the opposite direction to that commanded in the cockpit. The maintenance performed on the airplane before the accident flight included removal of the main landing gear (MLG) in order to stiffen the MLG struts. Interviews with the mechanics who performed the maintenance revealed that during re-installation and system testing of the MLG, it was discovered that the changes to the MLG struts impacted the V-bracket holding the aileron control system's upper torque tube. The V-bracket was removed and a redesigned V-bracket was installed in its place. This work required the disconnection of a portion of the aileron control system, including the removal of the aft upper torque tube bell crank from the torque tube. The mechanic who reinstalled the aft upper torque tube bell crank was under the incorrect assumption that there was only one way to install the bell crank on the torque tube. However, there are actually two positions in which the bell crank could be installed. The incorrect installation is accomplished by rotating the bell crank 180° about the axis of the torque tube and flipping it front to back, and this is the way the bell crank was found installed. With the bell crank installed incorrectly and the rest of the system installed as designed, there is binding in the system. This binding was noticed on the accident airplane during the inspection after initial installation. However, the mechanic did not recognize that the bell crank was improperly installed on the torque tube. Instead of fixing the problem by removing and correctly reinstalling the bell crank, he fixed the problem by disconnecting the necessary tie rods and rotating the upper torque tube so that the arm of the bell crank pointed up and to the left. This action reversed the movement of the ailerons. According to all of the personnel interviewed, there was no maintenance documentation to instruct mechanics how to perform the work since this was a proof-of-concept airplane. None of the mechanics who performed the work could recall if the position of the ailerons in relation to the position of the control stick was checked. Such a position check, if it had been performed by either the mechanics after the maintenance or by the flight crew during the preflight checks, would assuredly have indicated that the system was installed incorrectly.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
Pilot
- Certificate: commercial pilot
- Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instrument: airplane
- Flight time: 2,300 hours in all; 22 in this make and model
- Medical certificate: Class 1 (with waivers/limitations)
- Seat: left
- Injury: fatal
Co-pilot
- Certificate: flight instructor, commercial pilot
- Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instructor: airplane multi-engine; instructor: airplane single-engine; instructor: glider; instructor: instrument airplane; instrument: airplane; rotorcraft: glider
- Flight time: 3,100 hours in all; 16 in this make and model
- Medical certificate: Class 1 (with waivers/limitations)
- Seat: rgt
- Injury: fatal
The aircraft
- Airframe total time: 44 hours
- Last inspection: 100-hour inspection, July 1, 2006; 0 hours since
- Maximum gross weight: 7,300 lb
- Seats: 2
- Landing gear: retractable
- Engine 1: Williams International FJ33-4A-15 (turbofan); 0 hours total
- Engine 2: Williams International FJ33-4A-15 (turbofan); 0 hours total
The flight
- Departed from: U77 Spanish Fork UT at 10:06 pm
- Destination: U77
- Flight plan: none
- Runway 30, 5,700 ft by 100 ft
- A second pilot was aboard
Weather at the time
- Light: daylight
- Wind: from 270° at 4 knots
- Visibility: 10 statute miles
- Sky: clear
- Temperature: 86°F (30°C), dew point 57°F (14°C)
- Altimeter: 29.96 inHg
- Observation at 9:55 pm from PVU, 5 miles away
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Crew | 2 |
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
The docket, the folder of records gathered during an investigation (maintenance records, photographs, witness statements, examinations), has not been read from the NTSB for this case yet; the list appears here once it has. Open the docket at the NTSB.
Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.
