Bell 206B accident near Mead, Washington, August 17, 2004
On August 17, 2004 at about 4:40 pm local time, a Bell 206B (helicopter), registered N34698, was destroyed in an accident near Mead, Washington. It was a public-use flight under external-load helicopter rules (Part 133). 1 person was killed. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).
The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
The reversal of the reel machine during a sock line pull which resulted in a loss of control while hovering out of ground effect. Factors were the failure of company management to develop adequate procedures for conducting sock line pulls, the inadequate communication between the chief pilot and the pilot, the inadequate communication between the ground personnel and the pilot, and the pilot's lack of recent experience in Class C external load operations.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- August 17, 2004 · about 4:40 pm local time
- Place
- Mead, Washington · map
- Type
- Accident
- Injuries
- 1 person was killed.
- Weather
- visual conditions (good weather)
- Aircraft
- Bell 206B · all 206Bs on the register
- Registration
- N34698 · no longer on the register · serial 4324
- Damage
- Destroyed
- Flight
- Public-use flight · external-load helicopter rules (Part 133)
The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record
The helicopter was pulling sock line (rope) that was to be used to install a static wire at the top of 220-foot-tall towers supporting a 500-kV power line. (The stringing of sock line is a Class C external load operation, meaning an operation in which the external load is jettisonable and remains in contact with land or water during the rotorcraft operation.) The sock line was attached to the helicopter's remote cargo hook and played out of a truck mounted reel machine operating in the power payout mode. The reel machine operator stated that "suddenly the rope wrapped over another rope or pulled down in the drum, causing the rope to reverse on the drum." The reel machine operator immediately moved the machine's shift lever from "OUT" to "NEUTRAL," but by the time he had accomplished this, the rope between the reel and the helicopter went taut. Numerous witnesses, who were all members of the line crew installing the wires, reported that when the rope went taut, the helicopter pitched up and rolled right. The helicopter descended, impacted the ground and came to rest on its right side. Post-accident interviews revealed that the pilot, the line crew, and company management did not adequately recognize and mitigate the risks inherent in the procedures they were using to conduct the sock line pull. Specifically, the rigging used was a 25-foot long line with a 31-pound ballast weight, while other operators pulling sock line use longer long lines (50 to 100 feet) and heavier ballast (150 to 300 pounds) in order to provide pilots with an earlier warning of an impending shock load due to a snag so that the pilot will have more time to respond. Additionally, at the pilot's request, the reel machine was being operated in the power payout mode, instead of the free wheeling mode. This was due to a miscommunication between the pilot and the chief pilot, who stated that when he discussed the operation with the pilot, he assumed the pilot understood that he intended for the reel to be freewheeling. In the freewheel mode, when a snag occurs, at worst, the reel stops. In the power payout mode, when a snag occurs, the line can double back on the reel and begin to pull back in, as occurred in this accident. Also, while preparing for the sock line pull, the line crew was paying out sock line on the ground and experienced a snag, which resulted in the line being pulled in instead of paying out, just as occurred in the accident. However, there was no communication of this occurrence to the pilot. Finally, although the pilot had 21,803 hours rotorcraft flight time, 16,000 hours in the accident make and model helicopter, and 4,000 hours conducting external load operations, his most recent Class C external load experience was 5 years and 3 months prior to the accident.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
Pilot
- Certificate: airline transport pilot
- Ratings: instrument: helicopter; rotorcraft: helicopter
- Flight time: 21,803 hours in all; 16,000 in this make and model; 116 in the last 90 days; 34 in the last 30 days
- Last flight review: April 21, 2004
- Medical certificate: Class 2 (valid medical--w/ waivers/lim.)
- Seat: rgt
- Injury: fatal
The aircraft
- Airframe total time: 3,859 hours
- Last inspection: approved inspection programme, July 26, 2004; 37 hours since
- Maximum gross weight: 3,200 lb
- Seats: 5
- Landing gear: fixed
- Engine: Allison 250-C20R (turboshaft); 0 hours total
- Fire on the ground
The flight
- Departed from: GEG Spokane WA at 1:55 pm
- Destination: Mead WA
Weather at the time
- Light: daylight
- Wind: from 250° at 6 knots
- Visibility: 10 statute miles
- Sky: broken clouds at 20,000 ft; scat at 15,000 ft
- Temperature: 79°F (26°C), dew point 61°F (16°C)
- Altimeter: 30.04 inHg
- Observation at 4:53 pm from SFF
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Crew | 1 |
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
The docket, the folder of records gathered during an investigation (maintenance records, photographs, witness statements, examinations), has not been read from the NTSB for this case yet; the list appears here once it has. Open the docket at the NTSB.
Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.
