Cessna Citation 525 accident near Coupeville, Washington, July 22, 2003
On July 22, 2003 at about 5:15 pm local time, a Cessna Citation 525, registered N996JR, was substantially damaged in an accident near Coupeville, Washington. It was a personal flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). No one was hurt; 2 people were on board or involved. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).
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The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
The loss of airplane pitch control (trim runway and mistrim condition) resulting from a failure in the airplane's electric pitch trim system. Factors that contributed to the accident were the manufacturer's inadequate design of the pitch trim circuitry that allowed for a single-point failure mode, and the absence of an adequate failure warning system to clearly alert the pilot to the pitch trim runaway condition in sufficient time to respond in accordance with the manufacturer's checklist instructions.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 4, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- July 22, 2003 · about 5:15 pm local time
- Place
- Coupeville, Washington · map
- Type
- Accident
- Injuries
- No one was hurt; 2 people were on board or involved.
- Weather
- visual conditions (good weather)
- Aircraft
- Cessna Citation 525
- Registration
- N996JR · registry record · serial 0147
- Damage
- Substantial damage
- Flight
- Personal flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)
The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record
The corporate jet airplane experienced a loss of elevator trim control (runaway trim) that resulted in an uncommanded nose-low pitch attitude. The pilot reported that following the loss of elevator trim authority the airplane was extremely difficult to control and the elevator control forces were extremely high. The pilot continued to maneuver the airplane, but eventually ditched it into a nearby marine cove. The runaway trim condition was not immediately recognized by the pilot and he stated that, by that point in the event sequence, the control forces were so great that he had little time to troubleshoot the system and elected to continue on his established heading and ditch the airplane. Pulling the circuit breaker, which is called for by the checklist in the event of a trim runaway, would have arrested the trim movement. Post accident examination and functional testing of the airplane's electric pitch trim printed circuit board (PCB) showed a repeatable fault in the operation of the PCB's K6 relay, resulting in the relay contacts remaining closed. This condition would be representative of the autopilot pitch trim remaining engaged, providing an electrical current to drive continuous nose-down trim to the elevator trim motor. Examination of the airplane's maintenance records showed that the PCB was removed and replaced in conjunction with the phase inspection prior to the accident. Further examination of the airplane's maintenance records revealed that the replacement PCB was originally installed in an airplane that experienced an "electric trim runaway on the ground." Following the trim runaway, the PCB was removed and shipped to the manufacturer. After receiving the PCB the manufacturer tested the board and no discrepancies were noted. The unit was subsequently approved for return to service and later installed on the accident airplane. The investigation revealed a single-point failure of trim runaway (failed K6 relay) and a latent system design anomaly in the autopilot/trim disconnect switch on the airplane's pitch trim PCB. This design prohibited the disengagement of the electric trim motor during autopilot operation. As a result of the investigation, the FAA issued three airworthiness directives (AD 2003-21-07, AD 2003-23-20, and AD 2004-14-20), and the pitch trim printed circuit board was redesigned and evaluated for compliance with safety requirements via system safety assessment
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
Pilot
- Certificate: commercial pilot
- Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instrument: airplane
- Flight time: 8,500 hours in all; 2,689 in this make and model; 8,000 as pilot in command
- Last flight review: May 6, 2002
- Medical certificate: Class 3 (with waivers/limitations)
- Seat: left
- Injury: no injuries
The aircraft
- Airframe total time: 590 hours
- Last inspection: continuous airworthiness programme, August 1, 2002; 82 hours since
- Maximum gross weight: 10,400 lb
- Seats: 7
- Landing gear: retractable
- Engine 1: Williams International FJ44-1A (turbofan); 0 hours total
- Engine 2: Williams International FJ44-1A (turbofan); 0 hours total
The flight
- Departed from: CYYJ Sidney at 5:05 pm
- Destination: BOI Boise ID
- Flight plan: IFR
Weather at the time
- Light: daylight
- Wind: from 290° at 6 knots
- Visibility: 1 statute miles
- Sky: broken clouds at 100 ft
- Temperature: 55°F (13°C), dew point 54°F (12°C)
- Altimeter: 30.12 inHg
- Observation at 4:55 pm from KNUW, 7 miles away
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Crew | 1 | |||
| Passengers | 1 |
About this page
Everything above comes from the NTSB's public accident database: the narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words, and the coded tables behind its report (pilot, aircraft, flight, weather, injuries, sequence of events) are written out in plain English. Pilots' ages, home towns and medical details are left out on purpose. The docket at the NTSB holds the report as a PDF and the investigation's photographs and documents. This site never names pilots, passengers or anyone else involved. A preliminary report describes what is known soon after the event and can change; the final report, with the probable cause, usually follows one to two years later and this page is refreshed when it does. Case number SEA03FA147.