Learjet 60 accident near Hyannis, Massachusetts, July 2, 1999
On July 2, 1999 at about 2:24 am local time, a Learjet 60, registered N219FX, was substantially damaged in an accident near Hyannis, Massachusetts (Barnstable Municipal airport). It was an executive or corporate flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). No one was hurt; 4 people were on board or involved. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).
The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
The flightcrew's inadequate coordination and their failure to utilize checklists. Also causal was the captain's improper decision to continue the approach to a runway with insufficient length. A factor in the accident was the improper maintenance.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- July 2, 1999 · about 2:24 am local time
- Place
- Hyannis, Massachusetts · Barnstable Municipal
- Type
- Accident
- Injuries
- No one was hurt; 4 people were on board or involved.
- Weather
- visual conditions (good weather)
- Aircraft
- Learjet 60 · all 60s on the register
- Registration
- N219FX · no longer on the register · serial 007
- Damage
- Substantial damage
- Flight
- Executive or corporate flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)
The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record
The pilot in command (PIC) and first officer (FO) were on a return flight. While being vectored for the Runway 24 ILS approach, as the flaps were selected to 20 degrees and the landing gear was extended, the crew noted that the left and right amber HYDR PRESS lights began to illuminate. When the lights began to flash with more regularity, the crew discussed whether to continue or divert to another airport. The captain decided to proceed to the destination airport, with a 5,425-foot runway. After touchdown, the captain applied normal braking, but the brakes did not respond. Additionally, the crew attempted to use the reverse thrusters, which also did not respond. The captain then attempted to apply emergency braking, but the emergency brake lever would not move. The captain then requested the FO to apply emergency braking. The captain then declared he was aborting the landing, immediately after which, the FO successfully engaged the emergency brakes. The airplane proceeded off the departure end of the wet runway, struck a localizer antenna, and came to rest in a fence. Examination of the airplane revealed that the left main landing gear actuator extend hose leaked hydraulic fluid and was not torqued to specifications. According to a work item sheet, a corrective action was entered on the sheet on June 14, 'Replaced main gear actuator extend pressure hoses. Replaced uplock main gear hoses with new [Teflon] hoses.' The Airplane Flight Manual (AFM) stated that in the event of a hydraulic pressure loss, 'With no flaps, no spoilers, no thrust reversers, and no anti-skid, the landing distance will be greatly increased.' Multiply the Actual Landing Distance for Anti-Skid ON shown in Section V by a factor of 3.' The calculated landing distance, uncorrected, was 3,690 feet. The factor of three required an 11,000-foot runway. No abnormal or emergency quick reference checklists were found in the cockpit, and there was no mention of abnormal or emergency procedures in the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) transcript. An AFM, which contained an abnormal checklist and procedures section, was found in a side pocket next to the captain. Examination of company personnel files revealed that the captain had been issued an 'Employee Warning Notice,' in August 1998, for failure to follow instructions and rudeness to employees or customers. The notice also stated that numerous FO's reported that the pilot was rude and discourteous when he addressed them, and that he was not promoting good cockpit resource management (CRM). The captain had not received company CRM training. The airplane was part of a fractional ownership program and was operated under 14 CFR Part 91.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
Pilot
- Certificate: airline transport pilot
- Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instructor: airplane multi-engine; instructor: airplane single-engine; instructor: instrument airplane; instrument: airplane
- Flight time: 7,806 hours in all; 1,431 in this make and model; 129 in the last 90 days; 27 in the last 30 days; 6,619 as pilot in command; 2,590 on instruments
- Medical certificate: Class 1 (valid medical--w/ waivers/lim.)
- Seat: left
The aircraft
- Airframe total time: 4,294 hours
- Last inspection: approved inspection programme, July 1, 1999; 2 hours since
- Maximum gross weight: 23,500 lb
- Seats: 10
- Landing gear: retractable
- Engine: P&W PW300 (turbojet); 0 hours total
The flight
- Departed from: IAD Herdon VA at 1:18 am
- Destination: HYA MA
- Flight plan: IFR
- Runway 24, 5,425 ft by 150 ft
- A second pilot was aboard
Weather at the time
- Light: night, dark
- Wind: from 230° at 18 knots, gusting 25
- Visibility: 7 statute miles
- Sky: broken clouds at 1,000 ft; not recorded
- Temperature: 73°F (23°C), dew point 72°F (22°C)
- Altimeter: 30.00 inHg
- Observation at 2:36 am from HYA
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Crew | 2 | |||
| Passengers | 2 |
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
The docket, the folder of records gathered during an investigation (maintenance records, photographs, witness statements, examinations), has not been read from the NTSB for this case yet; the list appears here once it has. Open the docket at the NTSB.
Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.