Beech A36 accident near Athens, Georgia, February 26, 2008
On February 26, 2008 at about 9:45 pm local time, a Beech A36, registered N623CQ, was substantially damaged in an accident during enroute (cruise) near Athens, Georgia. It was a personal flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). No one was hurt; 2 people were on board or involved. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).
The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
The loss of propeller thrust due to the unseating of an internal propeller hub bushing. Contributing to the accident was the manufacturer's inadequate procedure to secure the bushing.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- February 26, 2008 · about 9:45 pm local time
- Place
- Athens, Georgia · map
- Type
- Accident
- Injuries
- No one was hurt; 2 people were on board or involved.
- Weather
- visual conditions (good weather)
- Aircraft
- Beech A36 · all A36s on the register
- Registration
- N623CQ · no longer on the register · serial E-1382
- Damage
- Substantial damage
- Flight
- Personal flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)
The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record
After takeoff on the first flight following a propeller overhaul, the airplane was leveled at 7,000 feet, and as the pilot and pilot-rated passenger discussed engine management, they noted the propeller rpm was high. They diverted to an alternate destination, and notified air traffic control (ATC). The propeller was adjusted but continued to overspeed. The pilot rated passenger managed engine and propeller rpm while the pilot flew the airplane at the manufacturer's best glide speed of 110 knots, but the engine continued to overspeed as the propeller provided no thrust. As propeller thrust and altitude decayed, the airplane descended through a cloud layer. When the airplane broke out beneath the cloud layer, the pilot selected a field for a forced landing area due to the fact that the surrounding terrain was wooded. Upon touchdown, the airplane bounced, the nose gear collapsed, and the airplane skidded to a stop. The pilot and pilot rated passenger stated that prior to the accident flight an annual inspection was completed and a newly overhauled propeller was installed. Disassembly of the propeller system after the accident revealed the rear pitch change rod bushing separated from the rear hub half and became loose in the hub. The bushing displayed traces of bonding sealant; however, the hub bore for the bushing did not. The hub cavity and the area on the aft side of the propeller piston, which are normally dry, contained "significant" amounts of oil. Pressurized oil on both sides of the propeller piston resulted in a hydraulic lock, fixed pitch condition. Using the as-found condition of the accident propeller system, engineers determined that airspeed of 97 knots or slower would be required to create positive thrust from the propeller system. After the accident, the propeller manufacturer revised its inspection and repair criteria, and changed the pitch change rod bushing installation procedure from one that used bonding sealants, to one that required a spiral retaining ring. The use of bonding sealants was no longer permitted.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
What happened, in order
- Powerplant sys/comp malf/fail during enroute (cruise) defining event
- Collision with terrain or object (not controlled flight into terrain) during emergency descent
The NTSB's findings
- cause Aircraft › Aircraft propeller/rotor › Propeller system › Propeller controlling system › Malfunction
- Environmental issues › Physical environment › Terrain › Rough terrain › Contributed to outcome
- cause Organizational issues › Management › Policy/procedure › Adequacy of policy/proc › Manufacturer
Pilot
- Certificate: private
- Ratings: single-engine land; instrument: airplane
- Flight time: 417 hours in all; 48 in this make and model; 39 in the last 90 days; 7 in the last 30 days; 392 as pilot in command
- Last flight review: December 14, 2007
- Medical certificate: Class 3 (with waivers/limitations)
- Seat: left
- Injury: no injuries
Co-pilot
- Certificate: commercial pilot, private
- Ratings: single-engine land; instrument: airplane
- Flight time: 1,736 hours in all; 1,207 in this make and model; 25 in the last 90 days; 1,874 as pilot in command
- Last flight review: December 6, 2006
- Medical certificate: Class 3 (with waivers/limitations)
- Seat: rgt
- Injury: no injuries
The aircraft
- Airframe total time: 1,061 hours
- Last inspection: annual inspection, February 24, 2008; 0.5 hours since
- Maximum gross weight: 3,700 lb
- Seats: 6
- Landing gear: retractable
- Engine: Cont Motor IO 520 SERIES; 0 hours total
- Operator: C & S Aviation INC
The flight
- Departed from: LZU Lawrenceville GA at 9:20 pm
- Destination: CLT Charlotte NC
- Flight plan: IFR
- A second pilot was aboard
Weather at the time
- Light: daylight
- Wind: from 280° at 17 knots, gusting 28
- Visibility: 10 statute miles
- Sky: broken clouds at 2,800 ft; clear
- Temperature: 43°F (6°C), dew point 37°F (3°C)
- Altimeter: 29.79 inHg
- Observation at 7:58 pm from AHN, 6 miles away
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Flight crew | 2 |
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
The docket, the folder of records gathered during an investigation (maintenance records, photographs, witness statements, examinations), has not been read from the NTSB for this case yet; the list appears here once it has. Open the docket at the NTSB.
Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.