Airbus Industrie A330-301 and Boeing 737-3B7 incident near Boston, Massachusetts, June 9, 2005
On June 9, 2005 at about 11:40 pm local time, 2 aircraft, Airbus Industrie A330-301 (EIORD) and Boeing 737-3B7 (N394US), were involved in the same incident near Boston, Massachusetts (Logan International airport). No one was hurt; 448 people were on board or involved. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).
The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
The local east controller's failure to follow FAA Order 7110.65, para 3-9-8 and Boston Tower Order 7110.11, Standard Operating Procedures, which resulted in a runway incursion during takeoff involving two transport category airplanes.
The local east controller's failure to follow FAA Order 7110.65, para 3-9-8 and Boston Tower Order 7110.11, Standard Operating Procedures, which resulted in a runway incursion during takeoff involving two transport category airplanes.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- June 9, 2005 · about 11:40 pm local time
- Place
- Boston, Massachusetts · Logan International · map
- Type
- Incident
- Injuries
- No one was hurt; 448 people were on board or involved.
- Weather
- visual conditions (good weather)
- Aircraft 1
- Airbus Industrie A330-301 · all A330-301s on the register
- Registration
- EIORD · no longer on the register · serial 0059
- Damage
- Not recorded
- Flight
- Flight · foreign airline rules (Part 129)
- Aircraft 2
- Boeing 737-3B7 · all 737-3B7s on the register
- Registration
- N394US · registry record · serial 23316
- Damage
- Not recorded
- Flight
- Flight · scheduled airline rules (Part 121)
The NTSB's narrative for the Airbus Industrie A330-301 final · quoted from the NTSB record
The airport was conducting operations on intersecting runways. The local east controller (LCE) was responsible for aircraft operating on runways 4R and 9, and the local west controller (LCW) was responsible for aircraft operating on runways 15R and 4L. Runway 15R intersected three active runways: 4L, 4R, and 9. The LCW was responsible for an Airbus A330, and the LCE was responsible for a Boeing 737. Both controllers were utilizing different frequencies. At 1927:51, the Airbus was instructed to taxi into position and hold on runway 15R. At 1938:24, the LCE contacted the LCW, and reported that he "observed and released" the Airbus. At 1939:10, the LCW cleared the Airbus for takeoff. Five seconds later, the LCE cleared the Boeing for takeoff from runway 9, which resulted in a runway incursion. Boston Tower Order 7110.11J, "Standard Operating Procedures" required the LCW to obtain a release from LCE in order to depart airplanes from runway 15R. Once the release was issued, LCE was required to stop operations on runways 4R and 9 until the airplane departed. Federal Aviation Administration Order 7110.65, Air Traffic Control, paragraph 3-9-8, Intersecting Runway Separation, stated in part: "Separate departing aircraft from an aircraft using an intersecting runway, or nonintersecting runways when the flight paths intersect, by ensuring that the departure does not begin takeoff roll until one of the following exists: a. The preceding aircraft has departed and passed the intersection, has crossed the departure runway, or is turning to avert any conflict... ."
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The NTSB's narrative for the Boeing 737-3B7 final · quoted from the NTSB record
The airport was conducting operations on intersecting runways. The local east controller (LCE) was responsible for aircraft operating on runways 4R and 9, and the local west controller (LCW) was responsible for aircraft operating on runways 15R and 4L. Runway 15R intersected three active runways: 4L, 4R, and 9. The LCW was responsible for an Airbus A330, and the LCE was responsible for a Boeing 737. Both controllers were utilizing different frequencies. At 1927:51, the Airbus was instructed to taxi into position and hold on runway 15R. At 1938:24, the LCE contacted the LCW, and reported that he "observed and released" the Airbus. At 1939:10, the LCW cleared the Airbus for takeoff. Five seconds later, the LCE cleared the Boeing for takeoff from runway 9, which resulted in a runway incursion. Boston Tower Order 7110.11J, "Standard Operating Procedures" required the LCW to obtain a release from LCE in order to depart airplanes from runway 15R. Once the release was issued, LCE was required to stop operations on runways 4R and 9 until the airplane departed. Federal Aviation Administration Order 7110.65, Air Traffic Control, paragraph 3-9-8, Intersecting Runway Separation, stated in part: "Separate departing aircraft from an aircraft using an intersecting runway, or nonintersecting runways when the flight paths intersect, by ensuring that the departure does not begin takeoff roll until one of the following exists: a. The preceding aircraft has departed and passed the intersection, has crossed the departure runway, or is turning to avert any conflict... ."
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record for the Airbus Industrie A330-301 from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
Pilot
- Certificate: airline transport pilot
- Ratings: multi-engine sea; instrument: airplane
- Medical certificate: Class 1
- Seat: left
- Injury: no injuries
Co-pilot
- Certificate: airline transport pilot
- Ratings: multi-engine land; instrument: airplane
- Medical certificate: Class 1 (without waivers/limitations)
- Seat: rgt
- Injury: no injuries
The aircraft
- Last inspection: continuous airworthiness programme
- Maximum gross weight: 509,000 lb
- Seats: 320
- Landing gear: retractable
- Engine 1: General Electric CF6-80E1 (turbofan); 0 hours total
- Engine 2: General Electric CF6-80E1 (turbofan); 0 hours total
The flight
- Departed from: BOS Boston MA at 11:40 pm
- Destination: EINN Shannon
- Flight plan: IFR
- Runway 15R, 10,083 ft by 150 ft
- A second pilot was aboard
Weather at the time
- Light: daylight
- Wind: from 080° at 4 knots
- Visibility: 8 statute miles
- Sky: broken clouds at 25,000 ft; a few clouds at 1,500 ft
- Temperature: 63°F (17°C), dew point 59°F (15°C)
- Altimeter: 30.10 inHg
- Observation at 11:54 pm from BOS
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Crew | 12 | |||
| Passengers | 328 |
The factual record for the Boeing 737-3B7 from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
Pilot
- Certificate: airline transport pilot
- Ratings: multi-engine land; instrument: airplane
- Flight time: 16,500 hours in all; 10,800 in this make and model; 267 in the last 90 days; 89 in the last 30 days
- Last flight review: July 1, 2004
- Medical certificate: Class 1 (with waivers/limitations)
- Seat: left
- Injury: no injuries
Co-pilot
- Certificate: airline transport pilot
- Ratings: multi-engine land; instrument: airplane
- Flight time: 17,800 hours in all; 1,200 in this make and model; 202 in the last 90 days; 73 in the last 30 days
- Last flight review: April 1, 2005
- Medical certificate: Class 1 (without waivers/limitations)
- Seat: rgt
- Injury: no injuries
The aircraft
- Airframe total time: 54,048 hours
- Last inspection: continuous airworthiness programme, April 1, 2004
- Maximum gross weight: 135,000 lb
- Seats: 132
- Landing gear: retractable
- Engine 1: General Electric CFM56-3-B1 (turbofan); 0 hours total
- Engine 2: General Motors CFM56-3-B1 (turbofan); 0 hours total
The flight
- Departed from: BOS Boston MA at 11:40 pm
- Destination: PHL Philadephia PA
- Flight plan: IFR
- Runway 09, 7,000 ft by 150 ft
- A second pilot was aboard
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Crew | 5 | |||
| Passengers | 103 |
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
The docket, the folder of records gathered during an investigation (maintenance records, photographs, witness statements, examinations), has not been read from the NTSB for this case yet; the list appears here once it has. Open the docket at the NTSB.
Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.