Boeing 747-236 accident near Providence, Rhode Island, February 28, 2000
On February 28, 2000 at about 2:00 am local time, a Boeing 747-236, registered GBDXL, was involved in an accident near Providence, Rhode Island. It was a flight of an unrecorded kind under foreign airline rules (Part 129). 1 person was seriously injured and 11 people had minor injuries; 371 others were unhurt. The weather was instrument conditions (cloud, fog or low visibility).
The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
Maintenance personnel's failure to reconnect the pitot connections to the elevator feel computer which resulted in an elevator control surface deflection which was outside of the normal autopilot elevator authority. The uncommanded autopilot input to the elevator control surface resulted from an undetermined electrical source. A factor in this accident was that the section of the 747 Maintenance Manuel utilized by company maintenance personnel did not contain an "elevator feel light test."
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- February 28, 2000 · about 2:00 am local time
- Place
- Providence, Rhode Island
- Type
- Accident
- Injuries
- 1 person was seriously injured and 11 people had minor injuries; 371 others were unhurt.
- Weather
- instrument conditions (cloud, fog or low visibility)
- Aircraft
- Boeing 747-236 · all 747-236s on the register
- Registration
- GBDXL · no longer on the register · serial 22305
- Damage
- Not recorded
- Flight
- Flight of an unrecorded kind · foreign airline rules (Part 129)
The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record
The airplane was in cruise flight when it began a descent from flight level 350. At the same time, the flight engineer was reconfiguring the airplane's electrical system from a Category III landing to a Category I landing. When the flight engineer closed the "number one bus-tie-breaker," the airplane experienced an uncommanded pitch-up, accompanied by numerous momentary instrument failures. Twelve occupants were injured. The airplane was utilizing the "A" autopilot system, which remained engaged. The pilot disconnected the autopilot, leveled the airplane, re-engaged the autopilot, and continued to an uneventful landing. During a ferry flight, maintenance personnel were able to duplicate a "sudden pitch-up" while using the airplane's "B" autopilot system, and closing the "number two bus-tie-breaker." Additionally, the flight crew reported that the airplane "felt light in pitch." Examination of data obtained from the flight data recorder and optical quick access recorder revealed an electrical discontinuity around the time of the pitch-up. An inspection of the airplane revealed that the number 1 and 2, elevator feel computer pitot connections were capped. Review of the airplane's maintenance history revealed that the airplane had recently undergone an "inter 2 check" at a British Airways maintenance facility. During that time, maintenance personnel disconnected the pitot connections to the elevator feel computer in order to perform pitot static system checks. The effect of the disconnected pitot-static lines on the elevator feel computer would have resulted in a more extreme travel of the elevator control surface. The calculated expected autopilot elevator authority for the accident flight was about 4 degrees. The estimated actual elevator deflection during the accident sequence was 6.87 degrees nose up, and 6.97 degrees nose down. Review of the Boeing basic airplane maintenance manual section that detailed the pitot-static system checks revealed a test to confirm that the elevator feel computer was reconnected and functioned. The test was not present the maintenance manual utilized by British Airways, which was provided by Boeing. The source of the pitch-up command to the autopilot was not determined; however, when the autopilot system was properly configured, the pitch-up characteristics were not objectionable and within expected values.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
Pilot
- Certificate: airline transport pilot
- Ratings: multi-engine land; instructor: airplane multi-engine; instructor: instrument airplane; instrument: airplane
- Flight time: 13,200 hours in all; 4,600 as pilot in command
- Medical certificate: Class 1 (valid medical--w/ waivers/lim.)
- Seat: left
The aircraft
- Airframe total time: 648 hours
- Last inspection: continuous airworthiness programme, February 23, 2000; 59 hours since
- Maximum gross weight: 820,000 lb
- Seats: 394
- Landing gear: retractable
- Engine: Rolls-Royce RB211-524D4 (turbofan); 0 hours total
The flight
- Departed from: LHR London OF
- Destination: JFK Jamaica NY
- Flight plan: IFR
- Runway 0
- A second pilot was aboard
Weather at the time
- Light: night, dark
- Sky: not recorded; not recorded
- Temperature: 0°F (-18°C), dew point 0°F (-18°C)
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Crew | 1 | 17 | ||
| Passengers | 1 | 10 | 354 |
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
The docket, the folder of records gathered during an investigation (maintenance records, photographs, witness statements, examinations), has not been read from the NTSB for this case yet; the list appears here once it has. Open the docket at the NTSB.
Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.