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Accidents · NTSB MIA03TA036 · Final report

Hughes OH-6 accident near New Port Richey, Florida, January 3, 2003

On January 3, 2003, a Hughes OH-6 (helicopter), registered N317LC, was substantially damaged in an accident near New Port Richey, Florida. It was a public-use flight under public-use (government) rules. No one was hurt; 2 people were on board or involved. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).

The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged

The pilot's inadequate preflight of the helicopter following maintenance he observed, and failure of maintenance personnel to tighten the "B" nut at the fuel nozzle following a compressor wash resulting in the total loss of engine power. Also, the pilot's intentional decay of main rotor rpm while attempting to clear obstructions and unsuitable terrain encountered during the forced landing resulting in a hard landing.

Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.

What the record shows

Date
January 3, 2003
Place
New Port Richey, Florida · map
Type
Accident
Injuries
No one was hurt; 2 people were on board or involved.
Weather
visual conditions (good weather)
Aircraft
Hughes OH-6 · all OH-6s on the register
Registration
N317LC · registry record · serial 68-17310
Damage
Substantial damage
Flight
Public-use flight · public-use (government) rules

The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record

The pilot stated that after takeoff while in a left turn climbing through 600 feet at 60 knots indicated airspeed, he heard a loss of engine power. He stopped the turn and noted that the engine was at flight idle as indicated by the dual tachometer. He verified the throttle was full open, and maneuvered the helicopter towards an open area. He bled off main rotor rpm to clear obstacles that were ahead, and decelerated at 10 feet above ground level. The helicopter touched down with little forward movement, coming to rest upright with the skids and tailboom separated. The helicopter was found to contain a sufficient quantity of fuel to sustain engine operation; no contaminants were reported. Examination of the engine revealed the fuel inlet line "B" nut was found loose by 2 1/2 flats at the fuel inlet nozzle. The fuel inlet line was drained and found to contain approximately 1 teaspoon of fuel while the fuel filter was full of fuel. The engine control rigging was found to be in limits. An abnormal sound was heard during testing of the aircraft fuel shutoff valve. Operational testing of the valve revealed it was operational but rotation of the valve body occurred with rotation of the valve. The engine was removed from the helicopter and transported to the manufacturer's facility. Prior to the engine run, the bleed air valve was found failed in the closed position; the internal spring was found unwound. The engine was operated in the presence of an FAA airworthiness inspector with a new bleed valve and the accident bleed valve installed; no appreciable difference was noted with respect to starting temperature, acceleration times, or stabilized operation. A customer bleed line that attaches to the scroll was found loose, it was tightened followed by engine operation. The line was loose when checked following the engine run. No significant findings were noted during the engine runs. Safety concerns prevented operation of the engine with the as-found position of the loose "B" nut at the fuel nozzle; however, a valve was installed to divert fuel from the fuel nozzle simulating the as-found position of the loose "B" nut. During the engine run, the valve was opened 1/4 and the engine operated normally. The valve was opened to 1/2 then 3/4, the engine continued to operate normally though the fuel flow increased. The valve was then fully opened and the engine flamed out. Several hours before the accident, a mechanic performed a compressor wash. It was common practice for the mechanic to clean the fuel nozzle when he performed a compressor wash.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

Pilot

  • Certificate: commercial pilot
  • Ratings: single-engine land; instrument: airplane; instrument: helicopter; rotorcraft: helicopter
  • Flight time: 5,810 hours in all; 1,015 in this make and model; 121 in the last 90 days; 38 in the last 30 days; 1,734 on instruments
  • Last flight review: January 19, 2002
  • Medical certificate: Class 2 (valid medical--w/ waivers/lim.)
  • Seat: rgt
  • Injury: no injuries

The aircraft

  • Airframe total time: 5,649.3 hours
  • Last inspection: 100-hour inspection, October 29, 2002; 49.8 hours since
  • Maximum gross weight: 2,550 lb
  • Seats: 4
  • Landing gear: fixed
  • Engine: Allison T63-A-700 (turboshaft); 0 hours total

The flight

  • Departed from: FA40 New Port Richey FL
  • Destination: FA40 New Port Richey FL
  • Flight plan: none

Weather at the time

  • Light: night, dark
  • Wind: from 190° at 4 knots
  • Visibility: 10 statute miles
  • Sky: overcast at 25,000 ft; a few clouds at 3,000 ft
  • Temperature: 64°F (18°C), dew point 63°F (17°C)
  • Altimeter: 29.98 inHg

Injuries

FatalSeriousMinorNone
Crew2

Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report

The docket, the folder of records gathered during an investigation (maintenance records, photographs, witness statements, examinations), has not been read from the NTSB for this case yet; the list appears here once it has. Open the docket at the NTSB.

Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.