Cessna 402C accident near Mercury, Nevada, March 11, 2008
On March 11, 2008 at about 4:50 am local time, a Cessna 402C, registered N594DM, was substantially damaged in an accident during enroute near Mercury, Nevada (Desert Rock airport). It was flown under charter and air-taxi rules (Part 135). No one was hurt; 1 person was on board or involved. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).
The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
A loss of power to both engines resulting from a fitting failure and leak at the right fuel selector valve that allowed fuel from the right tank to be lost overboard, and that then introduced air into the left engine's fuel lines during an attempted cross-feed operation.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- March 11, 2008 · about 4:50 am local time
- Place
- Mercury, Nevada · Desert Rock · map
- Type
- Accident
- Injuries
- No one was hurt; 1 person was on board or involved.
- Weather
- visual conditions (good weather)
- Aircraft
- Cessna 402C · all 402Cs on the register
- Registration
- N594DM · registry record · serial 402C0068
- Damage
- Substantial damage
- Flight
- Flight · charter and air-taxi rules (Part 135)
The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record
During the flight, the right fuel gauge indicated a decreasing amount of fuel while the left fuel gauge was constant. The pilot attempted to cross-feed fuel from the left tank and he set the auxiliary pumps to LOW. He saw no indication on the fuel gauge of a decrease in the left tank, and the right tank gauge continued to show a decrease in fuel. The right engine lost power; he secured the engine and feathered the propeller. Shortly thereafter, the left engine lost power. Air traffic control provided vectors to the nearest airport and the pilot managed to glide to the airport, landing gear-up on the runway. A Federal Aviation Administration inspector responded to the accident site and found 12 ounces of fuel in the right fuel tank. The left fuel tank had ruptured with significant fuel staining evidenced on the ground under the left wing. An inspection of the airplane's fuel system revealed a leak at the flexible rubber fuel hose/hose clamp at the right fuel valve. No anomalies were found in the fuel system for the left engine. The fuel system has left and right main fuel tanks in wet wings that supply their respective engines in normal flight. An auxiliary fuel pump, located outside the tank in line between the tank and the fuel selector valve, provides fuel pressure for priming during engine start and to purge fuel vapor from the lines when necessary. In the event of an engine-driven fuel pump failure, the auxiliary pumps can provide adequate fuel for engine operation. The engine-driven fuel pumps are the main pumps for the system and draw fuel by suction from the tanks through the fuel valves. Two fuel selector handles in the cockpit move the fuel valves in the wings and have positions for each main tank, cross feed, and off. During normal flight, the left selector valve is positioned to the left tank and feeds the left engine, while the right selector valve is positioned to the right tank and feeds the right engine. Fuel may be cross-fed from either main tank to the engine(s) by positioning both selector valves to the desired fuel tank. With a fitting leak on one valve, a cross-feed selection for both engines could introduce air into the operating engine's fuel lines. An "OFF" position on each valve can be selected by pushing a center button on the selector, which would stop fuel to the corresponding engine-driven fuel pump.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
What happened, in order
- Sys/Comp malf/fail (non-power) during enroute
- Fuel related during enroute
- Loss of engine power (total) during enroute defining event
- Abnormal runway contact during landing (flare/touchdown)
The NTSB's findings
- cause Aircraft › Fluids/misc hardware › Misc hardware › Hoses and tubes › Not specified
- cause Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Fuel system › Fuel transfer valve › Malfunction
Pilot
- Certificate: flight instructor, commercial pilot
- Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instructor: airplane single-engine; instructor: instrument airplane; instrument: airplane
- Flight time: 1,246 hours in all; 1,063 as pilot in command
- Last flight review: March 1, 2008
- Medical certificate: Class 1 (without waivers/limitations)
- Seat: left
- Injury: no injuries
The aircraft
- Airframe total time: 18,952 hours
- Last inspection: approved inspection programme, February 22, 2008; 15.7 hours since
- Maximum gross weight: 7,210 lb
- Seats: 2
- Landing gear: retractable
- Engine 1: Continental TSIO-520VB (piston); 0 hours total
- Engine 2: Continental TSIO-520VB (piston); 0 hours total
- Fire on the ground
- Operator: Aero Charter & Transport
The flight
- Departed from: RNO Reno NV at 3:15 am
- Destination: VGT Las Vegas NV
- Flight plan: IFR
- Runway 02, 7,515 ft by 100 ft
Weather at the time
- Light: night, dark
- Visibility: 10 statute miles
- Sky: clear
- Temperature: 50°F (10°C), dew point 19°F (-7°C)
- Altimeter: 30.27 inHg
- Observation at 4:53 am from DRA
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Flight crew | 1 |
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
The docket, the folder of records gathered during an investigation (maintenance records, photographs, witness statements, examinations), has not been read from the NTSB for this case yet; the list appears here once it has. Open the docket at the NTSB.
Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.