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Accidents · NTSB LAX06FA256 · Final report

Cessna 182P accident near Whitethorn, California, August 4, 2006

On August 4, 2006 at about 6:00 pm local time, a Cessna 182P, registered N9904E, was substantially damaged in an accident near Whitethorn, California (Shelter Cove Airport). It was a personal flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). 2 people were killed. The weather was instrument conditions (cloud, fog or low visibility).

The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged

The pilot's loss of situational awareness with regard to the airplane's proximity to mountainous terrain, and her failure to maintain an adequate terrain clearance altitude or flight path, which resulted in an in-flight collision with the terrain.

Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.

What the record shows

Date
August 4, 2006 · about 6:00 pm local time
Place
Whitethorn, California · Shelter Cove Airport · map
Type
Accident
Injuries
2 people were killed.
Weather
instrument conditions (cloud, fog or low visibility)
Aircraft
Cessna 182P · all 182Ps on the register
Registration
N9904E · no longer on the register · serial 18263964
Damage
Substantial damage
Flight
Personal flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)

The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record

The airplane impacted a mountain about 1 nautical mile from the departure airport during the en route climb phase of an instrument departure. The airport is on the coast next to the ocean with mountains immediately adjacent to the east that rise to 3,000 feet msl. A witness saw the airplane depart to the south in dense fog with the ground visibility less than 1/4-mile and follow the coastline until entering the fog layer. The witness noted that the direction of flight was unusual; typically, airplanes depart to the north, then turn left over the ocean to avoid the mountains. After the airplane entered the fog layer it climbed to about 500 to 700 feet above ground level (agl) and then made a 90-degree turn to the left toward the mountains. The airspace overlying the airport is Class G and there is no radar coverage in the area below 6,000 feet. The left-seated pilot held an instrument rating; the right-seated pilot did not. Both pilots had made flights together to this airport twice before (about 11 days prior to the accident and 2 days prior to the accident). Numerous residents around the airport reported that a dense fog surrounded the airport and cloaked the mountains. One witness stated that as he drove his automobile up the mountains away from the coastline, he came out of the clouds around 1,300 feet mean sea level (msl). Records maintained at the Automated Flight Service Station (AFSS) disclosed that the pilot contacted the facility twice for weather information. During the first call, about 3 hours prior to departure, she requested a weather briefing. The briefer advised that an AIRMET for instrument flight rule (IFR) conditions was current for the area. He then queried her, "how does it look outside?" The pilot responded by saying, "It's foggy probably visibility is less than 2." During her second telephone call, about 1 hour 45 minutes later, she was again told about the AIRMET for IFR conditions in the coastal areas and she filed an IFR flight plan requesting a direct routing and a 6,000 foot cruise altitude. She called the AFSS again and received her IFR clearance "as filed"; no heading or other departure instructions was requested by the pilot nor given in the clearance. The airport does not have a specified instrument departure. Examination of the accident site revealed that the left wing hit a tree first in a wings level, slightly nose high attitude. Post accident examinations revealed no mechanical anomalies with the airframe or engine that would have precluded normal operation. The AFSS specialist who read the IFR clearance to the pilot was given the IFR clearance by the Air Route Traffic Control Center (ARTCC) controller along with a clearance void time, but not a time check as required. When the pilot did not communicate with the radar controller on or before the void time, the controller transmitted "in the blind" and did not receive a reply. At that time, the controller should have considered the aircraft overdue and made the appropriate notifications, including issuing an Alert Notice (ALNOT), which would have initiated search and rescue efforts. However, the controller, with approval from his supervisor, removed the flight plan from the system. This action deleted any record of the flight and adversely impacted search and rescue efforts. Although the actions of the ARTCC controllers did not cause or contribute to this accident, their performance hindered the timeliness of search and rescue efforts.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

Pilot

  • Certificate: private
  • Ratings: single-engine land; instrument: airplane
  • Flight time: 710 hours in all; 589 as pilot in command
  • Medical certificate: Class 3 (with waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: left
  • Injury: fatal

Pilot

  • Certificate: private
  • Ratings: single-engine land
  • Flight time: 670 hours in all
  • Medical certificate: Class 3 (without waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: rear
  • Injury: fatal

The aircraft

  • Airframe total time: 4,206.5 hours
  • Last inspection: annual inspection, August 1, 2005; 110.3 hours since
  • Maximum gross weight: 2,950 lb
  • Seats: 4
  • Landing gear: fixed
  • Engine: Continental O-470S (piston); 0 hours total

The flight

  • Departed from: 0Q5 Whitethorn CA at 6:00 pm
  • Destination: UKI Ukiah CA
  • Flight plan: IFR
  • Runway 12, 3,400 ft by 75 ft
  • A second pilot was aboard

Weather at the time

  • Light: daylight
  • Visibility: 0.2 statute miles
  • Temperature: 64°F (18°C), dew point 50°F (10°C)
  • Altimeter: 29.90 inHg

Injuries

FatalSeriousMinorNone
Crew2

Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report

The docket, the folder of records gathered during an investigation (maintenance records, photographs, witness statements, examinations), has not been read from the NTSB for this case yet; the list appears here once it has. Open the docket at the NTSB.

Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.