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Accidents · NTSB LAX05LA131 · Final report

Schweizer SGS 2-32 accident near Mokuleia, Hawaii, April 6, 2005

On April 6, 2005 at about 11:00 pm local time, a Schweizer SGS 2-32 (glider), registered N693U, was substantially damaged in an accident near Mokuleia, Hawaii. It was an other work-use flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). 1 person was killed and 2 people had minor injuries. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).

The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged

the pilot's failure to maintain an adequate airspeed while maneuvering during a scenic flight, which led to an inadvertent stall/spin and secondary stall/spin encounter. Contributing factors were the pilot's lack of total flight experience, his inadequate flight training, and the unfavorable wind conditions.

Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.

What the record shows

Date
April 6, 2005 · about 11:00 pm local time
Place
Mokuleia, Hawaii · map
Type
Accident
Injuries
1 person was killed and 2 people had minor injuries.
Weather
visual conditions (good weather)
Aircraft
Schweizer SGS 2-32 · all SGS 2-32s on the register
Registration
N693U · no longer on the register · serial 18
Damage
Substantial damage
Flight
Other work-use flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)

The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record

During a for-hire sightseeing flight, the glider entered an inadvertent stall and spun to ground impact. The flight was conducted in an area where normal wind conditions brought trade winds that produced strong updrafts when they encountered the accident site ridgeline. On the day of the accident, the winds were described as shifty and gusting and they did not produce the updraft along the ridgeline that was most common in that area. In addition, the cloud bases would not allow for a tow greater than 2,000 feet. A witness (also a glider pilot), observed the accident glider eastbound about 400 to 500 feet above the ridge. She then noticed the glider "turn right (toward the ridge) and its nose come up slightly." The glider turned "approximately 45 degrees to the right, then turned back to the left and immediately entered a spin to the left." The witness reported that the glider rotated twice before it entered a second spin to the right. Post-accident examination of the glider revealed no anomalies that would have prevented its normal operation. A video recording of the flight revealed no anomalies with the glider. As captured during the final moments of an audio recording of the flight, the pilot's last transmission indicated that the glider was encountering a sink rate. According to the accident glider's flight manual, after spin entry, the pilot might experience one nose up and down oscillation before the stable spin occurs. The rotations are relatively slow with an altitude loss of approximately 300 feet per turn. Recovery technique was normal, except that considerably more control was needed to stop the rotation and to lower the nose. Instead of easing off back pressure on the stick, it must be pushed forward of neutral and instead of neutralizing the rudder, opposite rudder must be applied. The rotation could be stopped in 1/4 to 1/2 turn. Review of the pilot's training records and experience brought into serious question the quality of both. In less than 3 months after beginning flight training the pilot obtained his commercial pilot certificate, just 2 days after passing his private pilot check ride. Upon obtaining his commercial pilot certificate the pilot began conducting tour flights for fare-paying passengers; at this point his total flight experience amounted to 48.4 hours of flight time, of which 31.2 hours were as pilot-in-command. Review of the pilot's training records revealed he received stall/spin training on the same day he received training on a myriad of complex subjects. The operator said that when he conducted spin training with the pilot, on one occasion the pilot didn't get the control stick forward enough on a spin recovery and got into a secondary stall. The operator then had the pilot demonstrate two additional spin/spin recovery maneuvers. Federal Aviation Regulations indicated that an applicant may obtain their commercial glider certificate with as little as 25 hours of flight time and 100 flights as pilot-in-command. According to the Soaring Society of America and the Soaring Safety Foundation, it is unusual to obtain a commercial glider pilot certificate in as little time as the accident pilot, and it usually takes about 6 months to 1 year to obtain the required experience.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

Pilot

  • Certificate: commercial pilot
  • Ratings: rotorcraft: glider
  • Flight time: 48 hours in all; 7 in this make and model; 48 in the last 90 days
  • Last flight review: March 1, 2005
  • Medical certificate: None
  • Seat: frt
  • Injury: fatal

The aircraft

  • Airframe total time: 5,692 hours
  • Last inspection: 100-hour inspection, January 1, 2005
  • Maximum gross weight: 1,430 lb
  • Seats: 3
  • Landing gear: fixed
  • Engine:; 0 hours total

The flight

  • Departed from: HDH Mokuleia HI at 10:43 pm
  • Flight plan: none

Weather at the time

  • Light: daylight
  • Wind: from 090° at 2 knots, gusting 19
  • Visibility: 7 statute miles
  • Sky: broken clouds at 3,000 ft; a few clouds at 1,500 ft
  • Temperature: 70°F (21°C), dew point 70°F (21°C)
  • Altimeter: 30.14 inHg
  • Observation at 10:55 pm from HHI, 10 miles away

Injuries

FatalSeriousMinorNone
Crew1
Passengers2

Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report

The docket, the folder of records gathered during an investigation (maintenance records, photographs, witness statements, examinations), has not been read from the NTSB for this case yet; the list appears here once it has. Open the docket at the NTSB.

Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.