Bell 206B accident near Kalaheo, Hawaii, September 25, 2004
On September 25, 2004 at about 2:42 am local time, a Bell 206B (helicopter), registered N16849, was destroyed in an accident near Kalaheo, Hawaii. It was an aerial observation flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). 5 people were killed. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).
The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
The pilot's decision to continue flight under visual flight rules into an area of turbulent, reduced visibility weather conditions, which resulted in the pilot's spatial disorientation and loss of control of the helicopter. Contributing to this accident was the pilot's inexperience in assessing local weather conditions, inadequate Federal Aviation Administration surveillance of Special Federal Aviation Regulation 71 operating restrictions, and the operator's pilot-scheduling practices that likely had an adverse impact on pilot decision-making and performance.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- September 25, 2004 · about 2:42 am local time
- Place
- Kalaheo, Hawaii · map
- Type
- Accident
- Injuries
- 5 people were killed.
- Weather
- visual conditions (good weather)
- Aircraft
- Bell 206B · all 206Bs on the register
- Registration
- N16849 · no longer on the register · serial 2355
- Damage
- Destroyed
- Flight
- Aerial observation flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)
The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record
The Safety Board adopted the final report of this accident investigation, including the analysis and probable cause, on February 13, 2007. The Safety Board's full report will be available soon at http://ntsb.gov/Publictn/publictn.htm. The Aviation Accident Report number is NTSB/AAR-07/03. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- On September 24, 2004, about 1642 Hawaiian standard time, a Bell 206B helicopter, N16849, registered to and operated by Bali Hai Helicopter Tours, Inc., of Hanapepe, Hawaii, impacted mountainous terrain in Kalaheo, Hawaii, on the island of Kauai, 8.4 miles northeast of Port Allen Airport, Hanapepe. The commercial pilot and the four passengers were killed, and the helicopter was destroyed by impact forces and postimpact fire. The nonstop sightseeing air tour flight was operated under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 and visual flight rules with no flight plan filed. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed near the accident site. The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was the pilot's decision to continue flight under visual flight rules into an area of turbulent, reduced visibility weather conditions, which resulted in the pilot's spatial disorientation and loss of control of the helicopter. Contributing to this accident was the pilot's inexperience in assessing local weather conditions, inadequate Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) surveillance of Special Federal Aviation Regulation (SFAR) 71 operating restrictions, and the operator's pilot-scheduling practices that likely had an adverse impact on pilot decision-making and performance. The safety issues discussed in this report include the influence of pilot experience and operator scheduling on in-flight decision-making; the lack of FAA oversight of Part 91 air tour operators; the need for national air tour safety standards; and the lack of direct FAA surveillance of commercial air tour operators in Hawaii. Nine safety recommendations are addressed to the FAA regarding local weather-training programs for newly hired Hawaii air tour pilots; evaluation of operational practices for commercial air tour helicopter pilots; Honolulu Flight Standards District Office control of the annual safety meetings, as required under approved certificates of waiver or authorization; evaluation of the safety impact of the altitude restrictions in the State of Hawaii; national air tour safety standards; and the potential benefits of automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast technology for Hawaii air tour operators.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
Pilot
- Certificate: commercial pilot, military
- Ratings: rotorcraft: helicopter
- Flight time: 4,125 hours in all; 126 in this make and model; 2,820 as pilot in command; 800 on instruments
- Last flight review: May 1, 2004
- Medical certificate: Class 1 (without waivers/limitations)
- Seat: rgt
- Injury: fatal
The aircraft
- Airframe total time: 15,982.3 hours
- Last inspection: 100-hour inspection, September 1, 2004; 19.2 hours since
- Maximum gross weight: 3,350 lb
- Seats: 5
- Landing gear: fixed
- Engine: Allison 250-C20B (turboshaft); 0 hours total
- Fire on the ground
The flight
- Departed from: PAK Hanapepe HI at 2:05 am
- Flight plan: none
Weather at the time
- Light: daylight
- Wind: from 050° at 14 knots
- Visibility: 10 statute miles
- Sky: scat at 2,700 ft
- Temperature: 81°F (27°C), dew point 70°F (21°C)
- Altimeter: 30.00 inHg
- Observation at 2:53 am from LIH, 9 miles away
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Crew | 1 | |||
| Passengers | 4 |
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
The docket, the folder of records gathered during an investigation (maintenance records, photographs, witness statements, examinations), has not been read from the NTSB for this case yet; the list appears here once it has. Open the docket at the NTSB.
Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.