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Accidents · NTSB LAX02FA300 · Final report

Fairchild SA227-AC accident near Hawthorne, California, September 29, 2002

On September 29, 2002 at about 4:13 pm local time, a Fairchild SA227-AC, registered N343AE, was substantially damaged in an accident near Hawthorne, California (Hawthorne airport). It was flown under charter and air-taxi rules (Part 135). 1 person was seriously injured; 20 others were unhurt. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).

The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged

The pilot-in-command's failure to maintain directional control during the rejected takeoff. The loss of directional control was caused by the crew's failure to follow prescribed pretakeoff and takeoff checklist procedures to ensure the both propellers were out of the start locks. Contributing factors were the failure of the crew to follow normal company procedures during takeoff, the failure of the flightcrew to recognize an abnormal propeller condition during takeoff, and a lack of crew coordination in performing a rejected takeoff.

Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.

What the record shows

Date
September 29, 2002 · about 4:13 pm local time
Place
Hawthorne, California · Hawthorne · map
Type
Accident
Injuries
1 person was seriously injured; 20 others were unhurt.
Weather
visual conditions (good weather)
Aircraft
Fairchild SA227-AC · all SA227-ACs on the register
Registration
N343AE · no longer on the register · serial AC 554
Damage
Substantial damage
Flight
Flight · charter and air-taxi rules (Part 135)

The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record

The airplane veered off the runway during a rejected takeoff, overran an airport sign, and impacted a hangar. The captain stated that during the after start checklist he moved the power levers to disengage the start locks on the propellers. Post accident examination found that the left propeller was still in the start lock position, while the right propeller was in the normal operating range. The captain was the pilot flying (PF) and the second-in-command (SIC) was the nonflying pilot (NFP). After receiving their clearance, the PF taxied onto the runway and initiated the takeoff sequence. The SIC did not set and monitor the engine power during takeoff, as required by the company procedures. During the takeoff acceleration when the speed was between 40 and 60 knots, the captain released the nose gear steering control switch as the rudder became aerodynamically effective. When the switch was released, the airplane began immediately veering left due to the asymmetrical thrust between the left and right engine propellers. The PIC did not advise the SIC that he had lost directional control and was aborting the takeoff, as required by company procedures. The distance between where the PIC reported that he began the takeoff roll and where the first tire marks became apparent was about 630 feet, and the distance between where the marks first became apparent and where the airplane's left main landing gear tire marks exited the left side of the runway was about 220 feet. Thereafter, marks (depressions in the dirt) were noted for a 108-foot-long distance in the field located adjacent to the runway. Medium intensity tire tread marks were apparent on the parallel taxiway and the adjacent vehicle service road. These tread marks, over a 332-foot-long distance, led directly to progressively more pronounced marks and rubber transfer, and to the accident airplane's landing gear tires. Based on an examination of tire tracks and skid marks, the PIC did not reject the takeoff until the airplane approached the runway's edge, and was continuing its divergent track away from the runway's centerline. The airplane rolled on the runway through the dirt median and across a taxiway for 850 feet prior to the PIC applying moderate brakes, and evidence of heavier brake application was apparent only a few hundred feet from the impacted hangar. No evidence of preimpact mechanical failures or malfunctions was found with the propeller assemblies, nose wheel steering mechanism, or brakes.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

Pilot

  • Certificate: airline transport pilot
  • Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instrument: airplane
  • Flight time: 2,858 hours in all; 2,212 in this make and model; 81 in the last 90 days; 34 in the last 30 days; 1,182 as pilot in command; 0 on instruments
  • Last flight review: May 1, 2002
  • Medical certificate: Class 1 (without waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: left
  • Injury: no injuries

Co-pilot

  • Certificate: airline transport pilot, flight instructor
  • Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instructor: airplane multi-engine; instructor: airplane single-engine; instructor: instrument airplane; instrument: airplane
  • Flight time: 4,462 hours in all; 612 in this make and model; 215 in the last 90 days; 52 in the last 30 days; 3,756 as pilot in command; 2,347 on instruments
  • Medical certificate: Class 1 (with waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: rgt
  • Injury: no injuries

The aircraft

  • Airframe total time: 30,660 hours
  • Last inspection: continuous airworthiness programme, September 1, 2002; 23 hours since
  • Maximum gross weight: 14,500 lb
  • Seats: 21
  • Landing gear: retractable
  • Engine: Garrett TPE331-11U (turboprop); 0 hours total
  • Operator: C.A.T.S. Tours, Inc.

The flight

  • Departed from: HHR Hawthorne CA at 4:13 pm
  • Destination: GCN Grand Canyon AZ
  • Flight plan: IFR
  • Runway 25, 4,956 ft by 100 ft
  • A second pilot was aboard

Weather at the time

  • Light: daylight
  • Visibility: 10 statute miles
  • Sky: broken clouds at 5,000 ft; scat at 1,000 ft
  • Temperature: 64°F (18°C), dew point 57°F (14°C)
  • Altimeter: 29.96 inHg
  • Observation at 4:15 pm from HHR

Injuries

FatalSeriousMinorNone
Crew2
Passengers118

Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report

The docket, the folder of records gathered during an investigation (maintenance records, photographs, witness statements, examinations), has not been read from the NTSB for this case yet; the list appears here once it has. Open the docket at the NTSB.

Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.