MD Helicopters, INC. 600N accident near Fountain Hills, Arizona, August 14, 2001
On August 14, 2001 at about 3:15 pm local time, a MD Helicopters, INC. 600N, registered N70457, was substantially damaged in an accident near Fountain Hills, Arizona (Falcon Field). It was a business flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). 3 people had minor injuries; 1 other was unhurt. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).
The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
the manufacturer's pilot's failure to maintain yaw control and main rotor speed while recovering from an unusual attitude induced by the customer pilot's inadequate control inputs while maneuvering at low altitude. The manufacturer's pilot's inadequate supervision of the flight is also causal. A factor in the accident was the customer pilot's lack a familiarity with the NOTAR yaw control system.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- August 14, 2001 · about 3:15 pm local time
- Place
- Fountain Hills, Arizona · Falcon Field · map
- Type
- Accident
- Injuries
- 3 people had minor injuries; 1 other was unhurt.
- Weather
- visual conditions (good weather)
- Aircraft
- MD Helicopters, INC. 600N
- Registration
- N70457 · no longer on the register · serial RN057
- Damage
- Substantial damage
- Flight
- Business flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)
The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record
A staff pilot for the manufacturer was providing a sales demonstration flight to a potential customer's pilot when yaw control of the helicopter was lost, it entered a spin, collided with the ground, and rolled over. During the flight the customer's typical aerial application pest control flight profile was to be flown. The customer pilot flew Bell 206's currently in the mission and had no experience in the NOTAR anti-torque system. The maneuver was a simulated aerial application pass followed by a turn around. The manufacturer's pilot said the maneuver was very docile and consisted of a pass down a creek bed at 60 knots and 50 feet. The customer pilot initiated a gentle cyclic pull-up to a 10- to 15-degree nose up attitude while entering a right turn as the helicopter decelerated. At the 90 degree point in the turn, the helicopter was at 40 to 50 knots with a 30-degree or less bank angle to the right. As the nose came around in the turn, the nose tucked down to about 20 degrees below the horizon. The manufacturer's pilot took over the controls and added near full aft cyclic to level the nose; at this point, he received a low rotor warning horn (indicating a rotor droop at 95 percent or lower). Coincident with the low rotor warning, the helicopter began a right yaw rate. He added full left pedal, but the yaw rate continued at what he described as a "slow pedal turn rate," eventually completing 4 to 6 complete revolutions. At this point the helicopter began descending and he added collective. He immediately got a "power" audio warning, indicating that he was exceeding the upper power limit of the engine. The right yaw rate also increased with collective input. The pilot then modulated the collective between the low rotor warning and the excessive power warning in an attempt to both control the yaw and stop the descent. As he lowered the collective and the rotor speed began to build, the yaw would slow, but the helicopter then began descending faster. As he added collective to slow the descent, the yaw rate would increase. As the helicopter neared the ground, the yaw finally stopped; however, the helicopter was translating sideways toward a berm. The helicopter touched down on the right skid against the berm and it rolled over. The manufacturer's pilot said his hands were following on the controls as the customer pilot flew and he did not perceive any unusual control inputs. He further stated that his feet were about 1 inch from the anti-torque pedals and he did not feel any inputs from the customer pilot on the pedals. Based on his extensive flight test experience in this helicopter, the manufacturer's pilot believes that the aft cyclic input to correct the nose down pitching moment induced a rotor droop, and that the droop was the initiating event in the yaw rate onset. He does not know how low the rotor speed went, but the warning is triggered at 95 percent Nr. The lower limit of the Nr green arc is at 90 percent. The NOTAR anti-torque control system uses air from a pedal controlled jet thruster nozzle on the end of the tail boom to provide anti-torque control. Additional yaw control is provided by vertical stabilizers, which are largely effective only above 20 to 30 knots. Air is supplied to the thruster by a fan driven by a power takeoff shaft from the main transmission. There is a direct relationship between the speed of the main rotor and the speed of the fan. The pilot said he believes that the initial yaw onset was because the rotor drooped low enough to slow the fan below the speed which could supply the necessary air volume to the thruster to control the yaw and they were not fast enough for the vertical stabilizers to have any effect. After the occupants had extricated themselves from the wreckage, the customer pilot asked the pilot what had happened. He replied to them that he didn't know what happened and added, "Maybe we should have turned to the left instead." The helicopter's FAA approved Rotorcraft Flight Manual (RFM) contains several warnings about low speed maneuvering. Under the heading "Unanticipated Right Yaw", the RFM section notes that an unanticipated right yaw can occur when operating at low altitude and airspeeds below 60 knots when a pilot's attention is distracted by events outside the helicopter and sufficient control inputs are not made to adjust for changing aerodynamic conditions. The paragraph states, "If no directional or cyclic control inputs are made, a nose down pitch and a right roll may follow the right yaw." The section notes that this is most likely to occur at speeds below 60 knots in uncoordinated right turns, while flying out of trim with too much right pedal, or right turns to a downwind condition. Examination of the helicopter revealed no evidence of a preimpact malfunction or failure of the control system.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
Flight instructor
- Certificate: flight instructor, commercial pilot
- Ratings: single-engine land; instructor: helicopter; instrument: helicopter; rotorcraft: helicopter
- Flight time: 9,100 hours in all; 369 in this make and model; 137 in the last 90 days; 47 in the last 30 days; 8,800 as pilot in command; 5,000 on instruments
- Last flight review: February 18, 2000
- Medical certificate: Class 2 (valid medical--no waivers/lim.)
- Seat: left
- Injury: no injuries
Pilot
- Certificate: airline transport pilot, flight instructor
- Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instructor: airplane multi-engine; instructor: airplane single-engine; instructor: instrument helicopter; instrument: airplane; instrument: helicopter; rotorcraft: helicopter
- Flight time: 5,300 hours in all
- Last flight review: March 1, 2001
- Medical certificate: Class 1 (valid medical--w/ waivers/lim.)
- Seat: rgt
- Injury: no injuries
The aircraft
- Airframe total time: 361.2 hours
- Last inspection: annual inspection, April 13, 2001; 47 hours since
- Maximum gross weight: 4,100 lb
- Seats: 6
- Landing gear: fixed
- Engine: Rolls-Royce 250-C47M (turboshaft); 0 hours total
The flight
- Departed from: FFZ Falcon Field AZ at 2:45 pm
- A second pilot was aboard
Weather at the time
- Light: daylight
- Visibility: 50 statute miles
- Sky: broken clouds at 10,000 ft; clear
- Temperature: 0°F (-18°C), dew point 0°F (-18°C)
- Altimeter: 30.01 inHg
- Observation at 3:47 pm from FFZ, 10 miles away
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Crew | 1 | 1 | ||
| Passengers | 2 |
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
The docket, the folder of records gathered during an investigation (maintenance records, photographs, witness statements, examinations), has not been read from the NTSB for this case yet; the list appears here once it has. Open the docket at the NTSB.
Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.
