Eurocopter AS-350 BA accident near Kahului, Hawaii, April 21, 2000
On April 21, 2000 at about 7:30 pm local time, a Eurocopter AS-350 BA (helicopter), registered N6094H, was substantially damaged in an accident near Kahului, Hawaii (Kahului Airport). It was a flight of an unrecorded kind under charter and air-taxi rules (Part 135). No one was hurt; 6 people were on board or involved. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).
The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
Failure of the manufacturer to ensure proper quality control of the ignition solenoid housing chamfer area, which allowed for insufficient clamping forces between the ignition solenoid housing and T-fitting, and the eventual separation of the T-fitting, loss of fuel, and loss of engine power.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- April 21, 2000 · about 7:30 pm local time
- Place
- Kahului, Hawaii · Kahului Airport · map
- Type
- Accident
- Injuries
- No one was hurt; 6 people were on board or involved.
- Weather
- visual conditions (good weather)
- Aircraft
- Eurocopter AS-350 BA · all AS-350 BAs on the register
- Registration
- N6094H · no longer on the register · serial 2694
- Damage
- Substantial damage
- Flight
- Flight of an unrecorded kind · charter and air-taxi rules (Part 135)
The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record
The pilot attempted a run on landing after a loss of engine power over rough terrain. The helicopter bounced back into the air after initial touchdown and came to a sudden stop after a skid caught in a ditch. The pilot saw the engine oil pressure light illuminate followed by an illuminated generator light and the sound of the low rotor rpm audio. He informed his passengers that he was making a precautionary landing and briefed them on emergency procedures. After entering autorotation, he unsuccessfully attempted to restart the engine. He continued to the preselected landing zone, and after clearing obstacles, landed in an open area. One passenger seated in the back recalled smelling fuel about 15 seconds prior to the low rpm audio warning. During the on-scene inspection of the fuel system, the T-fitting was partially attached to the ignition solenoid housing. It was further noted that the safety wire was not a field installation. Maintenance personnel indicated that they had not done fieldwork in this area, and the last overhaul was conducted at the manufacturer's facilities in June 1999. The engine was later examined at the manufacturer's facility. Prior to removal of the ignition solenoid valve, T-fitting, and start drain components, manufacturer representatives confirmed that the safety wire, a swedged unit, was installed at their facility during the last overhaul. A visual inspection of the T-fitting and ignition solenoid valve revealed that the threads of both units were covered in a black substance with metallic particles sticking to the threads. The O-ring on the T-fitting was flattened with material missing from it. A metallurgical examination of the ignition solenoid valve and T-fitting was conducted. The T-fitting is made from steel, and the ignition solenoid valve is made from an aluminum alloy. The O-ring is located in a recessed groove that provides sealing between the threaded portion of the ignition solenoid valve and T-fitting. An energy dispersive x-ray spectroscopy (EDS) test indicated that the black substance found on the threads of both components contained peaks of aluminum. It also revealed that the inside threaded portion of the ignition solenoid valve housing exhibited deterioration consistent with fretting. An examination of the chamfer area of the ignition solenoid housing was outside of the manufacturer's design specifications. The chamfer area is the recessed groove in the ignition solenoid housing and is designed to guide the O-ring into position and prevent it from being pinched between the T-fitting and ignition solenoid valve once installed. The O-ring would not have seated properly during installation due to the chamfer area being outside of design specification limits. This would have prevented adequate clamping forces to be applied and may have allowed the lock nut to loosen. The engine was the placed in a test cell for an acceptance run. The engine started and ran for approximately 20 minutes while a range of acceptance tests were conducted. No discrepancies were noted with the engine run-up.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
Pilot
- Certificate: commercial pilot
- Ratings: instrument: helicopter; rotorcraft: helicopter
- Flight time: 6,811 hours in all; 4,551 in this make and model; 295 in the last 90 days; 90 in the last 30 days; 6,811 as pilot in command
- Medical certificate: Class 2 (valid medical--no waivers/lim.)
- Seat: rgt
The aircraft
- Airframe total time: 10,066 hours
- Last inspection: 100-hour inspection, April 5, 2000; 52 hours since
- Maximum gross weight: 4,630 lb
- Seats: 7
- Landing gear: fixed
- Engine: Turbomeca ARRIEL 1B (turboshaft); 0 hours total
The flight
- Departed from: OGG HI at 7:07 pm
- Runway 0
Weather at the time
- Light: daylight
- Wind: from 050° at 20 knots, gusting 16
- Visibility: 10 statute miles
- Sky: scat at 4,700 ft
- Temperature: 79°F (26°C), dew point 63°F (17°C)
- Altimeter: 30.00 inHg
- Observation at 7:54 pm from OGG, 2 miles away
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Crew | 1 | |||
| Passengers | 5 |
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
The docket, the folder of records gathered during an investigation (maintenance records, photographs, witness statements, examinations), has not been read from the NTSB for this case yet; the list appears here once it has. Open the docket at the NTSB.
Other NTSB records under N6094H the same tail number, which may have belonged to a different aircraft at the time
Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.