Gates Learjet 25B accident near Houston, Texas, January 13, 1998
On January 13, 1998 at about 2:10 pm local time, a Gates Learjet 25B, registered N627WS, was destroyed in an accident near Houston, Texas (G. Bush Intercontinental airport). It was a positioning flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). 2 people were killed. The weather was instrument conditions (cloud, fog or low visibility).
The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
The flight crew's continued descent of the airplane below the glideslope and through the published decision height without visual contact with the runway environment. Also, when the captain encountered difficulty tracking the localizer course, his improper decision to continue the approach by transferring control to the first officer instead of executing a missed approach contributed to the cause. In addition, the following were factors to the accident: (1) American Corporate Aviation's failure to provide an airworthy airplane to the flight crew following maintenance, resulting in a false glideslope indication to the first officer; (2) the flight crew's failure to follow company crew coordination procedures, which called for approach briefings and altitude callouts; and (3) the lack of an FAA requirement for a ground proximity warning system on the airplane.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- January 13, 1998 · about 2:10 pm local time
- Place
- Houston, Texas · G. Bush Intercontinental
- Type
- Accident
- Injuries
- 2 people were killed.
- Weather
- instrument conditions (cloud, fog or low visibility)
- Aircraft
- Gates Learjet 25B · all 25Bs on the register
- Registration
- N627WS · no longer on the register · serial 170
- Damage
- Destroyed
- Flight
- Positioning flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)
The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record
The flight crew was positioning the airplane in preparation for a revenue flight when it crashed 2 nautical miles (nm) short of the runway during a second instrument landing system approach in instrument meteorological conditions. Except for the final 48 seconds of the 25-minute flight, the captain was the flying pilot, and the first officer was the nonflying pilot. When the airplane was about 0.5 nm inside the outer marker on the first approach, the compass warning flag on the captain's course deviation indicator appeared, indicating that the heading display was unreliable. The airplane deviated from the localizer centerline to the left but continued to descend. After about 1 minute, during which time the airplane's track continued to diverge from the localizer centerline, the flight crew executed a missed approach. The flight crew then unsuccessfully attempted to clear the compass flag by resetting circuit breakers. The captain directed the first officer to request a second approach. Contrary to company crew coordination procedures, the flight crew did not conduct an approach briefing or make altitude callouts for either approach. Although accurate heading information was available to the captain on his radio magnetic indicator, he experienced difficulty tracking the localizer course as the airplane proceeded past the outer marker on the second approach. The captain transferred control to the first officer when the airplane was 1.9 nm inside the outer marker. The airplane then began to deviate below the glideslope. The descent continued through the published decision height of 200 feet above ground level, and the airplane struck 80-foot-tall trees. Postaccident testing revealed that the first officer's instruments were displaying a false full fly-down glideslope indication because of a failed amplifier in the navigation receiver. The glideslope deficiency was discovered 2 months before the accident by another flight crew. An FAA repair station attempted to resolve the problem and misdiagnosed it as "sticking" needles in the cockpit instruments. The operator was immediately advised of the problem. The operator's minimum equipment list for the airplane required that the problem be repaired within 10 days, but the operator improperly deferred maintenance on it for 60 days and allowed the unairworthy airplane to be flown by the accident flight crew. The airplane was not equipped with, nor was it required to be equipped with, a ground proximity warning system, which would have sounded 40 seconds before impact.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
Pilot
- Certificate: airline transport pilot, commercial pilot
- Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instrument: airplane
- Flight time: 8,777 hours in all; 2,512 in this make and model; 100 in the last 90 days; 19 in the last 30 days; 5,542 as pilot in command
- Medical certificate: Class 1 (valid medical--w/ waivers/lim.)
- Seat: left
The aircraft
- Airframe total time: 8,943 hours
- Last inspection: continuous airworthiness programme, August 31, 1997; 30 hours since
- Maximum gross weight: 15,000 lb
- Seats: 10
- Landing gear: retractable
- Engine: Ge CJ610-6 (turbojet); 0 hours total
- Fire on the ground
- Operator: American Corporate Aviation
The flight
- Departed from: HOU at 1:45 pm
- Destination: IAH
- Flight plan: IFR
- Runway 26, 9,401 ft by 150 ft
- A second pilot was aboard
Weather at the time
- Light: daylight
- Wind: from 360° at 8 knots
- Visibility: 0.2 statute miles
- Sky: broken clouds at 800 ft; scat at 200 ft
- Temperature: 147°F (64°C), dew point 145°F (63°C)
- Altimeter: 30.00 inHg
- Observation at 2:04 pm from IAH, 2 miles away
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Crew | 2 |
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
The docket, the folder of records gathered during an investigation (maintenance records, photographs, witness statements, examinations), has not been read from the NTSB for this case yet; the list appears here once it has. Open the docket at the NTSB.
Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.