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Accidents · NTSB ERA24LA216 · Final report

Apellix B1 Washing Drone accident near Orlando, Florida, February 20, 2024

On February 20, 2024 at about 7:38 pm local time, a 2024 Apellix B1 Washing Drone, registered FA33N7WLTR, was substantially damaged in an accident during maneuvering near Orlando, Florida. It was an other work-use flight under small-drone rules (Part 107). 1 person was seriously injured. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).

The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged

A failure of the sUAS’s magnetometer while operating in close proximity to commercial air conditioning equipment, which resulted in the sUAS’s erratic maneuvering. Contributing to the accident was the RPIC’s failure to input the appropriate command to disarm the sUAS and the manufacturer’s failure to include detailed information on how to disarm the sUAS in an emergency situation in their user/operator guidance documents.

Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.

What the record shows

Date
February 20, 2024 · about 7:38 pm local time
Place
Orlando, Florida · map
Type
Accident
Injuries
1 person was seriously injured.
Weather
visual conditions (good weather)
Aircraft
Apellix B1 Washing Drone, built 2024
Registration
FA33N7WLTR · no longer on the register · serial Unknown
Damage
Substantial damage
Flight
Other work-use flight · small-drone rules (Part 107)

The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record

The remote pilot in command (RPIC) reported that shortly after takeoff, the small unmanned aircraft system (sUAS) was repositioning when it started to move erratically and would not respond to given commands. The RPIC attempted to disarm the sUAS by moving the control sticks down and inward, as he was instructed during his abbreviated training; however, the sUAS did not respond to the command and continued to operate erratically. The RPIC decided to disarm the sUAS by manually grabbing the sUAS and unplugging the battery. While disarming the sUAS, the RPIC sustained serious injuries from the propeller blades. Following the accident, the operator sent the sUAS to the manufacturer for repair without authorization. As a result, the sUAS and the controller could not be examined by the NTSB after the accident. The manufacturer had recovered data from the sUAS’s flight controller after it was returned to them, and those data were forwarded to the NTSB and examined. The data showed that the sUAS remained connected to the control station during the flight and that the event log reported a compass/magnetometer error on multiple occasions. A failure in the magnetometer could result in a compass error, and the sUAS moving erratically. The data also showed that despite the RPIC’s report that he attempted to disarm the sUAS, the control sticks were never moved to the correct position to disarm the sUAS. A review of the manufacturer’s operator’s manual and user manual for the sUAS revealed that there were no instructions on how to disarm the sUAS in an emergency. Aerial imagery of the accident location showed the sUAS was operating on a hospital roof with a large rectangular structure that was consistent with a commercial air conditioning unit that could result in magnetic interference. Given this information, it is likely that the sUAS’s magnetometer failed shortly after takeoff and while in close proximity to the commercial air conditioning units, which resulted in the sUAS’s erratic movements.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

What happened, in order

  1. Loss of control in flight during maneuvering
  2. Sys/Comp malf/fail (non-power) during maneuvering defining event
  3. AC/prop/rotor contact w person during landing

The NTSB's findings

  • Personnel issues › Task performance › Use of equip/info › Use of equip/system › Pilot
  • Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Navigation system › Magnetic compass › Malfunction
  • Organizational issues › Development › Design › Policy/procedure development › Manufacturer

Pilot

  • Certificate: private, remote
  • Ratings: single-engine land
  • Flight time: 325 hours in all; 250 in this make and model
  • Last flight review: May 24, 2023
  • Medical certificate: Class 3 (without waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: none
  • Injury: serious injuries

The aircraft

  • Last inspection: inspection type not recorded
  • Maximum gross weight: 55 lb
  • Seats: 0
  • Landing gear: fixed

The flight

  • Flight plan: none

Weather at the time

  • Light: daylight
  • Wind: from 330° at 9 knots
  • Visibility: 10 statute miles
  • Sky: a few clouds at 3,000 ft
  • Temperature: 70°F (21°C), dew point 32°F (0°C)
  • Altimeter: 30.21 inHg
  • Observation at 2:53 pm from MCO, 4 miles away

Weather report (METAR): METAR KMCO 201953Z 33009KT 10SM FEW030 21/00 A3021 RMK AO2 SLP228 T02060000=

Injuries

FatalSeriousMinorNone
Flight crew1

Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report

11 documents, released by the NTSB on August 20, 2025. View them here, or download them; the NTSB redacts some personal details before release, and this site shows the NTSB's own titles rather than its file names.

#DocumentWhat it is
1 Pilot/operator Aircraft Accident Report, NTSB Form 6120.1 PDF, 11 pages View Download
2 Mor - Pilot Statement PDF, 1 page View Download
3 Mor - Operator's Manual Review PDF, 1 page View Download
4 Data Extraction Report PDF, 4 pages View Download
5 Data File from Suas DAT file Download
6 AIRDATADAT-2024-02-20_[14-37-41].CSV data file Download
7 FEB-20TH-2024-02-37PM-FLIGHT-AIRDATA.CSV data file Download
8 Google Earth Export map file Download
9 Data Viewer (Airdata Uav) video View Download
10 Mor - Apellix Suas Repair and Data Review PDF, 2 pages View Download
11 Investigative Photographs PDF, 3 pages View Download

The same docket at the NTSB · documents without a copy here are fetched from the NTSB when you open them.

Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.