Apellix B1 Washing Drone accident near Orlando, Florida, February 20, 2024
On February 20, 2024 at about 7:38 pm local time, a 2024 Apellix B1 Washing Drone, registered FA33N7WLTR, was substantially damaged in an accident during maneuvering near Orlando, Florida. It was an other work-use flight under small-drone rules (Part 107). 1 person was seriously injured. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).
The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
A failure of the sUAS’s magnetometer while operating in close proximity to commercial air conditioning equipment, which resulted in the sUAS’s erratic maneuvering. Contributing to the accident was the RPIC’s failure to input the appropriate command to disarm the sUAS and the manufacturer’s failure to include detailed information on how to disarm the sUAS in an emergency situation in their user/operator guidance documents.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- February 20, 2024 · about 7:38 pm local time
- Place
- Orlando, Florida · map
- Type
- Accident
- Injuries
- 1 person was seriously injured.
- Weather
- visual conditions (good weather)
- Aircraft
- Apellix B1 Washing Drone, built 2024
- Registration
- FA33N7WLTR · no longer on the register · serial Unknown
- Damage
- Substantial damage
- Flight
- Other work-use flight · small-drone rules (Part 107)
The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record
The remote pilot in command (RPIC) reported that shortly after takeoff, the small unmanned aircraft system (sUAS) was repositioning when it started to move erratically and would not respond to given commands. The RPIC attempted to disarm the sUAS by moving the control sticks down and inward, as he was instructed during his abbreviated training; however, the sUAS did not respond to the command and continued to operate erratically. The RPIC decided to disarm the sUAS by manually grabbing the sUAS and unplugging the battery. While disarming the sUAS, the RPIC sustained serious injuries from the propeller blades. Following the accident, the operator sent the sUAS to the manufacturer for repair without authorization. As a result, the sUAS and the controller could not be examined by the NTSB after the accident. The manufacturer had recovered data from the sUAS’s flight controller after it was returned to them, and those data were forwarded to the NTSB and examined. The data showed that the sUAS remained connected to the control station during the flight and that the event log reported a compass/magnetometer error on multiple occasions. A failure in the magnetometer could result in a compass error, and the sUAS moving erratically. The data also showed that despite the RPIC’s report that he attempted to disarm the sUAS, the control sticks were never moved to the correct position to disarm the sUAS. A review of the manufacturer’s operator’s manual and user manual for the sUAS revealed that there were no instructions on how to disarm the sUAS in an emergency. Aerial imagery of the accident location showed the sUAS was operating on a hospital roof with a large rectangular structure that was consistent with a commercial air conditioning unit that could result in magnetic interference. Given this information, it is likely that the sUAS’s magnetometer failed shortly after takeoff and while in close proximity to the commercial air conditioning units, which resulted in the sUAS’s erratic movements.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
What happened, in order
- Loss of control in flight during maneuvering
- Sys/Comp malf/fail (non-power) during maneuvering defining event
- AC/prop/rotor contact w person during landing
The NTSB's findings
- Personnel issues › Task performance › Use of equip/info › Use of equip/system › Pilot
- Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Navigation system › Magnetic compass › Malfunction
- Organizational issues › Development › Design › Policy/procedure development › Manufacturer
Pilot
- Certificate: private, remote
- Ratings: single-engine land
- Flight time: 325 hours in all; 250 in this make and model
- Last flight review: May 24, 2023
- Medical certificate: Class 3 (without waivers/limitations)
- Seat: none
- Injury: serious injuries
The aircraft
- Last inspection: inspection type not recorded
- Maximum gross weight: 55 lb
- Seats: 0
- Landing gear: fixed
The flight
- Flight plan: none
Weather at the time
- Light: daylight
- Wind: from 330° at 9 knots
- Visibility: 10 statute miles
- Sky: a few clouds at 3,000 ft
- Temperature: 70°F (21°C), dew point 32°F (0°C)
- Altimeter: 30.21 inHg
- Observation at 2:53 pm from MCO, 4 miles away
Weather report (METAR): METAR KMCO 201953Z 33009KT 10SM FEW030 21/00 A3021 RMK AO2 SLP228 T02060000=
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Flight crew | 1 |
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
11 documents, released by the NTSB on August 20, 2025. View them here, or download them; the NTSB redacts some personal details before release, and this site shows the NTSB's own titles rather than its file names.
| # | Document | What it is | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Pilot/operator Aircraft Accident Report, NTSB Form 6120.1 | PDF, 11 pages | View Download |
| 2 | Mor - Pilot Statement | PDF, 1 page | View Download |
| 3 | Mor - Operator's Manual Review | PDF, 1 page | View Download |
| 4 | Data Extraction Report | PDF, 4 pages | View Download |
| 5 | Data File from Suas | DAT file | Download |
| 6 | AIRDATADAT-2024-02-20_[14-37-41].CSV | data file | Download |
| 7 | FEB-20TH-2024-02-37PM-FLIGHT-AIRDATA.CSV | data file | Download |
| 8 | Google Earth Export | map file | Download |
| 9 | Data Viewer (Airdata Uav) | video | View Download |
| 10 | Mor - Apellix Suas Repair and Data Review | PDF, 2 pages | View Download |
| 11 | Investigative Photographs | PDF, 3 pages | View Download |
The same docket at the NTSB · documents without a copy here are fetched from the NTSB when you open them.
Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.
