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Accidents · NTSB ERA22FA026 · Final report

Piper PA-32R-300 accident near Walterboro, South Carolina, October 22, 2021

On October 22, 2021 at about 7:57 pm local time, a 1977 Piper PA-32R-300, registered N1652H, was destroyed in an accident during enroute (descent) near Walterboro, South Carolina (Lowcountry Rgnl airport). It was a personal flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). 1 person was killed and 1 person was seriously injured. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).

The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged

The pilot’s inadequate fuel planning and fuel management, which resulted in a loss of engine power due to fuel starvation.

Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 4, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.

What the record shows

Date
October 22, 2021 · about 7:57 pm local time
Place
Walterboro, South Carolina · Lowcountry Rgnl · map
Type
Accident
Injuries
1 person was killed and 1 person was seriously injured.
Weather
visual conditions (good weather)
Aircraft
Piper PA-32R-300, built 1977 · all PA-32R-300s on the register
Registration
N1652H · registry record · serial 32R-7780168
Damage
Destroyed
Flight
Personal flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)

The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record

The airplane departed from its home airport for an airport about 802 nautical miles away with the airplane’s fuel tanks filled to their total fuel capacity of 98 gallons. The pilot planned for the flight to only be a single leg, but about 1.5 hours into the flight he decided to land for fuel due to the 20-knot headwind, which he had not accounted for during his flight planning. About 2 hours and 53 minutes into the flight, the pilot advised air traffic control (ATC) that he wanted to divert for fuel and then resume his instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan to his destination. The air traffic controller cleared the pilot to fly direct to a diversion airport. When the airplane was approximately nine miles north of the diversion airport, at an assigned altitude of 1,600 feet msl, the pilot declared “Mayday” and reported a “lagging engine.” The pilot described that, when he reached 1,600 feet, he pushed the throttle forward to level off from the preceding descent, but the engine did not respond. The engine then surged (went up and back down), but it would not respond to his throttle inputs. The airplane subsequently impacted trees short of the diversion airport. During the impact sequence, the pilot was seriously injured and the passenger was fatally injured. The pilot had flown for about 3 hours, and 351 miles of the 802-mile flight, at the time of the accident. Fuel consumption calculations indicated that, depending on the power setting, more than half of the fuel load of 94 gallons of usable fuel would have been consumed before the accident (about 47.7 to 56.7 gallons, depending on power setting). This was greater than the usable fuel amount in each wing (47 gallons per side). While the pilot stated that he checked the fuel gauges every 15 minutes and would continue flying on the fuel tank that had the higher fuel indication, the Pilot’s Operating Handbook (POH) for the airplane, advised that to keep the airplane in best lateral trim during cruise flight, the fuel should be used alternately from each tank at one-hour intervals. The POH also stated, “Always remember that the electric fuel pump should be turned "ON" before switching tanks and should be left on for a short period thereafter. To preclude making a hasty selection, and to provide continuity of flow, the selector should be changed to another tank before fuel is exhausted from the tank in use. If signs of fuel starvation should occur at any time during flight, fuel exhaustion should be suspected, at which time the fuel selector should be immediately positioned to a full tank and the electric fuel pump switched to the "ON" position.” Postaccident examination of the airplane at the accident site revealed the postimpact fire had a burn pattern that appeared to initiate from the area of the right wing. Residual fuel was found in the right outboard fuel tank, and fuel staining was also present around the fuel filler port for the right wing. However, minimal thermal damage was present on the inboard leading edge of the left wing, and residual fuel and fuel staining were not evident. This physical evidence suggests that little or no fuel was present in the left wing fuel tanks, and that the majority of the fuel onboard the airplane at the time of the accident was in the right wing tanks. The postaccident examination of the engine did not reveal evidence of any preimpact failures or malfunctions that would have precluded normal operation. Based on this information, it is likely that the loss of power was due to the left wing having little or no usable fuel available, which subsequently introduced air into the fuel lines. Thus, after the loss of power, the fuel in the right wing would not have been a reliable source of fuel to quickly restore engine power. Based on the available evidence, the circumstances of the accident are consistent with fuel starvation resulting from the pilot’s mismanagement of the fuel system during the flight.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

What happened, in order

  1. Collision with terrain or object (not controlled flight into terrain) during emergency descent
  2. Fuel starvation during enroute (descent) defining event

The NTSB's findings

  • Personnel issues › Task performance › Planning/preparation › Fuel planning › Pilot
  • Aircraft › Fluids/misc hardware › Fluids › Fuel › Fluid management
  • Aircraft › Fluids/misc hardware › Fluids › Fuel › Fluid level

Pilot

  • Certificate: commercial pilot
  • Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instrument: airplane
  • Flight time: 1,967.8 hours in all; 76.4 in this make and model
  • Last flight review: October 28, 2019
  • Medical certificate: Class 2 (with waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: left
  • Injury: serious injuries

Passenger

  • Seat: rgt
  • Injury: fatal

The aircraft

  • Airframe total time: 6,049.8 hours
  • Last inspection: annual inspection, August 5, 2021
  • Maximum gross weight: 3,600 lb
  • Seats: 6
  • Landing gear: retractable
  • Engine: Lycoming IO-540-K1G5D (piston); 6,050 hours total
  • Fire on the ground

The flight

  • Departed from: EZF Fredericksburg VA at 4:56 pm
  • Destination: TMB Miami FL
  • Flight plan: IFR
  • Runway 23, 6,002 ft by 100 ft

Weather at the time

  • Light: daylight
  • Wind: from 260° at 8 knots
  • Visibility: 10 statute miles
  • Sky: scat at 3,900 ft
  • Temperature: 81°F (27°C), dew point 63°F (17°C)
  • Altimeter: 29.96 inHg
  • Observation at 3:55 pm from KRBW, 8 miles away

Weather report (METAR): KRBW 221955Z AUTO 26008KT 10SM SCT039 27/17 A2996 RMK AO2

Injuries

FatalSeriousMinorNone
Flight crew1
Passengers1

Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report

The docket, the folder of records gathered during an investigation (maintenance records, photographs, witness statements, examinations), has not been read from the NTSB for this case yet; the list appears here once it has. Open the docket at the NTSB.

About this page

Everything above comes from the NTSB's public accident database: the narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words, and the coded tables behind its report (pilot, aircraft, flight, weather, injuries, sequence of events) are written out in plain English. Pilots' ages, home towns and medical details are left out on purpose. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, the folder of records gathered during the investigation, shown as the NTSB released them (the NTSB redacts some personal details first) and listed under the NTSB's own titles. This site's own text never names pilots, passengers or anyone else involved. A preliminary report describes what is known soon after the event and can change; the final report, with the probable cause, usually follows one to two years later and this page is refreshed when it does. Case number ERA22FA026.