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Accidents · NTSB ERA21LA336 · Final report

Gulfstream Aerospace G-IV accident near Fort Lauderdale, Florida, August 21, 2021

On August 21, 2021 at about 5:40 pm local time, a 1989 Gulfstream Aerospace G-IV, registered N277GM, was substantially damaged in an accident during takeoff near Fort Lauderdale, Florida (Fort Lauderdale Executive airport). It was a personal flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). No one was hurt; 14 people were on board or involved. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).

The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged

The pilot-in-command’s (PIC) and second-in-command’s (SIC) failure during preflight inspection to ensure that the nose landing gear’s pip pin was properly installed, which resulted in separation of the pip pin during takeoff. Contributing to the accident was the ground crew supervisor’s failure to inform the PIC or SIC of the anomaly concerning the pip pin following a towing operation.

Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made November 2, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.

What the record shows

Date
August 21, 2021 · about 5:40 pm local time · cases in 2021
Place
Fort Lauderdale, Florida · Fort Lauderdale Executive · cases near this airport · map
Type
Accident
Injuries
No one was hurt; 14 people were on board or involved.
Weather
visual conditions (good weather)
Aircraft
Gulfstream Aerospace G-IV NO SERIES, built 1989 · all G-IVs on the register
Registration
N277GM · no longer on the register · serial 1124
Damage
Substantial damage
Flight
Personal flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)

The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record

The flight crew, which consisted of the pilot- and second-in-command (PIC and SIC), and a non-type-rated observer pilot, reported that during takeoff near 100 knots a violent shimmy developed at the nose landing gear (NLG). The PIC aborted the takeoff and during the abort procedure, the NLG separated. The airplane veered off the runway, and the right wing and right main landing gear struck approach lights, which resulted in substantial damage to the fuselage and right wing. The passengers and flight crew evacuated the airplane without incident through the main cabin door. Postaccident interviews revealed that following towing operations prior to the flight crew’s arrival, ground personnel were unable to get the plunger button and locking balls of the NLG’s removable pip pin to release normally. Following a brief troubleshooting effort by the ground crew, the pip pin’s plunger button remained stuck fully inward, and the locking balls remained retracted. The ground crew re-installed the pip pin through the steering collar with the upper torque link arm connected. However, with the locking balls in the retracted position, the pin was not secured in position as it should have been. Further, the ground personnel could not install the safety pin through the pip pin because the pin’s design prevented the safety pin from being inserted if the locking balls and plunger were not released. The ground personnel left the safety pin hanging from its lanyard on the right side of the NLG. The ground personnel subsequently informed their ramp supervisor of the anomaly. The supervisor reported that he informed the first arriving crewmember at the airplane (the observer pilot) that the nose pin needed to be checked. However, all three pilots reported that no ground crewmember told them about any issues with the NLG or pins. Examination of the runway environment revealed that the first item of debris located on the runway was the pip pin. Shortly after this location, tire swivel marks were located near the runway centerline, which were followed by large scrape and tire marks, leading to the separated NLG. The safety pin remained attached to the NLG via its lanyard and was undamaged. Postaccident examination and testing of the NLG and its pins revealed no evidence of preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures. The sticking of the pip pin plunger button that the ground crew reported experiencing could not be duplicated during postaccident testing. When installed on the NLG, the locking ball mechanism worked as intended, and the pip pin could not be removed by hand. Although the airplane’s preflight checklist called for a visual check of the NLG’s torque link to ensure that it was connected to the steering collar by the pip pin and that the safety pin was installed, it is likely that none of the pilots noticed that the pip pin did not have its safety pin installed during preflight. Subsequently, during the takeoff roll, without the locking balls extended, the pip pin likely moved outward and fell from its position holding the upper torque link arm. This allowed the upper torque link arm to move freely, which resulted in the violent shimmy and NLG separation. The location of the debris on the runway, tire marks, and postaccident examination and testing support this likely chain of events. Contributing to the PIC and SIC’s omission during preflight was the ground crew’s failure to directly inform the PIC or SIC that there was a problem with the NLG pip pin. The ground crew also failed to discard the malfunctioning pip pin per the airplane’s ground handling procedures and instead re-installed the pip pin. Although the observer pilot was reportedly informed of an issue with a nose gear pin, he was not qualified to act as a required flight crewmember for the airplane and was on his cell phone when he was reportedly informed of the issue by the ramp supervisor. These factors likely contributed to the miscommunication and the PIC’s and SIC’s subsequent lack of awareness of the NLG issue.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

What happened, in order

  1. Runway excursion during takeoff (rejected takeoff)
  2. Preflight or dispatch event during prior to flight
  3. Sys/Comp malf/fail (non-power) during takeoff defining event
  4. Part(s) separation from AC during takeoff (rejected takeoff)

The NTSB's findings

  • Personnel issues › Task performance › Communication (personnel) › Lack of communication › Ground crew
  • Personnel issues › Task performance › Use of equip/info › Use of checklist › Flight crew
  • Personnel issues › Task performance › Inspection › Preflight inspection › Flight crew
  • Personnel issues › Experience/knowledge › Experience/qualifications › Total experience w/ equipment › Copilot
  • Personnel issues › Experience/knowledge › Knowledge › Knowledge of equipment › Copilot

Pilot

  • Certificate: airline transport pilot, commercial pilot
  • Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instrument: airplane; rotorcraft: helicopter
  • Flight time: 20,053 hours in all; 3,120 in this make and model; 184 in the last 90 days; 49 in the last 30 days; 17,900 as pilot in command
  • Last flight review: November 2, 2020
  • Medical certificate: Class 1 (with waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: left
  • Injury: no injuries

Co-pilot

  • Certificate: airline transport pilot, commercial pilot
  • Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instructor: airplane single-engine; instrument: airplane
  • Flight time: 1,617 hours in all; 204 in this make and model; 32 in the last 90 days; 0 in the last 30 days; 943 as pilot in command; 271 on instruments
  • Last flight review: July 15, 2021
  • Medical certificate: Class 1 (without waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: rgt
  • Injury: no injuries

The aircraft

  • Airframe total time: 12,990 hours
  • Last inspection: continuous airworthiness programme, June 4, 2021
  • Maximum gross weight: 75,000 lb
  • Seats: 22
  • Landing gear: retractable
  • Engine 1: Rolls-Royc TAY MK 610-8 (turbojet); 12,382 hours total
  • Engine 2: Rolls-Royc TAY MK 610-8 (turbojet); 12,599 hours total

The flight

  • Departed from: FXE Fort Lauderdale FL at 5:40 pm
  • Destination: LAS Las Vegas NV
  • Flight plan: IFR
  • Runway 09/2, 6,002 ft by 100 ft
  • A second pilot was aboard

Weather at the time

  • Light: daylight
  • Wind: from 130° at 9 knots
  • Visibility: 10 statute miles
  • Sky: clear
  • Temperature: 93°F (34°C), dew point 73°F (23°C)
  • Altimeter: 29.99 inHg
  • Observation at 1:53 pm from FXE

Weather report (METAR): KFXE 211753Z 13009KT 10SM CLR 34/23 A2999 RMK AO2 SLP156 T03390228 10339 20283 58002

Injuries

FatalSeriousMinorNone
Flight crew4
Passengers10

Photographs from the investigation 8 pictures from the NTSB's docket, as the NTSB released them

The NTSB's photographs with the NTSB's captions, at screen size. Open a picture to see it full size or to report one that should not be shown.

Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report

24 documents, released by the NTSB on May 10, 2023. View them here, or download them; the NTSB redacts some personal details before release, and this site shows the NTSB's own titles rather than its file names.

#DocumentWhat it is
1 Flight Data Recorder Specialist's Factual Report PDF, 6 pages View Download
2 Pilot/operator Aircraft Accident Report, NTSB Form 6120.1 PDF, 11 pages View Download
3 PIC Interview Transcript PDF, 29 pages View Download
4 SIC Interview Transcript PDF, 20 pages View Download
5 Observer Pilot Interview Transcript PDF, 18 pages View Download
6 Record of Conversation (Pilot in Command) PDF, 2 pages View Download
7 Record of Conversation (SIC) PDF, 1 page View Download
8 Record of Conversation (Observer Pilot) PDF, 1 page View Download
9 Record of Conversation (FBO Ground Crew) PDF, 3 pages View Download
10 FBO Ramp Crew Statement_supervisor PDF, 1 page View Download
11 FBO Ramp Crew Statement 1 PDF, 1 page View Download
12 FBO Ramp Crew Statement 2 PDF, 1 page View Download
13 NTSB Factual Report_nose Landing Gear Examination PDF, 9 pages View Download
14 Wreckage Overview Kml map file Download
15 Excerpts of Gulfstream Publications PDF, 10 pages View Download
16 Photo Array PDF, 9 pages · our copy View Download
17 Figures for Report PDF, 4 pages View Download
18 FBO Policy Update - Aircraft Towing Procedures PDF, 1 page View Download
19 Release of Aircraft Wreckage, NTSB Form 6120.15 PDF, 1 page View Download
20 Statement of Party Representatives to NTSB Investigation PDF, 2 pages View Download
21 Video 1 - Towing Operations AVI file Download
22 Video 2 - Observer Pilot Arrival AVI file Download
23 Video 3 - SIC and Observer Walkaround AVI file Download
24 Cockpit Voice Recorder - Specialist's Factual Report PDF, 8 pages View Download

The same docket at the NTSB · documents without a copy here are fetched from the NTSB when you open them.

Connections how this case links to the rest of the register

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The whole map of how records connect · these connections as data: /graph/accident/ERA21LA336.json.

The bigger picture in Aviation Analytics: accidents over time since 1982, by model, by phase of flight and conditions, by place and on the map.

Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text does not name anyone involved, its policy at this time. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.