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Accidents · NTSB ERA21LA056 · Final report

Cessna 172 and Aero Commander 500 accident near Atlanta, Georgia, November 25, 2020

On November 25, 2020 at about 5:09 am local time, 2 aircraft, Cessna 172 (N8125U) and Aero Commander 500 (N777CM), were involved in the same accident near Atlanta, Georgia (Dekalb-Peachtree Airport). No one was hurt; 2 people were on board or involved. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).

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The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged

The Cessna pilot’s failure to tune his radio to the common traffic advisory frequency, which resulted in a lack of awareness of the other aircraft operating at the airport. Contributing to the accident was the Cessna pilot’s lack of understanding of the airport lighting system.
The Cessna pilot’s failure to tune his radio to the common traffic advisory frequency, which resulted in a lack of awareness of the other aircraft operating at the airport. Contributing to the accident was the Cessna pilot’s lack of understanding of the airport lighting system.

Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 4, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.

What the record shows

Date
November 25, 2020 · about 5:09 am local time
Place
Atlanta, Georgia · Dekalb-Peachtree Airport · map
Type
Accident · collision on the ground
Injuries
No one was hurt; 2 people were on board or involved.
Weather
visual conditions (good weather)
Aircraft 1
Cessna 172 F, built 1964 · all 172s on the register
Registration
N8125U · registry record · serial 17252025
Damage
Substantial damage
Flight
Personal flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)
Aircraft 2
Aero Commander 500 B, built 1964 · all 500s on the register
Registration
N777CM · registry record · serial 1412-147
Damage
Minor damage
Flight
Business flight · charter and air-taxi rules (Part 135)

The NTSB's narrative for the Cessna 172 final · quoted from the NTSB record

The private pilot of the Cessna was landing while the airline transport pilot of the Aero Commander was landing on the opposite runway during night visual meteorological conditions, after the airport control tower had closed. The Cessna pilot activated the runway approach lighting system and mistakenly believed that the green threshold lights indicated the direction for landing on the active runway. The pilot-controlled lighting system used a separate radio frequency from the common traffic advisory frequency (CTAF) at this airport. The Cessna pilot stated that he then “switched radio channels” and made “routine calls.” The Aero Commander pilot made radio announcements on the CTAF during each leg of the traffic pattern, announcing his location and intentions. Contrary to the Cessna pilot’s belief that the green lights he observed indicated the active runway (and the one on which he intended to land), they denoted the location of the (displaced) runway threshold of the adjacent runway. During landing rollout, the right-wing tip of the Cessna contacted the underside of the right wing of the Aero Commander, which had landed on the opposite runway, resulting in substantial damage to the Cessna’s right wing. The Cessna pilot reported that he did not hear any radio transmission from other aircraft operating at the time, and the pilot of the Aero Commander did not hear any radio transmissions from the Cessna pilot. Audio recordings of the CTAF frequency captured the radio transmissions made by the Aero Commander pilot (and other traffic) but did not capture any transmissions from the Cessna pilot. It is therefore likely that the Cessna pilot kept his single communications radio tuned to the pilot-controlled lighting frequency rather than change it to the CTAF as indicated in the airport/facility directory, which resulted in his communications not being heard by other pilots in the vicinity and his lack of awareness of the Aero Commander pilot’s position.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The NTSB's narrative for the Aero Commander 500 final · quoted from the NTSB record

The private pilot of the Cessna was landing while the airline transport pilot of the Aero Commander was landing on the opposite runway during night visual meteorological conditions, after the airport control tower had closed. The Cessna pilot activated the runway approach lighting system and mistakenly believed that the green threshold lights indicated the direction for landing on the active runway. The pilot-controlled lighting system used a separate radio frequency from the common traffic advisory frequency (CTAF) at this airport. The Cessna pilot stated that he then “switched radio channels” and made “routine calls.” The Aero Commander pilot made radio announcements on the CTAF during each leg of the traffic pattern, announcing his location and intentions. Contrary to the Cessna pilot’s belief that the green lights he observed indicated the active runway (and the one on which he intended to land), they denoted the location of the (displaced) runway threshold of the adjacent runway. During landing rollout, the right-wing tip of the Cessna contacted the underside of the right wing of the Aero Commander, which had landed on the opposite runway, resulting in substantial damage to the Cessna’s right wing. The Cessna pilot reported that he did not hear any radio transmission from other aircraft operating at the time, and the pilot of the Aero Commander did not hear any radio transmissions from the Cessna pilot. Audio recordings of the CTAF frequency captured the radio transmissions made by the Aero Commander pilot (and other traffic) but did not capture any transmissions from the Cessna pilot. It is therefore likely that the Cessna pilot kept his single communications radio tuned to the pilot-controlled lighting frequency rather than change it to the CTAF as indicated in the airport/facility directory, which resulted in his communications not being heard by other pilots in the vicinity and his lack of awareness of the Aero Commander pilot’s position.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The factual record for the Cessna 172 from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

What happened, in order

  1. Collision during takeoff/land during landing (landing roll) defining event

The NTSB's findings

  • Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action › Forgotten action/omission › Pilot
  • Personnel issues › Experience/knowledge › Knowledge › Aeronautical knowledge › Pilot
  • Environmental issues › Operating environment › Communication system › VHF/HF radio › Compliance w/ procedure

Pilot

  • Certificate: private
  • Ratings: single-engine land
  • Flight time: 580 hours in all
  • Medical certificate: BasicMed
  • Seat: left
  • Injury: no injuries

The aircraft

  • Airframe total time: 6,021 hours
  • Last inspection: annual inspection, June 1, 2020; 15 hours since
  • Maximum gross weight: 2,300 lb
  • Seats: 4
  • Landing gear: fixed
  • Engine: Continental Motors O-300D (piston); 0 hours total

The flight

  • Departed from: SAV Savannah GA at 3:00 am
  • Flight plan: none
  • Runway 21L, 6,001 ft by 100 ft

Weather at the time

  • Light: night
  • Wind: from 090° at 5 knots
  • Visibility: 10 statute miles
  • Sky: clear
  • Temperature: 46°F (8°C), dew point 36°F (2°C)
  • Altimeter: 30.26 inHg
  • Observation at 11:53 pm from PDK

Weather report (METAR): KPDK 250453Z AUTO 09005KT 10SM CLR 08/02 A3026 RMK AO2 SLP252 T00830022 401440017

Injuries

FatalSeriousMinorNone
Flig1

The factual record for the Aero Commander 500 from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

What happened, in order

  1. Collision during takeoff/land during landing (landing roll)

The NTSB's findings

  • Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action › Forgotten action/omission › Pilot of other aircraft
  • Personnel issues › Experience/knowledge › Knowledge › Aeronautical knowledge › Pilot of other aircraft
  • Environmental issues › Operating environment › Communication system › VHF/HF radio › Compliance w/ procedure

Pilot

  • Certificate: airline transport pilot
  • Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instrument: airplane
  • Flight time: 11,500 hours in all; 3,500 in this make and model; 150 in the last 90 days; 50 in the last 30 days
  • Last flight review: June 30, 2020
  • Medical certificate: Class 2 (with waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: left
  • Injury: no injuries

The aircraft

  • Airframe total time: 24,520 hours
  • Last inspection: approved inspection programme, September 18, 2020
  • Maximum gross weight: 6,750 lb
  • Seats: 2
  • Landing gear: retractable
  • Engine 1: Lycoming IO-540-E1A5 (piston); 28,899 hours total
  • Engine 2: Lycoming IO-540-E1A5 (piston); 18,877 hours total
  • Operator: Central Air Southwest

The flight

  • Departed from: BHM Birmingham AL at 6:00 am
  • Flight plan: IFR

Injuries

FatalSeriousMinorNone
Flig1

Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report

The docket, the folder of records gathered during an investigation (maintenance records, photographs, witness statements, examinations), has not been read from the NTSB for this case yet; the list appears here once it has. Open the docket at the NTSB.

About this page

Everything above comes from the NTSB's public accident database: the narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words, and the coded tables behind its report (pilot, aircraft, flight, weather, injuries, sequence of events) are written out in plain English. Pilots' ages, home towns and medical details are left out on purpose. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, the folder of records gathered during the investigation, shown as the NTSB released them (the NTSB redacts some personal details first) and listed under the NTSB's own titles. This site's own text never names pilots, passengers or anyone else involved. A preliminary report describes what is known soon after the event and can change; the final report, with the probable cause, usually follows one to two years later and this page is refreshed when it does. Case number ERA21LA056.