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Accidents · NTSB ERA19FA248 · Final report

Textron Aviation Inc 680A accident near Elizabethton, Tennessee, August 15, 2019

On August 15, 2019 at about 7:37 pm local time, a 2015 Textron Aviation Inc 680A, registered N8JR, was destroyed in an accident during landing near Elizabethton, Tennessee (Elizabethton Muni airport). It was a business flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). 3 people had minor injuries; 2 others were unhurt. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).

The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged

The pilot's continuation of an unstabilized approach despite recognizing associated cues and the flight crew's decision not to initiate a go-around before touchdown, which resulted in a bounced landing, a loss of airplane control, a landing gear collapse, and a runway excursion. Contributing to the accident was the pilot's failure to deploy the speedbrakes during the initial touchdown, which may have prevented the runway excursion, and the pilot's attempt to go around after deployment of the thrust reversers.

Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made November 2, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.

What the record shows

Date
August 15, 2019 · about 7:37 pm local time · cases in 2019
Place
Elizabethton, Tennessee · Elizabethton Muni · cases near this airport · map
Type
Accident
Injuries
3 people had minor injuries; 2 others were unhurt.
Weather
visual conditions (good weather)
Aircraft
Textron Aviation Inc 680A, built 2015
Registration
N8JR · no longer on the register · serial 680A0010
Damage
Destroyed
Flight
Business flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)

The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record

The pilots were conducting a visual flight rules cross-country flight with three passengers onboard. The preflight, departure, and cruise portions of the flight were uneventful. During the initial approach to the airport, the flight crew discussed having some difficulty visually acquiring the airport. They also discussed traffic in the area and were maneuvering around clouds, which may have increased the pilots' workload. As the approach continued, the airplane crossed a ridgeline at 710 ft above ground level (agl), which triggered a terrain awareness and warning system (TAWS) alert. Further, the flight crew made several comments about the airplane flying too fast and allowed the airspeed to increase well above the reference speed (Vref) for the approach. At 1535:57 (about 1 minute 52 seconds before landing), the pilot pulled back the throttles to idle, where they stayed for the remainder of the approach. In an attempt to slow the airplane for landing, the pilot partially extended the speedbrakes when the airplane was below 500 ft agl, which is prohibited in the airplane flight manual (AFM). Five seconds before touchdown, the airplane's descent rate was 1,500 ft per minute (fpm), which exceeded the maximum allowed for landing per the AFM of 600 fpm. When the airplane first touched down, it was traveling about 18 knots above Vref. The pilot did not extend the speedbrakes upon touchdown, which the landing checklist required, but instead attempted to deploy the thrust reversers immediately after touchdown, which was a later item on the landing checklist. However, the thrust reversers did not unlock because the airplane bounced and was airborne again before the command could be executed, which was consistent with system design and logic: the thrust reversers will not unlock until all three landing gear are on the ground. The airplane touched down four times total; on the third touchdown (after the second bounce), when all three landing gear contacted the runway, the thrust reversers unlocked as previously commanded during the first touchdown. Although the pilot subsequently advanced the throttles to idle, which would normally stow the thrust reversers, the airplane had bounced a third time and had already become airborne again before the thrust reversers could stow. When the airplane became airborne, the system logic cut hydraulic power to the thrust reverser actuators; thus the reversers would not stow. The thrust reversers were subsequently pulled open due to the aerodynamic forces. The pilot attempted to go around by advancing the throttles when the airplane was airborne. However, the electronic engine controls prevented the increase in engine power because the thrust reversers were not stowed. When the airplane touched down the fourth and final time, the pilot attempted to land straight ahead on the runway; the airplane touched down hard and the right main landing gear then collapsed under the wing. The airplane departed the paved surface and came to rest about 600 ft beyond the runway threshold. The passengers and crew eventually evacuated the airplane through the main cabin door, and the airplane was destroyed in a postaccident fire. A postaccident examination of the airplane systems, structure, powerplants, and landing gear revealed no evidence of mechanical malfunctions or anomalies that would have precluded normal operation. The airplane's approach was unstabilized: its airspeed during the approach and landing well exceeded Vref and its descent rate exceeded the maximum allowed for landing just seconds before touchdown. Both the pilot and copilot commented on the airplane's high speed several times during the approach. During short final, the pilot asked the copilot if he should go around, and the copilot responded, "no." Although the copilot was the director of operations for the flight department and the direct supervisor of the pilot, the pilot stated that the copilot's position did not influence his decisions as pilot-in-command nor did it diminish his command authority. Neither the pilot nor copilot called for a go-around before landing despite awareness that the approach was unstabilized. As the airplane touched down, the pilot failed to follow the AFM guidance and used the thrust reversers before the speedbrakes. According to the airplane manufacturer's calculations, the airplane could have stopped within the length of runway available if the airplane had not bounced and the speedbrakes and wheel brakes were used at the point of the first touchdown. After the third touchdown, when the airplane became airborne again, the pilot attempted a go-around; the AFM prohibits touch-and-go landings after the thrust reversers are deployed. It is critical for pilots to know the point at which they should not attempt a go-around; a committed-to-stop (CTS) point is the point at which a go-around or rejected landing procedure will not be initiated and the only option will be bringing the aircraft to a stop. Establishing a CTS point eliminates the ambiguity for pilots making decisions during time-critical events. The FAA issued Information for Operators 17009, "Committed-to-Stop Point on Landings," to inform operators and pilots about the importance of establishing a CTS point; however, the director of operations was not aware of the concept of a CTS point during landing.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

What happened, in order

  1. Hard landing during landing (flare/touchdown)
  2. Abnormal runway contact during landing (flare/touchdown)
  3. Landing gear collapse during landing (flare/touchdown)
  4. Runway excursion during landing defining event
  5. Collision with terrain or object (not controlled flight into terrain) during landing (landing roll)
  6. Fire/smoke (post-impact) during post (impact)

The NTSB's findings

  • cause Aircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability › Performance/control parameters › Airspeed › Not attained/maintained
  • cause Aircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability › Performance/control parameters › Descent rate › Not attained/maintained
  • cause Personnel issues › Action/decision › Info processing/decision › Decision making/judgment › Pilot
  • cause Personnel issues › Task performance › Use of equip/info › Aircraft control › Pilot
  • factor Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action › Incorrect action sequence › Pilot
  • factor Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action › Lack of action › Pilot
  • factor Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action › Delayed action › Pilot

Pilot

  • Certificate: airline transport pilot, commercial pilot
  • Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; single-engine sea; instructor: airplane single-engine; instrument: airplane
  • Flight time: 5,800 hours in all; 765 in this make and model
  • Last flight review: October 24, 2018
  • Medical certificate: Class 1 (with waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: left
  • Injury: no injuries

Co-pilot

  • Certificate: airline transport pilot, commercial pilot
  • Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instrument: airplane
  • Flight time: 11,000 hours in all; 1,165 in this make and model
  • Last flight review: October 24, 2018
  • Medical certificate: Class 2 (without waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: rgt
  • Injury: no injuries

The aircraft

  • Airframe total time: 1,165 hours
  • Last inspection: continuous airworthiness programme, July 26, 2019; 17 hours since
  • Maximum gross weight: 31,025 lb
  • Seats: 11
  • Landing gear: retractable
  • Engine 1: P&W Canada 306D1 (turbofan); 1,165 hours total
  • Engine 2: P&W Canada 306D1 (turbofan); 1,165 hours total
  • Fire on the ground
  • Operator: Jrm Air LLC

The flight

  • Departed from: SVH Statesville NC at 7:19 pm
  • Destination: 0A9 Elizabethton TN
  • Flight plan: none
  • Runway 24, 5,001 ft by 75 ft
  • A second pilot was aboard

Weather at the time

  • Light: daylight
  • Visibility: 10 statute miles
  • Sky: broken clouds at 7,000 ft; scat at 4,700 ft
  • Temperature: 84°F (29°C), dew point 66°F (19°C)
  • Altimeter: 29.96 inHg
  • Observation at 7:35 pm from K0A9, 1 miles away

Injuries

FatalSeriousMinorNone
Flight crew2
Passengers3

Photographs from the investigation 20 pictures from the NTSB's docket, as the NTSB released them

The NTSB's photographs with the NTSB's captions, at screen size. Open a picture to see it full size or to report one that should not be shown.

Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report

33 documents, released by the NTSB on July 16, 2020. View them here, or download them; the NTSB redacts some personal details before release, and this site shows the NTSB's own titles rather than its file names.

#DocumentWhat it is
1 Pilot/operator Aircraft Accident Report, NTSB Form 6120.1 PDF, 11 pages View Download
2 Flight Crew Written Statements PDF, 4 pages View Download
3 NTSB Record of Conversation - Flight Crew Interview PDF, 3 pages View Download
4 NTSB Record of Conversation - Passengers Interview PDF, 2 pages View Download
5 Witness Statements PDF, 6 pages View Download
6 NTSB Memorandum for Record - Pope PDF, 2 pages View Download
7 NTSB Memorandum for Record - Pope Interview 2 PDF, 2 pages View Download
8 NTSB Memorandum for Record - Melton 1 PDF, 1 page View Download
9 NTSB Memorandum for Record - Melton 2 PDF, 2 pages View Download
10 Initial Training Records - PIC PDF, 4 pages View Download
11 Recurrent Training Records - PIC PDF, 2 pages View Download
12 Initial and Recurrent Training Records - SIC PDF, 8 pages View Download
13 Recurrent Training Records - SIC PDF, 4 pages View Download
14 Tru Simulation Thrust Reverser System Training Module PDF, 2 pages View Download
15 Excerpts - Latitude AFM PDF, 3 pages View Download
16 Excerpts - Operating Manual PDF, 7 pages View Download
17 Excerpts - Maintenance Records PDF, 16 pages View Download
18 Weather Information PDF, 4 pages View Download
19 Notams PDF, 1 page View Download
20 Excerpt - Airport Supplement PDF, 1 page View Download
21 NTSB Memorandum for Record - Airport Information PDF, 1 page View Download
22 Photo Array PDF, 20 pages · our copy View Download
23 Wreckage Path PDF, 1 page View Download
24 NTSB Examination Summary PDF, 13 pages View Download
25 Textron Ares Data Review PDF, 27 pages View Download
26 Ares Data 4-06-2019 data file Download
27 Ares Data Accident Flight data file Download
28 Textron Technical Report PDF, 8 pages View Download
29 P&wc Accident Report PDF, 55 pages View Download
30 Cockpit Displays - Specialist's Factual Report PDF, 9 pages View Download
31 Cockpit Displays - Attachment 1 (Compressed Tabular Data for Event Flight) data file Download
32 Statement of Party Representatives to NTSB Investigation PDF, 14 pages View Download
33 Cockpit Voice Recorder - Group Chairman's Factual Report PDF, 23 pages View Download

The same docket at the NTSB · documents without a copy here are fetched from the NTSB when you open them.

Connections how this case links to the rest of the register

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The whole map of how records connect · these connections as data: /graph/accident/ERA19FA248.json.

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Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text does not name anyone involved, its policy at this time. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.

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