Maule M7 accident near Floresville, Texas, September 11, 2018
On September 11, 2018 at about 9:37 pm local time, a 2003 Maule M7, registered N969AW, was substantially damaged in an accident during landing (landing roll) near Floresville, Texas (Private airport). It was an instructional flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). No one was hurt; 2 people were on board or involved. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).
The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
The separation of the left inboard main landing gear (MLG) attachment bolt due to insufficient torque, which resulted in the collapse of the left MLG.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 4, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- September 11, 2018 · about 9:37 pm local time
- Place
- Floresville, Texas · Private · map
- Type
- Accident
- Injuries
- No one was hurt; 2 people were on board or involved.
- Weather
- visual conditions (good weather)
- Aircraft
- Maule M7 235C, built 2003 · all M7s on the register
- Registration
- N969AW · registry record · serial 25093C
- Damage
- Substantial damage
- Flight
- Instructional flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)
The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record
The flight instructor and the private pilot-rated student, who was in the left seat and was also the airplane owner, were practicing approaches. Upon landing, the pilots heard a loud popping noise, and the instructor then initiated a go-around. Subsequently, the pilot felt vibration under the floorboard. The pilots thought that a tire might have blown. The instructor flew the approach and conducted a three-point landing, and just before the airplane came to a stop, the left main landing gear (MLG) collapsed, which resulted in substantial damage to the left wing. An examination of the left MLG revealed that its inboard attachment bolt and nut were missing. After the accident, the bolt was found along the path of the landing rollout. Examination of the attachment bolt revealed that the bolt threads were undamaged. The attachment nut was not found. The right MLG's inboard attachment bolt and nut were found still attached; however, they were loose, with only two to three threads visible past the nut. The inboard attachment bolts were upgraded high-strength bolts. The airframe manufacturer had issued a service letter (SL) that stated that, when using the high-strength bolts, the outboard attachment bolts required the same amount of torque as indicated in the airplane maintenance manual but that the inboard attachment bolts required a higher torque amount than the standard bolts. However, a review of the maintenance manual revealed that it did not include the new, higher torque requirements specified in the SL. Therefore, mechanics who only follow the maintenance manual may not be aware that higher torque values are required. A review of the airplane maintenance records revealed that its last annual inspection was completed about 6 months before the accident. The mechanic who performed the inspection reported that he did not verify the torque on the bolts, that he only used his hands to confirm that they were secure, and that he did not reference the SL during the inspection. It could not be determined whether the mechanic's failure to verify the torque on the bolts or the insufficient torque values in the MM led to the torque on the left inboard MLG attachment bolt being insufficient and the resultant collapse of the left MLG.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
What happened, in order
- Aircraft maintenance event during prior to flight
- Part(s) separation from AC during landing (landing roll)
- Landing gear collapse during landing (landing roll) defining event
The NTSB's findings
- cause Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Landing gear system › Main landing gear attach sec › Incorrect service/maintenance
- Aircraft › Aircraft handling/service › Maintenance/inspections › Scheduled maint checks › Related maintenance info
- Personnel issues › Task performance › Maintenance › Scheduled/routine maintenance › Other/unknown
- Personnel issues › Task performance › Use of equip/info › Use of available resources › Other/unknown
Flight instructor
- Certificate: flight instructor, commercial pilot
- Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instructor: airplane multi-engine; instructor: airplane single-engine; instructor: instrument airplane; instrument: airplane
- Flight time: 5,100 hours in all
- Medical certificate: Class 2 (with waivers/limitations)
- Seat: rgt
- Injury: no injuries
Dual student
- Certificate: private
- Ratings: single-engine land; instrument: airplane
- Flight time: 515 hours in all
- Medical certificate: Class 3 (without waivers/limitations)
- Seat: left
- Injury: no injuries
The aircraft
- Airframe total time: 1,975 hours
- Last inspection: annual inspection, April 30, 2018
- Maximum gross weight: 2,500 lb
- Seats: 4
- Landing gear: fixed
- Engine: Lycoming IO-540 Series (piston); 0 hours total
The flight
- Departed from: N/A Floresville TX
- Destination: N/A Floresville TX
- Flight plan: none
- A second pilot was aboard
Weather at the time
- Light: daylight
- Wind: from 360° at 5 knots
- Visibility: 10 statute miles
- Sky: broken clouds at 5,500 ft; scat at 3,300 ft
- Temperature: 82°F (28°C), dew point 70°F (21°C)
- Altimeter: 29.87 inHg
- Observation at 9:53 pm from SSF, 20 miles away
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Flight crew | 2 |
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
The docket, the folder of records gathered during an investigation (maintenance records, photographs, witness statements, examinations), has not been read from the NTSB for this case yet; the list appears here once it has. Open the docket at the NTSB.
About this page
Everything above comes from the NTSB's public accident database: the narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words, and the coded tables behind its report (pilot, aircraft, flight, weather, injuries, sequence of events) are written out in plain English. Pilots' ages, home towns and medical details are left out on purpose. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, the folder of records gathered during the investigation, shown as the NTSB released them (the NTSB redacts some personal details first) and listed under the NTSB's own titles. This site's own text never names pilots, passengers or anyone else involved. A preliminary report describes what is known soon after the event and can change; the final report, with the probable cause, usually follows one to two years later and this page is refreshed when it does. Case number ERA18LA270.
