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Accidents · NTSB ERA17LA332 · Final report

Robinson Helicopter R22 and Piper PA 28R-201 mid-air collision near Clearwater, Florida, September 23, 2017

On September 23, 2017 at about 9:02 pm local time, 2 aircraft, Robinson Helicopter R22 (N404TB) and Piper PA 28R-201 (N1881H), were involved in a mid-air collision near Clearwater, Florida (Clearwater Air Park airport). 1 person had minor injuries; 2 others were unhurt. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).

The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged

The airplane pilot's inadequate visual lookout, which resulted in an in-flight collision with a helicopter. Contributing to the accident was the airplane pilot's failure to adequately transmit his position while operating in the airport traffic pattern.
The airplane pilot's inadequate visual lookout, which resulted in an in-flight collision with a helicopter. Contributing to the accident was the airplane pilot's failure to adequately transmit his position while operating in the airport traffic pattern.

Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.

What the record shows

Date
September 23, 2017 · about 9:02 pm local time
Place
Clearwater, Florida · Clearwater Air Park · map
Type
Accident · mid-air collision
Injuries
1 person had minor injuries; 2 others were unhurt.
Weather
visual conditions (good weather)
Aircraft 1
Robinson Helicopter R22 Beta, built 2005 · all R22s on the register
Registration
N404TB · no longer on the register · serial 3747
Damage
Substantial damage
Flight
Instructional flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)
Aircraft 2
Piper PA 28R-201 201, built 1977 · all PA 28R-201s on the register
Registration
N1881H · no longer on the register · serial 28R-7737015
Damage
Substantial damage
Flight
Personal flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)

The NTSB's narrative for the Robinson Helicopter R22 final · quoted from the NTSB record

A private pilot in a fixed-wing airplane was landing at the airport following a personal flight, and a flight instructor and a pilot receiving instruction were conducting a flight review in a helicopter and practicing maneuvers in the airport traffic pattern. The instructor reported that he or the pilot receiving instruction made radio calls on the common traffic advisory frequency (CTAF) before each turn in the pattern. When the helicopter was 1 mile from the runway, the pilot receiving instruction turned the helicopter onto final approach. After completing a steep approach, the pilot receiving instruction brought the helicopter into a hover about 15 ft above the runway threshold. The airplane pilot stated that he heard a heavy buzzing sound on the CTAF, like a helicopter rotor, and a barely distinguishable word; he scanned for traffic and declared being on downwind. The airplane pilot quickly turned to the base leg of the traffic pattern and then proceeded to land; the airplane then struck the helicopter from behind as the airplane landed on the same runway as the helicopter. The pilots of both aircraft reported scanning for traffic; however, the airplane pilot reported that he did not see the helicopter until about 2 seconds before the collision, while the flight instructor and pilot receiving instruction in the helicopter did not see the airplane before the collision, as the helicopter was oriented down the runway with its tail pointed toward the runway's approach end. Given that the airplane struck the helicopter from behind while landing, it is unlikely that the helicopter pilots were in a position to see and take action to avoid the airplane. Conversely, because of the airplane's position, the airplane pilot had the best opportunity to see and take action to avoid the helicopter. Postaccident examinations of the radio communication systems in the airplane and helicopter did not reveal any anomalies. The instructor in the helicopter indicated that radio calls were made during every turn while the helicopter was in the airport traffic pattern. The airplane pilot indicated that he was operating on the CTAF and that he was confident his calls on the radio were heard. However, the pilot of another airplane who was about 2 miles west of the airport and was monitoring the airport's CTAF recalled hearing a radio call from the helicopter announcing that it was on a 1-mile final approach to the runway at 500 ft but did not recall hearing any transmissions from the airplane. Thus, given that the airplane pilot's transmissions were not heard, it is likely that he did not adequately transmit the airplane's position while in the airport traffic pattern.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The NTSB's narrative for the Piper PA 28R-201 final · quoted from the NTSB record

A private pilot in a fixed-wing airplane was landing at the airport following a personal flight, and a flight instructor and a pilot receiving instruction were conducting a flight review in a helicopter and practicing maneuvers in the airport traffic pattern. The instructor reported that he or the pilot receiving instruction made radio calls on the common traffic advisory frequency (CTAF) before each turn in the pattern. When the helicopter was 1 mile from the runway, the pilot receiving instruction turned the helicopter onto final approach. After completing a steep approach, the pilot receiving instruction brought the helicopter into a hover about 15 ft above the runway threshold. The airplane pilot stated that he heard a heavy buzzing sound on the CTAF, like a helicopter rotor, and a barely distinguishable word; he scanned for traffic and declared being on downwind. The airplane pilot quickly turned to the base leg of the traffic pattern and then proceeded to land; the airplane then struck the helicopter from behind as the airplane landed on the same runway as the helicopter. The pilots of both aircraft reported scanning for traffic; however, the airplane pilot reported that he did not see the helicopter until about 2 seconds before the collision, while the flight instructor and pilot receiving instruction in the helicopter did not see the airplane before the collision, as the helicopter was oriented down the runway with its tail pointed toward the runway's approach end. Given that the airplane struck the helicopter from behind while landing, it is unlikely that the helicopter pilots were in a position to see and take action to avoid the airplane. Conversely, because of the airplane's position, the airplane pilot had the best opportunity to see and take action to avoid the helicopter. Postaccident examinations of the radio communication systems in the airplane and helicopter did not reveal any anomalies. The instructor in the helicopter indicated that radio calls were made during every turn while the helicopter was in the airport traffic pattern. The airplane pilot indicated that he was operating on the CTAF and that he was confident his calls on the radio were heard. However, the pilot of another airplane who was about 2 miles west of the airport and was monitoring the airport's CTAF recalled hearing a radio call from the helicopter announcing that it was on a 1-mile final approach to the runway at 500 ft but did not recall hearing any transmissions from the airplane. Thus, given that the airplane pilot's transmissions were not heard, it is likely that he did not adequately transmit the airplane's position while in the airport traffic pattern.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The factual record for the Robinson Helicopter R22 from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

What happened, in order

  1. Midair collision during landing defining event
  2. Collision with terrain or object (not controlled flight into terrain) during uncontrolled descent

The NTSB's findings

  • cause Personnel issues › Psychological › Attention/monitoring › Monitoring other aircraft › Pilot of other aircraft
  • factor Personnel issues › Task performance › Communication (personnel) › Lack of communication › Pilot of other aircraft

Flight instructor

  • Certificate: flight instructor, commercial pilot
  • Ratings: instructor: helicopter; instrument: helicopter; rotorcraft: helicopter
  • Flight time: 224 hours in all; 224 in this make and model; 30 in the last 90 days; 10 in the last 30 days
  • Medical certificate: Class 2 (without waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: left
  • Injury: minor injuries

Pilot

  • Certificate: private
  • Ratings: single-engine land; rotorcraft: helicopter
  • Flight time: 5,203 hours in all
  • Medical certificate: Class 2 (with waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: left
  • Injury: minor injuries

The aircraft

  • Airframe total time: 3,340 hours
  • Last inspection: annual inspection, September 22, 2017; 2 hours since
  • Maximum gross weight: 1,369 lb
  • Seats: 2
  • Landing gear: fixed
  • Engine: Lycoming O-360-J2A (piston); 5,527 hours total

The flight

  • Departed from: CLW Clearwater FL at 8:30 pm
  • Destination: CLW Clearwater FL
  • Flight plan: none
  • Runway 34, 4,108 ft by 75 ft
  • A second pilot was aboard

Weather at the time

  • Light: daylight
  • Wind: from 100° at 7 knots
  • Visibility: 10 statute miles
  • Sky: a few clouds at 9,500 ft
  • Temperature: 90°F (32°C), dew point 72°F (22°C)
  • Altimeter: 29.82 inHg
  • Observation at 8:53 pm from CLW

Injuries

FatalSeriousMinorNone
Flight crew2

The factual record for the Piper PA 28R-201 from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

What happened, in order

  1. Midair collision during landing (flare/touchdown) defining event

The NTSB's findings

  • cause Personnel issues › Psychological › Attention/monitoring › Monitoring other aircraft › Pilot
  • factor Personnel issues › Task performance › Communication (personnel) › Lack of communication › Pilot

Pilot

  • Certificate: private
  • Ratings: single-engine land; instrument: airplane; rotorcraft: helicopter
  • Flight time: 284 hours in all; 34 in this make and model; 26 in the last 90 days; 12 in the last 30 days; 148 as pilot in command
  • Last flight review: July 1, 2016
  • Medical certificate: Class 3 (with waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: left
  • Injury: minor injuries

The aircraft

  • Airframe total time: 5,718 hours
  • Last inspection: 100-hour inspection, June 13, 2017; 70 hours since
  • Maximum gross weight: 2,749 lb
  • Seats: 4
  • Landing gear: retractable
  • Engine: Lycoming IO-360-C1C6 (piston); 5,753 hours total

The flight

  • Departed from: CLW Clearwater FL at 8:00 pm
  • Destination: CLW Clearwater FL
  • Flight plan: none
  • Runway 34, 4,108 ft by 75 ft

Injuries

FatalSeriousMinorNone
Flight crew1

Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report

The NTSB has not released the docket for this case yet. The docket, the folder of records gathered during an investigation (maintenance records, photographs, witness statements, examinations), is usually released when the investigation is nearly complete, and the list here is refreshed when it appears. Check at the NTSB.

Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.