Cessna 152 accident near Miami, Florida, November 13, 2016
On November 13, 2016 at about 6:00 pm local time, a 1982 Cessna 152, registered N94292, was substantially damaged in an accident during enroute (cruise) near Miami, Florida. It was an instructional flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). No one was hurt; 2 people were on board or involved. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).
The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
The loss of torque on the No. 3 connecting rod’s nuts, which resulted in the failure of the No. 3 connecting rod’s bolts and a subsequent total loss of engine power due to the operator's maintenance personnel’s improper installation of the connecting rod nuts.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- November 13, 2016 · about 6:00 pm local time
- Place
- Miami, Florida · map
- Type
- Accident
- Injuries
- No one was hurt; 2 people were on board or involved.
- Weather
- visual conditions (good weather)
- Aircraft
- Cessna 152 NO SERIES, built 1982 · all 152s on the register
- Registration
- N94292 · registry record · serial 15285643
- Damage
- Substantial damage
- Flight
- Instructional flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)
The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record
The private pilot reported that, during the instructional flight to accumulate flight time, the airplane experienced a rough-running engine in cruise flight and that the engine subsequently experienced a total loss of power. The pilot tried to restart the engine to no avail. He then chose to conduct a forced landing to a road, during which the airplane touched down on soft, wet ground before reaching the road. It then nosed over and came to rest inverted. During recovery of the airplane, large cracks were noted in the engine crankcase near the No. 2 cylinder. Disassembly of the engine revealed that the crankshaft was fractured at the No. 3 connecting rod journal and exhibited signatures consistent with extreme heat. The No. 3 connecting rod bolts fractured at the point where the nuts contacted the connecting rod. Each connecting rod nut had a flat-face side and a raised-lip side. As found, the nuts were oriented with the raised-lip side touching the connecting rod despite the engine manufacturer's service instruction, which stated that "Nuts [were] to be assembled with flat face side touching the connecting rod." The caution associated with the orientation of the connecting rod nuts at installation stated that "the connecting rod bolt cannot be tightened correctly if the nut on the connecting rod is installed incorrectly." The operator's maintenance personnel likely installed the nuts incorrectly during an engine overhaul about 246 flight hours before the accident flight, which resulted in a loss of torque on the connecting rod's nuts and the subsequent fracture of the connecting rod's bolts and total loss of engine power.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
What happened, in order
- Loss of engine power (total) during enroute (cruise) defining event
- Off-field or emergency landing during landing
- Nose over/nose down during landing
The NTSB's findings
- cause Aircraft › Aircraft power plant › Engine (reciprocating) › Recip engine power section › Failure
- cause Personnel issues › Task performance › Maintenance › Installation › Maintenance personnel
- Environmental issues › Physical environment › Runway/land/takeoff/taxi surface › Soft surface › Contributed to outcome
Pilot
- Certificate: private
- Ratings: single-engine land; instrument: airplane
- Flight time: 212.5 hours in all; 212.5 in this make and model; 122 in the last 90 days
- Medical certificate: Class 1 (with waivers/limitations)
- Seat: left
- Injury: no injuries
Pilot
- Certificate: private
- Ratings: single-engine land
- Flight time: 128.3 hours in all; 128.3 in this make and model; 107 in the last 90 days
- Medical certificate: Class 1 (without waivers/limitations)
- Seat: rgt
- Injury: no injuries
The aircraft
- Airframe total time: 3,782.7 hours
- Last inspection: 100-hour inspection, November 3, 2016; 52 hours since
- Maximum gross weight: 1,669 lb
- Seats: 2
- Landing gear: fixed
- Engine: Lycoming O-235 SERIES (piston); 16,874 hours total
- Operator: Dean International INC
The flight
- Departed from: LAL Lakeland FL at 5:20 pm
- Destination: TMB Miami FL
- Flight plan: VFR
- A second pilot was aboard
Weather at the time
- Light: daylight
- Wind: from 110° at 8 knots
- Visibility: 10 statute miles
- Sky: a few clouds at 3,000 ft
- Temperature: 81°F (27°C), dew point 59°F (15°C)
- Altimeter: 30.03 inHg
- Observation at 7:53 pm from KFXE, 26 miles away
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Flight crew | 2 |
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
5 documents, released by the NTSB on December 21, 2018. View them here, or download them; the NTSB redacts some personal details before release, and this site shows the NTSB's own titles rather than its file names.
| # | Document | What it is | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Pilot/operator Aircraft Accident Report, NTSB Form 6120.1 | PDF, 13 pages | View Download |
| 2 | FAA Inspector's Statement Engine Prelim | PDF, 1 page | View Download |
| 3 | FAA Inspector's Statement Memo for Record | PDF, 2 pages | View Download |
| 4 | Lycoming Engine Service Instruction | PDF, 5 pages | View Download |
| 5 | Photos | PDF, 5 pages | View Download |
The same docket at the NTSB · documents without a copy here are fetched from the NTSB when you open them.
Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.