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Accidents · NTSB ERA17FA074 · Final report

Independent Technologies INC EPIC LT accident near Port Orange, Florida, December 27, 2016

On December 27, 2016 at about 10:56 pm local time, a 2009 Independent Technologies INC EPIC LT, an amateur-built aircraft,, registered N669WR, was substantially damaged in an accident during approach (IFR missed approach) near Port Orange, Florida (Spruce Creek airport). It was a personal flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). 2 people were killed. The weather was instrument conditions (cloud, fog or low visibility).

The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged

The pilot's loss of airplane control due to spatial disorientation, which resulted in the exceedance of the airplane's critical angle of attack and an aerodynamic stall/spin. Contributing to the accident was the pilot's failure to fly a stabilized approach consistent with the published instrument approach procedure.

Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.

What the record shows

Date
December 27, 2016 · about 10:56 pm local time
Place
Port Orange, Florida · Spruce Creek · map
Type
Accident
Injuries
2 people were killed.
Weather
instrument conditions (cloud, fog or low visibility)
Aircraft
Independent Technologies INC EPIC LT NO SERIES, built 2009, amateur-built
Registration
N669WR · no longer on the register · serial 029
Damage
Substantial damage
Flight
Personal flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)

The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record

The private pilot obtained a full weather briefing before departing on a long cross-country flight. The destination airport was forecast to be under visual meteorological conditions, but there was an AIRMET and Center Weather Advisory (CWA) issued for low instrument flight rules (IFR) conditions later that day. The briefer told the pilot to check the weather again en route to see if the AIRMET and CWA had been updated. At the time the pilot stopped for fuel, another CWA was issued for low IFR conditions at his destination airport; however, there were no records to indicate that the pilot obtained this information during the fuel stop or after departing on the last leg of the flight. A review of air traffic control communications revealed that, about 10 minutes before arriving at the airport, the pilot reported that he had obtained the current weather conditions at his destination airport. The most recent observation, about 1 hour before the accident indicated good visibility; however, the weather reporting equipment did not provide ceiling heights. It is unknown if the pilot obtained weather information from nearby airports, which were reporting low instrument meteorological conditions (visibility between 1/4 and 1/2 mile and ceilings 200-300 ft above ground level [agl]). Additionally, three pilot reports (PIREPs) describing the poor weather conditions were filed within the hour before the accident. The controller did not relay the PIREPs or the CWA information to the pilot, so the pilot was likely unaware of the deteriorating conditions. Based on radar information and statements from witnesses, the pilot's approach to the airport was unstabilized. He descended below the minimum descent altitude of 440 ft, and, after breaking through the fog about 100 ft agl, the airplane reentered the fog and completed a 360° right turn near the approach end of the runway, during which its altitude varied from 100 ft to 300 ft. The airplane then climbed to an altitude about 800 ft before radar contact was lost near the accident site. The airplane came to rest inverted, consistent with one witness's statement that it descended through the clouds in a spin before impact; postaccident examination revealed no preimpact anomalies with the airplane or engine that would have precluded normal operation. Although the pilot was instrument rated, his recent instrument experience could not be established. The circumstances of the accident, including the restricted visibility conditions and the pilot's maneuvering of the airplane before the impact, are consistent with a spatial disorientation event. It is likely that the pilot experienced a loss of control due to spatial disorientation, which resulted in an aerodynamic stall and spin.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

What happened, in order

  1. Altitude deviation during approach (IFR final approach)
  2. Other weather encounter during approach (IFR final approach)
  3. Loss of control in flight during approach (IFR missed approach) defining event
  4. Aerodynamic stall/spin during approach (IFR missed approach)
  5. Collision with terrain or object (not controlled flight into terrain) during uncontrolled descent

The NTSB's findings

  • cause Personnel issues › Task performance › Use of equip/info › Aircraft control › Pilot
  • cause Personnel issues › Psychological › Perception/orientation/illusion › Spatial disorientation › Pilot
  • cause Aircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability › Performance/control parameters › Airspeed › Not attained/maintained
  • cause Aircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability › Performance/control parameters › Angle of attack › Not attained/maintained
  • cause Environmental issues › Conditions/weather/phenomena › Ceiling/visibility/precip › Low visibility › Effect on operation
  • factor Personnel issues › Task performance › Use of equip/info › Use of policy/procedure › Pilot
  • factor Environmental issues › Conditions/weather/phenomena › Ceiling/visibility/precip › Low visibility › Compliance w/ procedure
  • Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action › Lack of action › ATC personnel
  • Environmental issues › Conditions/weather/phenomena › Ceiling/visibility/precip › Low visibility › Decision related to condition

Pilot

  • Certificate: private
  • Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instrument: airplane
  • Flight time: 4,246 hours in all; 956 in this make and model
  • Last flight review: October 1, 2016
  • Medical certificate: Class 3 (with waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: left
  • Injury: fatal

The aircraft

  • Airframe total time: 822.3 hours
  • Last inspection: condition inspection, August 18, 2016
  • Maximum gross weight: 7,500 lb
  • Seats: 6
  • Landing gear: retractable
  • Engine: P&W Canada PT6A-67A (turboprop); 822 hours total

The flight

  • Departed from: NQA Millington TN at 8:58 pm
  • Destination: 7FL6 Port Orange FL
  • Flight plan: IFR
  • Runway 05, 4,000 ft by 176 ft

Weather at the time

  • Light: dusk
  • Visibility: 2.5 statute miles
  • Temperature: 66°F (19°C), dew point 66°F (19°C)
  • Altimeter: 30.18 inHg
  • Observation at 10:55 pm from 7FL6

Injuries

FatalSeriousMinorNone
Flight crew1
Passengers1

Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report

18 documents, released by the NTSB on June 13, 2018. View them here, or download them; the NTSB redacts some personal details before release, and this site shows the NTSB's own titles rather than its file names.

The same docket at the NTSB · documents without a copy here are fetched from the NTSB when you open them.

Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.