Beech F33A accident near Clinton, Connecticut, November 15, 2014
On November 15, 2014 at about 9:06 pm local time, a 1975 Beech F33A, registered N4548S, was substantially damaged in an accident during enroute (cruise) near Clinton, Connecticut. It was a personal flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). 1 person had minor injuries. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).
The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
The pilot's inadequate fuel planning and improper fuel management, which resulted in a total loss of engine power due to fuel starvation. Contributing to the accident was the pilot's failure to follow proper procedures in response to the loss of engine power.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- November 15, 2014 · about 9:06 pm local time
- Place
- Clinton, Connecticut · map
- Type
- Accident
- Injuries
- 1 person had minor injuries.
- Weather
- visual conditions (good weather)
- Aircraft
- Beech F33A, built 1975 · all F33As on the register
- Registration
- N4548S · registry record · serial CE-601
- Damage
- Substantial damage
- Flight
- Personal flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)
The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record
According to the commercial pilot, earlier on the day of the accident, she had flown the airplane from her home airport to the airport from which the accident flight departed. Before departing on the return flight to her home airport, she noted about 20 gallons of fuel in each main wing tank for the 45-minute flight. After taking off and establishing the airplane on course, she climbed the airplane to 4,500 ft mean sea level; trimmed the airplane for cruise flight; and set engine rpm to 2,300, manifold pressure to 23 inches of mercury, and fuel flow to 13 gallons per hour. Sometime later, she heard "a loud explosive bang - like a gunshot." She immediately checked her instruments and noted that the rpm had risen to over 2,500. She then reduced the propeller control with no effect. The airplane started to "shudder." The rpm dropped to 2,000, the airspeed had dropped off, and the airplane began to lose altitude. She then checked her propeller setting and aggressively advanced the propeller, but there was no increase in rpm. She contacted air traffic control, reported engine problems, and declared an emergency; the controller advised her to land at a nearby airport. The pilot turned toward the airport but was unable to see it. When she realized that she was not going to find the airport or an open area, she decided not to put the landing gear down because she was aiming to land the airplane on top of the trees. She reached down to shut the fuel selector off because she was afraid there might be a fire once she crashed. Because she was approaching the trees, she did not look at the fuel selector handle to check its setting. She knew she turned the handle but was not sure if she had fully turned it to the off position from the right tank position. The airplane then collided with the trees and sustained substantial damage. Postaccident examination of the propeller and engine revealed no evidence of preexisting malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation. An engine run in a test cell revealed that it operated normally with no anomalies noted. Further examination of the airplane revealed that it had not been configured by the pilot per the manufacturer's published guidance in the pilot's operating handbook and Federal Aviation Administration-approved airplane flight manual for a loss of engine power, maximum glide configuration, or landing without power. First responders did not report evidence of a fuel spill, although both wing tip tanks and wing fuel bladders were breached. The tip tanks were totally devoid of fuel, but fuel was in the undamaged portion of each of the wing tank's fuel bladders. About 17 gallons of fuel were recovered from the right-wing tank, and less than 1 gallon of fuel was recovered from the left-wing tank. The fuel selector was in the left tank position. The fuel strainer was clean, free of debris, and devoid of fuel. No fuel was recovered from the fuel supply line to the engine-driven fuel pump. Examination of the electronic fuel-flow indicator, which presented information to the pilot about the fuel usage and could display the total fuel used and the remaining fuel on board, revealed that it had not been initialized by the pilot in quite some time. An accurate fuel-remaining value relied on the pilot to initialize the device when refueling. A review of fueling information revealed that the pilot had not refueled the airplane at her home airport earlier that day; further, she did not refuel before departing on the accident flight. Because the pilot had not refueled before either flight on the day of the accident and had not initialized the fuel-flow indicator, it is likely that she did not perform adequate preflight fuel planning and improperly managed the fuel in flight, which led to fuel starvation.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
What happened, in order
- Preflight or dispatch event during prior to flight
- Fuel starvation during enroute (cruise) defining event
- Loss of engine power (total) during enroute (cruise)
- Landing area overshoot during emergency descent
- Off-field or emergency landing during landing
- Collision with terrain or object (not controlled flight into terrain) during landing
The NTSB's findings
- cause Personnel issues › Task performance › Planning/preparation › Fuel planning › Pilot
- cause Personnel issues › Action/decision › Info processing/decision › Decision making/judgment › Pilot
- cause Aircraft › Fluids/misc hardware › Fluids › Fuel › Fluid level
- cause Aircraft › Fluids/misc hardware › Fluids › Fuel › Fluid management
- cause Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Fuel system › Fuel selector/shutoff valve › Incorrect use/operation
- factor Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action › Lack of action › Pilot
Pilot
- Certificate: commercial pilot, private
- Ratings: single-engine land; instrument: airplane
- Flight time: 1,549 hours in all; 827 in this make and model; 13 in the last 90 days; 5 in the last 30 days; 1,018 as pilot in command
- Last flight review: December 27, 2013
- Medical certificate: Class 2 (with waivers/limitations)
- Seat: left
- Injury: minor injuries
The aircraft
- Airframe total time: 3,016.0 hours
- Last inspection: annual inspection, February 22, 2014; 39 hours since
- Maximum gross weight: 3,400 lb
- Seats: 4
- Landing gear: retractable
- Engine: Continental IO-550-B (piston); 867 hours total
The flight
- Departed from: GON Groton CT at 8:55 pm
- Destination: MGJ Montgomery NY
- Flight plan: none
Weather at the time
- Light: daylight
- Wind: from 320° at 7 knots
- Visibility: 10 statute miles
- Sky: clear
- Temperature: 37°F (3°C), dew point 12°F (-11°C)
- Altimeter: 30.27 inHg
- Observation at 8:55 pm from SNC, 4 miles away
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Flight crew | 1 |
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
The docket, the folder of records gathered during an investigation (maintenance records, photographs, witness statements, examinations), has not been read from the NTSB for this case yet; the list appears here once it has. Open the docket at the NTSB.
Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.
