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Accidents · NTSB ERA15FA128 · Final report

Piper PA28 accident near Greensboro, North Carolina, February 11, 2015

On February 11, 2015 at about 7:15 pm local time, a 1970 Piper PA28, registered N5985U, was substantially damaged in an accident during initial climb near Greensboro, North Carolina (Air Harbor Airport). It was a personal flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). 1 person was killed. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).

The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged

A total loss of engine power after takeoff due to fuel starvation as a result of excessive wear of the fuel selector valve. Also causal was the owner/operator and maintenance personnel's inadequate maintenance, and inadequate postmaintenance inspection.

Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.

What the record shows

Date
February 11, 2015 · about 7:15 pm local time
Place
Greensboro, North Carolina · Air Harbor Airport · map
Type
Accident
Injuries
1 person was killed.
Weather
visual conditions (good weather)
Aircraft
Piper PA28 140, built 1970 · all PA28s on the register
Registration
N5985U · no longer on the register · serial 28-26822
Damage
Substantial damage
Flight
Personal flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)

The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record

On the day of the accident, the private pilot rented the airplane from a fixed base operator. A witness saw the pilot start the airplane and taxi to the end of the runway, where the pilot performed an engine run-up. Two witnesses reported that the takeoff sounded normal; however, they did not hear the airplane continue around the airport traffic pattern. One of the witnesses then drove to the end of runway where he found the wreckage. Examination of the accident site and airplane revealed that the airplane had descended and impacted trees after departure. There was no evidence of engine power at the time of impact. Examination of the engine revealed no evidence of any preimpact mechanical malfunctions; however, only trace amounts of fuel were found in both the carburetor float bowl and the engine-driven fuel pump. Examination of the fuel system revealed that the fuel strainer and electric fuel pump were both devoid of fuel. The fuel selector was likely original to the airplane, and had not been modified in accordance with mandatory service bulletins issued by the manufacturer to reduce the possibility of pilot mismanagement of the fuel system through inadvertent selection to the "OFF" position. Examination of the fuel selector control revealed that the valve handle was in the right tank position at the time of the accident; however, testing of the valve with air indicated that the valve was closed. Subsequent attempts to manipulate the selector valve revealed that it was stiff to rotate, and positive engagement of the detents could not be consistently obtained. Further attempts to flow air through the valve produced intermittent results, which indicated that the plug cock inside the fuel valve was not functioning properly and could reduce or block the fuel flow, resulting in a partial or complete loss of engine power. Disassembly of the fuel selector valve revealed rotational scoring in the valve body and on the plug cock, which displayed discoloration and heavily-worn detents. Spectroscopy of the debris particles found in the valve body and embedded in the plug cock indicated that the debris was the result of excessive wear of the valve components. Both the owner, who was also the operator and maintenance personnel stated that they checked the fuel selector valve during an annual inspection that was completed about 11 hours prior to the accident. Review of maintenance and operator records revealed several discrepancies, including when the most recent annual inspection had occurred, whether the items required by the inspection were accomplished, and if the annual inspection engine run was performed by an individual unqualified to do so. The condition of the fuel selector valve cast doubt as to whether much of the maintenance had been properly performed, since inspection in accordance with Federal Aviation Administration and manufacturer guidelines would have revealed that the fuel selector valve was not airworthy. Although an autopsy and toxicology testing of the pilot revealed evidence of coronary artery disease and unreported use of antidepressant medication, it is unlikely that these factors impaired the pilot's ability to safely operate the airplane. Given the condition of the airplane's fuel selector valve, it is likely that the engine experienced a total loss of power shortly after takeoff due to fuel starvation, which resulted in the airplane's descent into terrain, leaving the pilot with few options.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

What happened, in order

  1. Aircraft maintenance event during prior to flight
  2. Aircraft inspection event during prior to flight
  3. Fuel starvation during initial climb defining event
  4. Loss of engine power (total) during initial climb
  5. Collision with terrain or object (not controlled flight into terrain) during emergency descent

The NTSB's findings

  • cause Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Fuel system › Fuel selector/shutoff valve › Inadequate inspection
  • cause Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Fuel system › Fuel selector/shutoff valve › Fatigue/wear/corrosion
  • cause Personnel issues › Task performance › Maintenance › Scheduled/routine maintenance › Maintenance personnel
  • cause Personnel issues › Task performance › Maintenance › Scheduled/routine maintenance › Owner/builder
  • cause Personnel issues › Task performance › Inspection › Post maintenance inspection › Maintenance personnel
  • cause Personnel issues › Task performance › Inspection › Post maintenance inspection › Owner/builder
  • Organizational issues › Support/oversight/monitoring › Oversight › Oversight of maintenance › Operator

Pilot

  • Certificate: private
  • Ratings: single-engine land
  • Flight time: 359 hours in all; 63 in this make and model; 207 as pilot in command
  • Last flight review: April 26, 2014
  • Medical certificate: Class 3 (with waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: left
  • Injury: fatal

The aircraft

  • Airframe total time: 3,799.0 hours
  • Last inspection: annual inspection, January 6, 2015; 11 hours since
  • Maximum gross weight: 2,150 lb
  • Seats: 4
  • Landing gear: fixed
  • Engine: Lycoming O-320-E2A (piston); 3,799 hours total

The flight

  • Departed from: W88 Greensboro NC at 7:15 pm
  • Destination: W88 Greensboro NC
  • Flight plan: none
  • Runway 27, 2,460 ft by 65 ft

Weather at the time

  • Light: daylight
  • Visibility: 10 statute miles
  • Sky: a few clouds at 15,000 ft
  • Temperature: 48°F (9°C), dew point 30°F (-1°C)
  • Altimeter: 29.95 inHg
  • Observation at 6:54 pm from GSO, 8 miles away

Injuries

FatalSeriousMinorNone
Flight crew1

Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report

The docket, the folder of records gathered during an investigation (maintenance records, photographs, witness statements, examinations), has not been read from the NTSB for this case yet; the list appears here once it has. Open the docket at the NTSB.

Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.