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Accidents · NTSB ERA15FA099 · Final report

Cessna 152 accident near New Smyrna Beach, Florida, January 14, 2015

On January 14, 2015 at about 1:58 am local time, a 1977 Cessna 152, registered N757ZM, was substantially damaged in an accident during approach near New Smyrna Beach, Florida (New Smyrna Beach Muni airport). It was a personal flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). 1 person was killed. The weather was instrument conditions (cloud, fog or low visibility).

The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged

The pilot's failure to maintain control of the airplane while operating under visual flight rules (VFR) in night, instrument meteorological conditions, likely due to spatial disorientation. Contributing to the outcome was the radar controller's failure to follow published guidance for providing assistance to VFR pilots having difficulty flying in instrument conditions.

Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.

What the record shows

Date
January 14, 2015 · about 1:58 am local time
Place
New Smyrna Beach, Florida · New Smyrna Beach Muni · map
Type
Accident
Injuries
1 person was killed.
Weather
instrument conditions (cloud, fog or low visibility)
Aircraft
Cessna 152, built 1977 · all 152s on the register
Registration
N757ZM · no longer on the register · serial 15280134
Damage
Substantial damage
Flight
Personal flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)

The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record

The commercial pilot was in the process of purchasing a block of flight time with the intent of building time toward an additional rating. According to the operator, the pilot did not complete the mandatory checkout. However, she possessed the keys to the airplane since she had flown the previous day with an instructor, but he did not approve her for solo flight because he believed she required additional practice landing the airplane with an instructor onboard. On the day of the accident, she flew an undetermined number of local, solo flights without the knowledge of the operator. The accident flight was initiated at night, presumably with the intent of operating in the local airport traffic pattern. About 7 minutes into the flight, the pilot likely encountered instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) and requested assistance from air traffic control. An air traffic controller attempted to provide the pilot with radar vectors to a nearby airport; however, the pilot was unable to visually acquire that airport. The controller then observed the airplane on radar at 600 ft and descending and directed the pilot to climb and turn. A short time later, radar and radio contact were lost; the airplane had crashed. The level of damage and fragmentation of the wreckage was consistent with ground impact at a high velocity. The flight was conducted on a dark, moonless night, under an overcast ceiling, and the final portion of the flight was over the ocean. These factors would have reduced the pilot's ability to perceive the natural horizon and increased her risk of spatial disorientation. Although the pilot held an instrument rating and had recently completed an instrument proficiency check, on the night of the accident, she did not demonstrate the skills necessary to control an airplane in IMC. She also did not display the ability to adequately communicate her situation to the controller, nor did she seem to understand or comply with the assistance offered to her. Review of autopsy results and postaccident toxicological testing showed no evidence of any physiologically induced incapacitation or other impairment. During the sequence of events leading up to the accident, the pilot communicated with two air traffic controllers. The pilot described that she was operating in conditions that limited her ability to navigate and potentially affected her ability to control the airplane under visual flight rules (VFR). Although the actions of the controllers did not directly contribute to the pilot's loss of control while attempting to fly under VFR in IMC, the controllers did not act in accordance with Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) guidance that dictates how to assist pilots experiencing this type of emergency. Specifically, the controllers did not ascertain if the pilot was qualified and capable of IFR flight nor did they attempt to locate and direct the pilot toward the nearest areas reporting visual meteorological conditions. Further, a controller assisting the accident controller had the opportunity to solicit a pilot report from another pilot in a nearby airplane to ascertain if that airplane was operating above the reported IMC but did not do so. During postaccident interviews, the air traffic controllers indicated that they had not received FAA-required evidence-based simulation training on emergencies and described the computer-based emergency training that they received as poor quality.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

What happened, in order

  1. VFR encounter with IMC during approach
  2. Loss of control in flight during approach defining event
  3. Collision with terrain or object (not controlled flight into terrain) during uncontrolled descent

The NTSB's findings

  • cause Aircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability › Performance/control parameters › (general) › Not attained/maintained
  • cause Personnel issues › Psychological › Perception/orientation/illusion › Spatial disorientation › Pilot
  • cause Personnel issues › Task performance › Use of equip/info › Aircraft control › Pilot
  • cause Environmental issues › Conditions/weather/phenomena › Ceiling/visibility/precip › Below VFR minima › Effect on operation
  • cause Environmental issues › Conditions/weather/phenomena › Light condition › Dark › Effect on operation
  • factor Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action › Lack of action › ATC personnel
  • factor Personnel issues › Task performance › Use of equip/info › Use of policy/procedure › ATC personnel
  • cause Organizational issues › Support/oversight/monitoring › Training › Emergency proc training › ATC

Pilot

  • Certificate: commercial pilot
  • Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instrument: airplane
  • Flight time: 416 hours in all
  • Last flight review: November 19, 2014
  • Medical certificate: Class 3 (with waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: left
  • Injury: fatal

The aircraft

  • Airframe total time: 12,000 hours
  • Last inspection: annual inspection, October 27, 2014; 23 hours since
  • Maximum gross weight: 1,676 lb
  • Seats: 2
  • Landing gear: fixed
  • Engine: Lycoming O-235-L2C (piston); 0 hours total

The flight

  • Departed from: X50 Edgewater FL at 1:40 am
  • Destination: X50 Edgewater FL
  • Flight plan: none

Weather at the time

  • Light: night, dark
  • Wind: from 350° at 8 knots
  • Visibility: 8 statute miles
  • Sky: overcast at 500 ft
  • Temperature: 63°F (17°C), dew point 61°F (16°C)
  • Altimeter: 30.13 inHg
  • Observation at 1:55 am from EVB, 3 miles away

Injuries

FatalSeriousMinorNone
Flight crew1

Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report

The docket, the folder of records gathered during an investigation (maintenance records, photographs, witness statements, examinations), has not been read from the NTSB for this case yet; the list appears here once it has. Open the docket at the NTSB.

Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.