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Accidents · NTSB ERA15FA096 · Final report

Robinson Helicopter R22 BETA accident near Catano, Puerto Rico, January 10, 2015

On January 10, 2015 at about 2:32 pm local time, a 1992 Robinson Helicopter R22 BETA, registered N348VH, was destroyed in an accident during approach (VFR pattern downwind) near Catano, Puerto Rico (Fernando Luis Ribas Dominicci airport). It was an instructional flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). 1 person was killed. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).

The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged

The student pilot’s failure to maintain rotor rpm while maneuvering in the airport traffic pattern, which resulted in the helicopter’s uncontrolled descent to the water. Contributing to the accident was the student’s distraction with other aircraft operating in the traffic pattern.

Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.

What the record shows

Date
January 10, 2015 · about 2:32 pm local time
Place
Catano, Puerto Rico · Fernando Luis Ribas Dominicci · map
Type
Accident
Injuries
1 person was killed.
Weather
visual conditions (good weather)
Aircraft
Robinson Helicopter R22 BETA, built 1992 · all R22 BETAs on the register
Registration
N348VH · no longer on the register · serial 2258
Damage
Destroyed
Flight
Instructional flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)

The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record

The student helicopter pilot was on a solo training flight in the airport traffic pattern. He had completed eight approaches via a right downwind approach to the runway, when the air traffic controller advised him that he was number three for his next approach. About 1 minute later, the student pilot requested a left 360-degree turn. The controller then instructed him to hold at his current location and expect to be number four in sequence. During the next 6 minutes, the controller made three attempts to have the student pilot report the traffic to follow on final approach in sight, and the student pilot advised that it was hard for him to hear the controller's instructions due to wind noise. The controller then advised the student pilot to follow an airplane on short final approach, and the student pilot reported the traffic in sight. About 1 minute later, the controller advised the pilot of another airplane to follow the helicopter on the approach. The airplane pilot observed the helicopter ascend in a series of right, 360-degree turns for about 100 to 200 ft. As it climbed, white smoke consistent with a rapid increase in engine rpm and an engine overspeed trailed the helicopter. When the helicopter climbed to an apex of about 800 ft, the ends of both rotor blades coned upward to where the tips were nearly vertical, consistent with a low rotor rpm condition. The helicopter then entered a right, spiraling descent until it impacted the water. A postaccident examination of the airframe and engine revealed no evidence of mechanical malfunctions or failures with the helicopter that would have precluded normal operation. The main rotor blade elastomeric teeter stops were missing, consistent with low rotor rpm blade flapping. Although the temperature and dew point were conducive to carburetor icing, its formulation likely would not have allowed the helicopter to climb as high as it did just before the accident. More likely, the student pilot became distracted while he attempted to track other aircraft in the traffic pattern and sequence the helicopter for the approach, which led to his failure to maintain rotor rpm. Toxicological testing performed on specimens from the pilot identified butalbital in liver (1.24 ug/g) and in muscle (0.468 ug/g). Estimated corresponding blood levels were likely below the therapeutic window for butalbital, and unlikely to have been directly impairing at the time of the accident.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

What happened, in order

  1. Abrupt maneuver during approach (VFR pattern downwind)
  2. Loss of control in flight during approach (VFR pattern downwind) defining event
  3. Collision with terrain or object (not controlled flight into terrain) during uncontrolled descent

The NTSB's findings

  • cause Personnel issues › Task performance › Use of equip/info › Aircraft control › Student/instructed pilot
  • cause Aircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability › Performance/control parameters › Prop/rotor parameters › Not attained/maintained

Dual student

  • Certificate: student
  • Flight time: 91 hours in all; 91 in this make and model; 9 in the last 90 days; 1 in the last 30 days
  • Medical certificate: Class 3 (with waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: rgt
  • Injury: fatal

The aircraft

  • Airframe total time: 3,965 hours
  • Last inspection: 100-hour inspection, December 21, 2014; 10 hours since
  • Maximum gross weight: 1,369 lb
  • Seats: 2
  • Landing gear: fixed
  • Engine: Lycoming O-320 SERIES (piston); 2,756 hours total
  • Operator: Vertical Solutions Helicopter Company Ll

The flight

  • Departed from: TJIG San Juan PR at 1:30 pm
  • Destination: TJIG San Juan PR
  • Flight plan: none
  • Runway 9, 5,539 ft by 100 ft

Weather at the time

  • Light: daylight
  • Wind: from 100° at 12 knots
  • Visibility: 10 statute miles
  • Sky: scat at 2,500 ft
  • Temperature: 81°F (27°C), dew point 72°F (22°C)
  • Altimeter: 30.15 inHg
  • Observation at 2:45 pm from TJIG, 1 miles away

Injuries

FatalSeriousMinorNone
Flight crew1

Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report

11 documents, released by the NTSB on January 11, 2017. View them here, or download them; the NTSB redacts some personal details before release, and this site shows the NTSB's own titles rather than its file names.

The same docket at the NTSB · documents without a copy here are fetched from the NTSB when you open them.

Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.