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Accidents · NTSB ERA13LA148 · Final report

Piper PA-32-300 accident near Sanford, North Carolina, February 27, 2013

On February 27, 2013 at about 8:53 pm local time, a Piper PA-32-300, registered N1953H, was substantially damaged in an accident during approach (VFR pattern downwind) near Sanford, North Carolina (Raleigh Executive Jetport airport). It was a personal flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). No one was hurt; 1 person was on board or involved. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).

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The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged

The installation of an incorrect length of cotter pin on the throttle linkage clevis pin by maintenance personnel at an undetermined time, which resulted in the pin coming loose and the loss of throttle control.

Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 4, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.

What the record shows

Date
February 27, 2013 · about 8:53 pm local time
Place
Sanford, North Carolina · Raleigh Executive Jetport · map
Type
Accident
Injuries
No one was hurt; 1 person was on board or involved.
Weather
visual conditions (good weather)
Aircraft
Piper PA-32-300 · all PA-32-300s on the register
Registration
N1953H · registry record · serial 32-7740044
Damage
Substantial damage
Flight
Personal flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)

The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record

The private pilot was in the traffic pattern at the intended destination airport when the airplane experienced a loss of engine throttle control. Unable to reach the runway, he elected to perform a forced landing in a nearby field. During the landing, the airplane struck a fence post, which resulted in substantial damage to the left wing of the airplane. Postaccident examination revealed that the throttle lever clevis and throttle cable became separated from the throttle arm, which resulted in the engine being unresponsive to throttle input; thus, the pilot could not apply power to the engine from the idle position. No evidence of metal deformation existed on either the throttle lever clevis or on the throttle cable; however, examination of the cotter pin revealed that one prong was separated and unable to be located. Examination of the remaining portion of the cotter pin revealed that it was twice as long as manufacturer-approved guidance required. Examination of the clevis for the propeller cable linkage revealed that the cotter pin prongs exceeded Federal Aviation Administration Advisory Circular 43-13-1B guidance by allowing the prong to exceed the pin diameter and the cotter pin prongs were not seated firmly against the shank. A review of maintenance records did not reveal when the cotter pin was replaced. The hardware was likely installed using the incorrect safetying technique and the improper length of cotter pin. This allowed the prong to become caught and subsequently fracture on nearby hardware, which resulted in the cotter pin becoming unsecured and separating from the linkage pin. Subsequently, the linkage pin detached, which allowed the throttle lever clevis and cable to separate from each other. The last annual inspection occurred 2 weeks and less than 1 flight hour before the accident. It is likely that the mechanic did not detect the incorrect cotter pin and safetying technique due to its location; the location was such that it would have been difficult for the mechanic to see.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

What happened, in order

  1. Sys/Comp malf/fail (non-power) during approach (VFR pattern downwind) defining event
  2. Off-field or emergency landing during emergency descent
  3. Collision with terrain or object (not controlled flight into terrain) during landing (flare/touchdown)

The NTSB's findings

  • cause Aircraft › Aircraft power plant › Engine controls › Power lever › Malfunction
  • cause Aircraft › Fluids/misc hardware › Misc hardware › Fasteners › Incorrect service/maintenance
  • cause Personnel issues › Task performance › Maintenance › Replacement › Other/unknown
  • Environmental issues › Physical environment › Object/animal/substance › Fence/fence post › Contributed to outcome

Pilot

  • Certificate: private
  • Ratings: single-engine land
  • Flight time: 401 hours in all; 228 in this make and model; 6 in the last 90 days; 347 as pilot in command
  • Last flight review: June 12, 2012
  • Medical certificate: Class 3
  • Seat: left
  • Injury: no injuries

The aircraft

  • Airframe total time: 4,014 hours
  • Last inspection: annual inspection, February 15, 2013
  • Maximum gross weight: 3,400 lb
  • Seats: 6
  • Landing gear: fixed
  • Engine: Lycoming IO-540-K1G5 (piston); 0 hours total

The flight

  • Departed from: 5W8 Siler City NC at 8:43 pm
  • Destination: TTA Sanford NC
  • Flight plan: none
  • Runway 21, 6,500 ft by 100 ft

Weather at the time

  • Light: daylight
  • Wind: at 8 knots
  • Visibility: 10 statute miles
  • Sky: broken clouds at 100 ft
  • Temperature: 59°F (15°C), dew point 39°F (4°C)
  • Altimeter: 29.72 inHg
  • Observation at 8:55 pm from TTA, 2 miles away

Injuries

FatalSeriousMinorNone
Flight crew1

Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report

The docket, the folder of records gathered during an investigation (maintenance records, photographs, witness statements, examinations), has not been read from the NTSB for this case yet; the list appears here once it has. Open the docket at the NTSB.

About this page

Everything above comes from the NTSB's public accident database: the narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words, and the coded tables behind its report (pilot, aircraft, flight, weather, injuries, sequence of events) are written out in plain English. Pilots' ages, home towns and medical details are left out on purpose. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, the folder of records gathered during the investigation, shown as the NTSB released them (the NTSB redacts some personal details first) and listed under the NTSB's own titles. This site's own text never names pilots, passengers or anyone else involved. A preliminary report describes what is known soon after the event and can change; the final report, with the probable cause, usually follows one to two years later and this page is refreshed when it does. Case number ERA13LA148.