Swift Museum Foundation, Inc. GC-1A accident near East Moriches, New York, October 20, 2012
On October 20, 2012 at about 7:04 pm local time, a Swift Museum Foundation, Inc. GC-1A, registered N80823, was substantially damaged in an accident during maneuvering near East Moriches, New York. It was a personal flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). 2 people were killed. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).
The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
The failure of the pilot to maintain airspeed, while attempting a precautionary landing for reasons that could not be determined from the available evidence. Contributing to the accident was the pilot’s pitch-up reaction to birds that took flight during his approach for the precautionary landing, which resulted in an inadvertent stall.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- October 20, 2012 · about 7:04 pm local time
- Place
- East Moriches, New York · map
- Type
- Accident
- Injuries
- 2 people were killed.
- Weather
- visual conditions (good weather)
- Aircraft
- Swift Museum Foundation, Inc. GC-1A
- Registration
- N80823 · no longer on the register · serial 226
- Damage
- Substantial damage
- Flight
- Personal flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)
The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record
The airplane departed with an adequate supply of fuel in the main fuel tank but an unknown amount of fuel in the tip tanks. After the airplane took off, the mechanic who performed the last condition inspection and who was near the departure end of the runway noted an unusual sound; he said the sound was abnormal and expected the pilot to return, but he did not. The airplane’s GPS indicated that the flight proceeded south to the southern Long Island coastline then turned to the west, paralleling the coastline while climbing to a maximum altitude of 2,602 feet. The flight continued on the westerly heading along the southern coast of Long Island and descended to 2,383 feet and then turned north; the VHF transceiver was set to the Farmingdale automatic terminal information service. The flight continued on the northerly heading and descended to 1,812 feet, then turned to an easterly heading, followed by a southeasterly heading toward the southern coast of Long Island. The flight then turned back to an easterly heading with a steadily decreasing altitude and a steady groundspeed of about 86 knots. When just west of Moriches Inlet, the GPS altitude was noted to be 60 feet, and the groundspeed was 85 knots. Several witnesses located near the crash site heard a sputtering engine. One witness stated that the airplane was running flawlessly, but he thought it was going to land because it was flying “way too slow.” Another witness who was located about 1,000 to 1,500 feet west of the Moriches Inlet reported seeing a flock of birds take flight followed by the airplane pitching up and then pitching down into the inlet. Postaccident inspection of the airframe, flight controls, engine, and engine systems revealed no evidence of preimpact failure or malfunction. Although minimal damage was noted on the propeller, no evidence of a bird strike was noted on any component of the airplane. The flaps and landing gear were extended, consistent with a precautionary landing. During the postaccident examination, the left side of the engine exhaust, where it enters the muffler, was circumferentially fractured at a weld, and cracks were noted in a weld-repaired area of the left side exhaust system components; the fracture and cracks can be attributed to overload as a result of impact. There was no evidence of exhaust gas escaping the repaired area. Further, no carbon monoxide was detected in specimens of the pilot or passenger taken during the postmortem examinations. Although a crack to the left side exhaust system had been detected 9 days earlier and repaired at a non-aviation facility, it did not play a role in the accident. The fuel selector was found positioned to the tip tanks, both of which were breached during the impact sequence; therefore, no determination could be made as to the quantity of fuel in the tanks at the time of the accident. Although the remaining quantity of fuel in the main fuel tank was not quantified during the postaccident investigation, the airplane had only been operated for 40 minutes since the main fuel tank was filled; the main fuel tank can hold over 2 hours of fuel. No obstructions of the fuel supply from the main or tip tanks were noted, and the engine-driven fuel pump tested satisfactorily. Although about 6 ounces of water was drained from the main fuel tank, the water was consistent with ocean water; no other contaminants from the tank were noted. Water contamination was also noted from a sample of fuel and water drained from an open fuel supply line for the right tip tank; however, the right tip tank was breached and the water was likely from the ocean. No fuel or contamination was noted in the carburetor bowl. Although a valve on the left side of the firewall was inoperative, which allowed heated air to enter the cockpit by the pilot’s side, no determination could be made as to how or if that factored into the accident sequence. Further, that condition had been known by the pilot since September. Based on the flight track and groundspeed recorded by the GPS and the fact that the landing gear and flaps were extended, it is likely that the pilot was performing a precautionary landing. However, the reason for the attempted precautionary landing could not be determined from the available evidence. Based on the witness statement of birds in the area, it is likely that during the precautionary landing, the pilot reacted to the birds by pitching the airplane up, stalled the airplane, and was unable to recover because of the low altitude.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
What happened, in order
- Unknown or undetermined during enroute
- Off-field or emergency landing during maneuvering
- Altitude deviation during maneuvering
- Aerodynamic stall/spin during maneuvering defining event
- Collision with terrain or object (not controlled flight into terrain) during uncontrolled descent
The NTSB's findings
- cause Aircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability › Performance/control parameters › Airspeed › Not attained/maintained
- cause Personnel issues › Task performance › Use of equip/info › Aircraft control › Pilot
- factor Environmental issues › Physical environment › Object/animal/substance › Animal(s)/bird(s) › Effect on operation
- factor Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action › Incorrect action performance › Pilot
Pilot
- Certificate: private
- Ratings: single-engine land
- Flight time: 500 hours in all
- Last flight review: July 1, 2012
- Medical certificate: Class 3 (with waivers/limitations)
- Seat: left
- Injury: fatal
The aircraft
- Last inspection: condition inspection, October 11, 2012; 3 hours since
- Maximum gross weight: 1,570 lb
- Seats: 2
- Landing gear: retractable
- Engine: Lycoming O-360-A1A (piston); 0 hours total
The flight
- Departed from: 1N2 East Moriches NY at 6:55 pm
- Destination: FRG Farmingdale NY
- Flight plan: none
Weather at the time
- Light: daylight
- Wind: from 200° at 12 knots
- Visibility: 10 statute miles
- Sky: clear
- Temperature: 66°F (19°C), dew point 57°F (14°C)
- Altimeter: 29.68 inHg
- Observation at 6:56 pm from HWV, 6 miles away
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Flight crew | 1 | |||
| Passengers | 1 |
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
The docket, the folder of records gathered during an investigation (maintenance records, photographs, witness statements, examinations), has not been read from the NTSB for this case yet; the list appears here once it has. Open the docket at the NTSB.
Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.
