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Accidents · NTSB ERA12LA188 · Final report

Piper PA-30 accident near Culpeper, Virginia, February 6, 2012

On February 6, 2012 at about 11:16 pm local time, a Piper PA-30, registered N1WE, was substantially damaged in an accident during landing (flare/touchdown) near Culpeper, Virginia (Culpeper Regional airport). It was a personal flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). No one was hurt; 3 people were on board or involved. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).

The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged

The pilot's failure to use the manufacturer's checklist to troubleshoot the perceived malfunction and thereby ensure the position of the landing gear before landing. The reason the landing gear were not down and locked could not be determined, as no mechanical failures or anomalies were reported before the accident or observed during postaccident testing.

Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.

What the record shows

Date
February 6, 2012 · about 11:16 pm local time
Place
Culpeper, Virginia · Culpeper Regional · map
Type
Accident
Injuries
No one was hurt; 3 people were on board or involved.
Weather
visual conditions (good weather)
Aircraft
Piper PA-30 · all PA-30s on the register
Registration
N1WE · no longer on the register · serial 30-1193
Damage
Substantial damage
Flight
Personal flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)

The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record

While approaching the destination airport, the pilot did not observe the green landing gear down-and-locked light illuminate when she moved the landing gear handle to the "down" position. She manipulated the handle several times and still did not observe the green light. The pilot stated that after she tried to manually extend the landing gear, the nose landing gear appeared to be extended in the viewing mirror, and she heard a "whistling" sound consistent with gear extension; however, the green down-and-locked light in the cockpit was not illuminated. The pilot continued to the airport to land. She reported that she heard the gear warning horn during the landing flare, but that it was "too late" to abort the landing, and the landing gear collapsed upon touchdown. After the accident, the landing gear was cycled and operated normally, although the gear down-and-locked light did not appear to be illuminated. However, the airplane’s navigation lights were observed to be in the “on” position. By design, the gear down-and-locked light illuminated more dimly with the navigation lights on (nighttime use) than with the navigation lights off (daytime use). When the emergency landing gear extension procedure was performed after the airplane’s navigation lights were turned off, the gear extended and locked down, and the corresponding gear down-and-locked light was visibly illuminated. The emergency checklist that the pilot used during the accident flight did not instruct the pilot to confirm the position of the navigation lights, and the pilot stated that she did not consult the pilot's operating handbook (POH) during the flight. If the pilot had reviewed the emergency gear extension checklist in the POH or if the checklist she used had included a check of the navigation lights, the pilot may have been better able to determine the position of the landing gear before touchdown.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

What happened, in order

  1. Landing gear collapse during landing (flare/touchdown) defining event

The NTSB's findings

  • cause Personnel issues › Task performance › Use of equip/info › Use of checklist › Pilot
  • cause Aircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability › Performance/control parameters › Configuration › Related operating info
  • cause Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Landing gear system › Gear position and warning › Incorrect use/operation

Pilot

  • Certificate: airline transport pilot, flight instructor, commercial pilot
  • Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instructor: airplane multi-engine; instructor: airplane single-engine; instructor: instrument airplane; instrument: airplane
  • Flight time: 4,100 hours in all; 175 in this make and model; 85 in the last 90 days; 28 in the last 30 days; 3,900 as pilot in command; 2,305 on instruments
  • Last flight review: September 21, 2011
  • Medical certificate: Class 1
  • Seat: left
  • Injury: no injuries

The aircraft

  • Airframe total time: 4,128 hours
  • Last inspection: annual inspection, July 22, 2011
  • Maximum gross weight: 3,725 lb
  • Seats: 4
  • Landing gear: retractable
  • Engine 1: Lycoming IO-320 SERIES (piston); 0 hours total
  • Engine 2: Lycoming IO-320 SERIES (piston); 0 hours total

The flight

  • Departed from: HGR Hagerstown MD at 10:10 pm
  • Destination: CJR Culpeper VA
  • Flight plan: none
  • Runway 22, 5,000 ft by 100 ft

Weather at the time

  • Light: dusk
  • Visibility: 10 statute miles
  • Sky: clear
  • Temperature: 41°F (5°C), dew point 32°F (0°C)
  • Altimeter: 30.10 inHg
  • Observation at 11:15 pm from CJR

Injuries

FatalSeriousMinorNone
Flight crew1
Passengers2

Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report

The docket, the folder of records gathered during an investigation (maintenance records, photographs, witness statements, examinations), has not been read from the NTSB for this case yet; the list appears here once it has. Open the docket at the NTSB.

Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.