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Accidents · NTSB ERA11LA502 · Final report

Cessna P210N accident near South Deerfield, Massachusetts, September 23, 2011

On September 23, 2011 at about 8:15 pm local time, a Cessna P210N, registered N210LE, was substantially damaged in an accident during initial climb near South Deerfield, Massachusetts. It was a personal flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). 2 people were seriously injured. The weather was instrument conditions (cloud, fog or low visibility).

The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged

The failure of the electrical system due to an alternator failure during flight in instrument meteorological conditions, and the pilot’s inadequate preflight inspection and failure to use the approved checklist for the dual alternator system. Contributing to the accident was the inadequate maintenance because the alternator restart battery pack was not replaced annually, as required by the airplane service manual.

Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.

What the record shows

Date
September 23, 2011 · about 8:15 pm local time
Place
South Deerfield, Massachusetts · map
Type
Accident
Injuries
2 people were seriously injured.
Weather
instrument conditions (cloud, fog or low visibility)
Aircraft
Cessna P210N · all P210Ns on the register
Registration
N210LE · no longer on the register · serial P21000825
Damage
Substantial damage
Flight
Personal flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)

The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record

According to the pilot, during the initial climb, the airplane experienced a loss of electrical power. The pilot said that he unsuccessfully attempted to restart the alternators by cycling the on/off switches. The airplane was in instrument meteorological conditions, and when he saw a clearing in the clouds, the pilot made a “standard rate” spiral down through it. After exiting the clouds, he found a suitable place to land. On the approach, about 300 feet above ground level, the airplane started to porpoise. The pilot attempted to correct the porpoise, but the nose of the airplane struck the top of a tree before impacting the ground. Postaccident examination of the airplane’s flight controls did not reveal any mechanical anomalies. The engine examination revealed that incorrect pistons were installed at the time the engine was overhauled about 350 hours before the accident, but this did not play a role in the accident. The airplane was equipped with a dual alternator system. A postaccident interview with the pilot revealed that he attempted to energize the alternator’s field utilizing the pilot operating handbook procedure for a single alternator system. The dual alternator system emergency procedure was a supplement for the pilot operating handbook, and the checklist that was located in the airplane did not contain the normal or emergency procedures that were required for the dual alternator system. The emergency procedure for the dual system stated to depress the ALT RESTART switch, located next to the circuit breaker panel; the pilot stated that he did not know about the ALT RESTART switch. The No. 1 alternator was tested and examined. The No. 1 alternator functioned for 5 minutes during the test before it stopped producing power. It showed signs of excessive heat consistent with overloading when examined internally. The No. 2 alternator was not tested due to accident damage. The internal examination revealed burnt windings. The onboard engine data monitoring system indicated that the battery voltage decreased rapidly just prior to the loss of electrical power. A postaccident examination of the airplane’s electrical system revealed that the alternator restart battery pack did not contain enough voltage to reenergize the alternator field in the event that an alternator failed. A functional test of the system was required every 25 hours to ensure it worked correctly. The batteries were required as per the Airplane Service Manual to be replaced annually or sooner if the alternators cannot be restarted under a heavy load electrical load. A review of the airplane’s maintenance records revealed that most recent documentation for the alternator restart system batteries change was about 12 years ago. It is likely that the No. 2 alternator failed at an unknown time, which resulted in the entire electrical system on the airplane feeding off of the No. 1 alternator. The No. 1 alternator subsequently overloaded and failed, and the airplane’s battery was unable to sustain the electrical system demand. If the BEFORE TAKEOFF checklist for a dual alternator equipped airplane had been completed, the pilot could have detected that the airplane’s electrical charging system was not working correctly.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

What happened, in order

  1. Electrical system malf/failure during initial climb defining event
  2. Off-field or emergency landing during emergency descent
  3. Collision with terrain or object (not controlled flight into terrain) during emergency descent
  4. Collision with terrain or object (not controlled flight into terrain) during uncontrolled descent

The NTSB's findings

  • cause Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Electrical power system › AC generator › alternator › Failure
  • cause Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Electrical power system › DC power distribution system › Failure
  • Environmental issues › Conditions/weather/phenomena › Ceiling/visibility/precip › Below VFR minima › Contributed to outcome
  • cause Personnel issues › Task performance › Use of equip/info › Use of checklist › Pilot
  • cause Personnel issues › Task performance › Inspection › Preflight inspection › Pilot
  • factor Personnel issues › Task performance › Maintenance › Scheduled/routine maintenance › Maintenance personnel

Pilot

  • Certificate: private
  • Ratings: single-engine land; instrument: airplane
  • Flight time: 1,452 hours in all; 985 in this make and model; 56 in the last 90 days; 32 in the last 30 days; 1,284 as pilot in command
  • Last flight review: January 19, 2011
  • Medical certificate: Class 3 (with waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: left
  • Injury: serious injuries

The aircraft

  • Airframe total time: 2,985 hours
  • Last inspection: annual inspection, August 11, 2011
  • Seats: 6
  • Landing gear: fixed
  • Engine: Continental Motors Inc. TSIO-520-AF3B (piston); 0 hours total

The flight

  • Departed from: BAF West Field MA at 7:39 pm
  • Destination: BHB Bar Habor ME
  • Flight plan: IFR

Weather at the time

  • Light: daylight
  • Wind: from 060° at 5 knots
  • Visibility: 3 statute miles
  • Sky: overcast at 2,400 ft; scat at 2,000 ft
  • Temperature: 70°F (21°C), dew point 66°F (19°C)
  • Altimeter: 30.07 inHg
  • Observation at 8:10 pm from ORE

Injuries

FatalSeriousMinorNone
Flight crew1
Passengers1

Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report

The docket, the folder of records gathered during an investigation (maintenance records, photographs, witness statements, examinations), has not been read from the NTSB for this case yet; the list appears here once it has. Open the docket at the NTSB.

Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.