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Accidents · NTSB ERA11LA390 · Final report

Aero Vodochody L39C accident near West Milford, New Jersey, July 9, 2011

On July 9, 2011 at about 4:39 pm local time, a Aero Vodochody L39C, registered N111XN, was substantially damaged in an accident during landing (landing roll) near West Milford, New Jersey (Greenwood Lake Airport). It was a personal flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). 1 person was seriously injured. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).

The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged

The pilot's excessive airspeed and failure to attain the proper landing point, which resulted in the airplane touching down too fast and too far down the short runway. Contributing to the accident was the pilot's failure to retract the flaps after landing, which resulted in delayed brake activation, the pilot’s decision to land on a runway with an insufficient safety margin for the landing conditions, and the pilot’s failure to use the emergency brake lever.

Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.

What the record shows

Date
July 9, 2011 · about 4:39 pm local time
Place
West Milford, New Jersey · Greenwood Lake Airport · map
Type
Accident
Injuries
1 person was seriously injured.
Weather
visual conditions (good weather)
Aircraft
Aero Vodochody L39C · all L39Cs on the register
Registration
N111XN · no longer on the register · serial 934873
Damage
Substantial damage
Flight
Personal flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)

The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record

While landing on runway 24 at an airport that had obstructions on both ends of the runway, had only 3,471 feet of usable runway available, and which required a 3.50 degree glideslope for landing, the pilot of the ex-military jet trainer landed the airplane and overran the runway. According to the pilot's written statement, during the landing he touched down 5 to 6 feet prior to the painted "24" on the runway. He then lowered the nose of the airplane and "retracted" the wing flaps. He then pushed the control stick forward and applied the brakes by squeezing the control-stick-mounted brake handle, but braking did not occur. He then applied the brakes a second time, extended the speed brakes, wiggled the control stick, and pushed the control stick forward and applied the brakes a third time without result before applying them a fourth time. He then felt the anti-skid engage. The airplane then struck a chain link fence and went over an embankment before impacting the ground, nosing over, and coming to rest inverted. The pilot was seriously injured during the impact sequence and the airplane incurred substantial damage to the forward fuselage. Review of the pilot's statement also revealed that he had not touched down at 96 knots indicated airspeed, as specified by the landing speeds chart, but had touched down at 106 knots, which would have extended his landing distance by about 20 percent. Further, witnesses observed the airplane actually touch down about 300 to 400 feet past the painted "24" on the runway, not the 5 to 6 feet prior to the painted "24" as stated by the pilot. Skid marks that matched the width of the airplane's main landing gear geometry were also present on the runway surface. The marks started about 1,270 feet past the painted "24" on the runway and continued until they left the pavement. Review of performance planning charts also revealed that the safety margin for operating at the airport was insufficient: even if the airplane had touched down just prior to the painted "24" on the runway, the pilot would already have 205 feet of the usable runway behind him, and with moderate braking the landing roll would have been about 2,500 feet, and the landing distance, when landing over a 50 foot obstacle, would have been about 3,370 feet. With intensive braking, the landing roll would have been about 2,000 feet, and the landing distance, when landing over a 50 foot obstacle, would have been about 2,900 feet. The pilot also would not have met the accelerate/stop criteria for takeoff or a balked landing, as the airplane required 3,600 feet to accelerate to takeoff speed and then stop after an aborted takeoff. Examination of the airplane did not reveal any evidence of a preimpact mechanical failure or malfunction that would have resulted in failure of the normal braking system. The flaps were also in the 44 degree (landing) position and had not been retracted, as was required for a minimum run landing to reduce lift, increase weight on the wheels, and reduce tire skidding. Examination of the flight manual also revealed that, in the event of a brake failure, activation of the main wheel brake units still would have been possible if the pilot had operated the emergency brake lever. According to the flight manual, he should have used the emergency brake lever if he believed that he had lost normal braking.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

What happened, in order

  1. Landing area overshoot during landing
  2. Runway excursion during landing (landing roll) defining event
  3. Collision during takeoff/land during landing (landing roll)

The NTSB's findings

  • cause Aircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability › Performance/control parameters › Airspeed › Not attained/maintained
  • cause Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action › Incorrect action performance › Pilot
  • Aircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability › Performance/control parameters › Surface speed/braking › Attain/maintain not possible
  • factor Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Flight control system › TE flap control system › Incorrect use/operation
  • cause Aircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability › Performance/control parameters › Descent/approach/glide path › Not attained/maintained
  • factor Personnel issues › Action/decision › Info processing/decision › Decision making/judgment › Pilot

Pilot

  • Certificate: private
  • Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instrument: airplane
  • Flight time: 1,700 hours in all; 60 in this make and model; 100 in the last 90 days; 15 in the last 30 days; 1,650 as pilot in command
  • Last flight review: September 1, 2009
  • Medical certificate: Class 3 (without waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: frt
  • Injury: serious injuries

The aircraft

  • Airframe total time: 460 hours
  • Last inspection: annual inspection, July 1, 2010
  • Maximum gross weight: 11,244 lb
  • Seats: 2
  • Landing gear: retractable
  • Engine: Ivchenko A1-25TL (turbofan); 0 hours total
  • Operator: Air Vatche Inc.

The flight

  • Departed from: MGJ Montgomery NY at 4:20 pm
  • Destination: 4N1 West Milford NJ
  • Flight plan: none
  • Runway 24, 3,471 ft by 60 ft

Weather at the time

  • Light: daylight
  • Wind: from 190° at 5 knots
  • Visibility: 10 statute miles
  • Sky: clear
  • Temperature: 81°F (27°C), dew point 70°F (21°C)
  • Altimeter: 29.87 inHg
  • Observation at 4:39 pm from 4N1

Injuries

FatalSeriousMinorNone
Flight crew1

Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report

The docket, the folder of records gathered during an investigation (maintenance records, photographs, witness statements, examinations), has not been read from the NTSB for this case yet; the list appears here once it has. Open the docket at the NTSB.

Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.