Piper Aircraft INC PA-44-180 accident near West Palm Beach, Florida, November 11, 2010
On November 11, 2010 at about 11:05 pm local time, a Piper Aircraft INC PA-44-180, registered N883FT, was substantially damaged in an accident during initial climb near West Palm Beach, Florida (Palm Beach International Airpo airport). It was an instructional flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). 4 people were killed. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).
The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
The failure of both the pilot and the certified flight instructor to ensure that the left fuel selector was in the on position for takeoff and their failure to follow the proper procedures when the left engine lost power shortly after takeoff, resulting in an in-flight loss of control.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- November 11, 2010 · about 11:05 pm local time
- Place
- West Palm Beach, Florida · Palm Beach International Airpo · map
- Type
- Accident
- Injuries
- 4 people were killed.
- Weather
- visual conditions (good weather)
- Aircraft
- Piper Aircraft INC PA-44-180 4496249
- Registration
- N883FT · no longer on the register · serial 4496249
- Damage
- Substantial damage
- Flight
- Instructional flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)
The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record
The commercial pilot’s most recent flight in a multi-engine airplane was about 1 year before the accident. During initial climb after takeoff, the certified flight instructor (CFI) reported to the tower controller that the airplane had experienced an engine failure and that they needed to return to the runway. The controller cleared the flight to land on any runway, but the airplane subsequently banked left and impacted the ground in a nose-down attitude. Examination of the wreckage revealed that the propeller for the engine that lost power (the left engine) was not in the feathered position and that the landing gear was in the extended position, which is contrary to the published emergency procedure for an engine failure during takeoff. Postaccident download of avionics data revealed that the left engine lost fuel flow and rpm less than 1 minute after takeoff power was applied, and examination of the wreckage revealed that the left fuel selector lever and fuel selector valve were found in the off position. The taxiing checklist for the airplane specified that the fuel selectors were to be switched from the on position to the crossfeed position to ensure that the crossfeeds were working properly; the before takeoff checklist specified that the fuel selectors should be set to the on position. Postaccident ground testing performed in an airplane of the same model as the accident airplane revealed that, when the fuel selectors are moved from the crossfeed position to the on position (or from the on position to the crossfeed position), the fuel selector passes through the off position. The ground testing also showed that, when the test airplane’s left fuel selector was placed in the off position and then takeoff power was applied to both engines, the left engine lost power completely after 36 seconds. Therefore, the loss of engine power during the accident flight is consistent with the takeoff having been performed with left fuel selector in the off position.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
What happened, in order
- Fuel starvation during initial climb defining event
- Loss of engine power (total) during initial climb
- Loss of control in flight during initial climb
- Collision with terrain or object (not controlled flight into terrain) during uncontrolled descent
The NTSB's findings
- cause Aircraft › Fluids/misc hardware › Fluids › Fuel › Incorrect use/operation
- cause Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action › Lack of action › Instructor/check pilot
- Personnel issues › Experience/knowledge › Training › Recent instruct/training recvd › Pilot
- cause Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action › Lack of action › Pilot
- cause Personnel issues › Task performance › Use of equip/info › Aircraft control › Instructor/check pilot
- cause Personnel issues › Task performance › Use of equip/info › Aircraft control › Pilot
Pilot
- Certificate: commercial pilot
- Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instrument: airplane
- Flight time: 306 hours in all; 47 in this make and model; 11 in the last 30 days; 199 as pilot in command
- Last flight review: October 1, 2009
- Medical certificate: Class 3 (with waivers/limitations)
- Seat: left
- Injury: fatal
Flight instructor
- Certificate: flight instructor, commercial pilot
- Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instructor: airplane multi-engine; instructor: airplane single-engine; instructor: instrument airplane; instrument: airplane
- Flight time: 2,278 hours in all; 492 in this make and model
- Last flight review: August 27, 2010
- Medical certificate: Class 3 (with waivers/limitations)
- Seat: rgt
- Injury: fatal
The aircraft
- Airframe total time: 1,638 hours
- Last inspection: 100-hour inspection, October 25, 2010
- Maximum gross weight: 3,800 lb
- Seats: 4
- Landing gear: retractable
- Engine 1: Lycoming LO-360-A1H6 (piston); 0 hours total
- Engine 2: Lycoming O-360-A1H6 (piston); 0 hours total
- Fire on the ground
- Operator: Fit Aviation LLC
The flight
- Departed from: PBI West Palm Beach FL at 11:05 pm
- Destination: MLB Melbourne FL
- Flight plan: VFR
- Runway 10R, 3,213 ft by 75 ft
- A second pilot was aboard
Weather at the time
- Light: dusk
- Wind: from 200° at 9 knots
- Visibility: 10 statute miles
- Sky: scat at 6,000 ft
- Temperature: 75°F (24°C), dew point 55°F (13°C)
- Altimeter: 30.12 inHg
- Observation at 10:53 pm from PBI
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Flight crew | 2 | |||
| Passengers | 2 |
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
The docket, the folder of records gathered during an investigation (maintenance records, photographs, witness statements, examinations), has not been read from the NTSB for this case yet; the list appears here once it has. Open the docket at the NTSB.
Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.