Piper PA-32R-301 accident near Washington, Georgia, August 10, 2010
On August 10, 2010 at about 6:15 am local time, a Piper PA-32R-301, registered N220ST, was substantially damaged in an accident during enroute (cruise) near Washington, Georgia. It was a positioning flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). 1 person was killed. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).
The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
The manufacturer's inadequate quality control and improper manufacture of the fuel servo diaphragm assembly, which resulted in fatigue cracking of the hub stud and subsequent loss of engine power due to fuel starvation.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- August 10, 2010 · about 6:15 am local time
- Place
- Washington, Georgia · map
- Type
- Accident
- Injuries
- 1 person was killed.
- Weather
- visual conditions (good weather)
- Aircraft
- Piper PA-32R-301 · all PA-32R-301s on the register
- Registration
- N220ST · registry record · serial 3246220
- Damage
- Substantial damage
- Flight
- Positioning flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)
The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record
During the cruise portion of a positioning flight, the pilot reported a loss of engine power to air traffic controllers. He was then radar vectored towards the closest airport but was unable to reach it. The airplane impacted trees, was partially consumed by a postimpact fire, and the pilot was fatally injured. Examination of the engine's fuel servo revealed that the hub stud in the fuel servo diaphragm assembly was fractured, which would have resulted in the fuel servo being unable to properly meter fuel. Review of maintenance records revealed that an engine overhaul had been completed approximately 18 hours prior to the accident and that the fuel servo was shipped to the fuel servo manufacturer, where the unit was overhauled using the manufacturer's components. Examination of the hub stud revealed that it fractured as a result of fatigue cracking. The most likely cause of the fatigue cracking was a lack of braze material, which should have filled the gap between the hub stud and the hub and would have supported the shoulder of the hub stud. The manufacturer's brazing process documentation indicated that a visual check would have been performed to ensure that the braze did not exceed a certain measurement over the hub or hub stud, but there was no specific indication that a check would have been made to ensure that the braze was visible at the joint edges as required by the braze process specification, nor did any of the records provided by the manufacturer indicate the quantity of braze to be used for each assembly or how it was applied. The hub stud from the airplane and a hub stud from an exemplar assembly (from the same batch) were also found to be significantly softer than specified by the manufacturer's assembly drawing. Based on the hardness measurements, the ultimate tensile strengths of these hub studs was only about 80 percent of the expected tensile strength. Fatigue resistance of the hub stud would have correlated with the tensile strength, so the reduced hardness relative to the specification likely played some role in the rapid onset and propagation of the fatigue cracking. The reduced hardness of the hub studs indicated that the thermal history for the brazing process was either incorrectly specified or that the process was not properly controlled for this lot of assemblies. Also indicative of the manufacturer’s poor quality control was the lack of conformance to the drawings for the hub stud from the airplane and the exemplar hub studs; these hub studs had a groove perpendicular to the axis of the stud at the termination of the threads on the hub end, which was not in the drawing, and may have increased the stress concentrations. The hub stud from the accident fractured at the midplane of this groove, at the plane of maximum stress concentration.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
What happened, in order
- Loss of engine power (total) during enroute (cruise) defining event
- Off-field or emergency landing during emergency descent
- Collision with terrain or object (not controlled flight into terrain) during emergency descent
The NTSB's findings
- cause Organizational issues › Development › Manufacture/production › Equipment manufacture › Manufacturer
- cause Aircraft › Aircraft power plant › Engine fuel and control › Fuel control/carburetor › Failure
Pilot
- Certificate: commercial pilot
- Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; single-engine sea; instructor: airplane single-engine; instrument: airplane
- Flight time: 2,250 hours in all
- Last flight review: December 21, 2009
- Medical certificate: Class 2 (without waivers/limitations)
- Seat: left
- Injury: fatal
The aircraft
- Airframe total time: 1,960 hours
- Last inspection: annual inspection, July 30, 2010
- Maximum gross weight: 3,600 lb
- Seats: 6
- Landing gear: retractable
- Engine: Lycoming IO-540-K1G5 (piston); 0 hours total
- Fire on the ground
- Operator: Coastal Aviation INC
The flight
- Departed from: MDQ Huntsville AL at 4:48 am
- Destination: LRO Mt. Pleasant SC
- Flight plan: IFR
Weather at the time
- Light: night
- Wind: from 100° at 3 knots
- Visibility: 10 statute miles
- Sky: clear
- Temperature: 79°F (26°C), dew point 70°F (21°C)
- Altimeter: 29.98 inHg
- Observation at 6:20 am from 3J7, 19 miles away
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Flight crew | 1 |
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
The docket, the folder of records gathered during an investigation (maintenance records, photographs, witness statements, examinations), has not been read from the NTSB for this case yet; the list appears here once it has. Open the docket at the NTSB.
Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.
