The U.S. aircraft register, updated daily · Carbon Free Flight by 2050
Accidents · NTSB ERA10FA283 · Final report

Schweizer 269C-1 accident near Boxborough, Massachusetts, May 26, 2010

On May 26, 2010 at about 8:45 pm local time, a Schweizer 269C-1 (helicopter), registered N73SJ, was substantially damaged in an accident during maneuvering near Boxborough, Massachusetts. It was an instructional flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). 1 person was killed and 1 person was seriously injured. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).

Preview. This page is not yet listed for search engines.

The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged

The FAA inspector's rapid reduction of power which resulted in a loss of engine power and his decision to initiate a turn during the autorotation without sufficient altitude to clear obstacles. Contributing to the accident was the FAA’s lack of comprehensive currency requirements in the make and model helicopter and the inspector's specific limited recent flight experience related to this make and model helicopter.

Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 4, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.

What the record shows

Date
May 26, 2010 · about 8:45 pm local time
Place
Boxborough, Massachusetts · map
Type
Accident
Injuries
1 person was killed and 1 person was seriously injured.
Weather
visual conditions (good weather)
Aircraft
Schweizer 269C-1 · all 269C-1s on the register
Registration
N73SJ · registry record · serial 0335
Damage
Substantial damage
Flight
Instructional flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)

The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record

The purpose of the accident flight was for the commercial pilot to complete her certified flight instructor (CFI) checkride with a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) inspector. According to the commercial pilot, they were returning to the departure airport after satisfactorily completing all of the required maneuvers when the FAA inspector unexpectedly announced he was simulating an engine failure and chopped the throttle. As the commercial pilot attempted to recover the helicopter from the maneuver, she realized the helicopter had experienced an actual power loss. The FAA inspector attempted to troubleshoot the power loss and the commercial pilot prepared for a straight-ahead forced landing to a road. During the descent, the FAA inspector instructed the commercial pilot to turn the helicopter into the wind, and came on the controls to initiate a turn which resulted in a flight path toward wooded terrain, and away from the road. Shortly after, the helicopter impacted trees and terrain in an upright attitude. Examination of the helicopter revealed no preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation. The commercial pilot had accumulated 206 hours of flight experience, all of which was in light piston-powered helicopters, and a majority of which was gained exclusively in the make and model of the accident helicopter. The FAA inspector had accumulated a significant amount of flight experience in large turbine powered helicopters; however, he had only accumulated 2 hours of flight experience in make and model of the accident helicopter (a light piston-powered helicopter), during the previous 7 years. This experience was accumulated over four flights, all less than an hour in duration, during the 16 months prior to the accident. Examination of the flight manual for the helicopter revealed a warning to avoid "throttle chops" to full idle to prevent the possibility of engine stoppage. It was unclear whether the FAA inspector was familiar with this warning. On the day of the accident, several different pilots performed a number of simulated engine failures in the helicopter under the same atmospheric conditions, without experiencing a loss of power. At the time of the accident, FAA policy required inspectors in the "4040" flight evaluation program to maintain their currency by performing a certain number of tasks each quarter, assuring their proficiency through self-certification. There was no flight hour requirement for maintaining their proficiency. Additionally FAA inspectors in the "4040" program were not required to accumulate any recent flight experience in specific helicopter make and model/type. In contrast, the FAA did require designated pilot examiners who performed pilot evaluations on behalf of the FAA, to have logged at least 5 hours of PIC flight time in that specific helicopter make and model/type.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

What happened, in order

  1. Loss of engine power (total) during maneuvering defining event
  2. Autorotation Off-field or emergency landing
  3. Autorotation Collision with terrain or object (not controlled flight into terrain)

The NTSB's findings

  • cause Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action › Incorrect action performance › FAA or designated personnel
  • factor Organizational issues › Management › Policy/procedure › Adequacy of policy/proc › FAA/Regulator
  • factor Personnel issues › Experience/knowledge › Experience/qualifications › Recent experience w/ equipment › FAA or designated personnel

Pilot

  • Certificate: commercial pilot
  • Ratings: instrument: helicopter; rotorcraft: helicopter
  • Flight time: 206 hours in all; 128 in this make and model; 30 in the last 90 days; 8 in the last 30 days; 137 as pilot in command; 0 on instruments
  • Last flight review: March 20, 2010
  • Medical certificate: Class 1 (without waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: left
  • Injury: serious injuries

Pilot (unmanned)

  • Certificate: airline transport pilot, flight instructor, commercial pilot
  • Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instructor: airplane multi-engine; instructor: airplane single-engine; instructor: helicopter; instructor: instrument airplane; instructor: instrument helicopter; instrument: airplane; instrument: helicopter; rotorcraft: helicopter
  • Flight time: 8,898 hours in all; 2 in this make and model; 8 in the last 90 days; 1 in the last 30 days; 7,970 as pilot in command; 3,535 on instruments
  • Last flight review: October 29, 2008
  • Medical certificate: Class 2 (with waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: rgt
  • Injury: fatal

The aircraft

  • Airframe total time: 957 hours
  • Last inspection: 100-hour inspection, April 12, 2010; 82 hours since
  • Seats: 3
  • Landing gear: fixed
  • Engine: Lycoming HIO-360-G1A (piston); 0 hours total

The flight

  • Departed from: BED Bedford MA
  • Destination: BED Bedford MA
  • Flight plan: none
  • A second pilot was aboard

Weather at the time

  • Light: daylight
  • Wind: from 340° at 6 knots
  • Visibility: 10 statute miles
  • Sky: clear
  • Temperature: 93°F (34°C), dew point 63°F (17°C)
  • Altimeter: 29.65 inHg
  • Observation at 8:56 pm from BED, 11 miles away

Injuries

FatalSeriousMinorNone
Flight crew11

Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report

The docket, the folder of records gathered during an investigation (maintenance records, photographs, witness statements, examinations), has not been read from the NTSB for this case yet; the list appears here once it has. Open the docket at the NTSB.

About this page

Everything above comes from the NTSB's public accident database: the narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words, and the coded tables behind its report (pilot, aircraft, flight, weather, injuries, sequence of events) are written out in plain English. Pilots' ages, home towns and medical details are left out on purpose. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, the folder of records gathered during the investigation, shown as the NTSB released them (the NTSB redacts some personal details first) and listed under the NTSB's own titles. This site's own text never names pilots, passengers or anyone else involved. A preliminary report describes what is known soon after the event and can change; the final report, with the probable cause, usually follows one to two years later and this page is refreshed when it does. Case number ERA10FA283.