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Accidents · NTSB ERA09FA141 · Final report

Remos Aircraft Gmbh Remos GX accident near Sebring, Florida, January 25, 2009

On January 25, 2009 at about 12:45 pm local time, a Remos Aircraft Gmbh Remos GX, registered N9GX, was substantially damaged in an accident during takeoff near Sebring, Florida (Sebring Regional Airport). It was an aerial observation flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). 1 person was killed and 1 person was seriously injured. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).

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The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged

The pilot's inadequate preflight assembly and inspection which resulted in the pushrod connection to the left aileron not being connected, which led to a subsequent inflight loss of control and impact with terrain.

Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 4, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.

What the record shows

Date
January 25, 2009 · about 12:45 pm local time
Place
Sebring, Florida · Sebring Regional Airport · map
Type
Accident
Injuries
1 person was killed and 1 person was seriously injured.
Weather
visual conditions (good weather)
Aircraft
Remos Aircraft Gmbh Remos GX · all Remos GXs on the register
Registration
N9GX · registry record · serial 299
Damage
Substantial damage
Flight
Aerial observation flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)

The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record

During a two airplane aerial photography flight at an airshow, after takeoff the lead airplane was observed to roll to the right, with both the left and right ailerons drooping trailing edge down. The airplane descended while turning, and reached a bank angle of about 80 degrees and impacted right wing tip first on a parking apron. The airplane skidded around to the right, slid across the apron and came to rest next to a taxiway. The pilot was seriously injured, the photographer in the right seat was fatally injured, and the airplane was substantially damaged during the impact sequence. The airplane was manufactured with folding wings. Examination revealed that the roll control system had not been properly connected prior to takeoff. On the day before the accident, the pilot and the national service manager for the airplane manufacturer had been demonstrating the wing folding mechanism for prospective customers. On the morning of the accident flight, the national service manager and the pilot of the accident airplane pulled both of the airplanes that were to be used for the aerial photography flight out from under the display tent. Both airplanes had their left wings in the folded position. When they pulled the accident airplane out from under the display tent, the national service manager was at the left wing root. He inserted the left wing's main wing securing bolt, installed the securing pin, and then went over to the other airplane to preflight it. He did not however, connect the pushrod connection for the left aileron before going over to the other airplane, nor did he advise the pilot that the "coupling was not connected". The pilot, who was at the left wingtip when he and the national service manager were unfolding the left wing, thought that he saw the national service manager go inside the airplane, and assumed he was connecting the aileron. Review of the Pilot Operating Handbook revealed that after connecting the wings to the fuselage, "the pushrod connection of the ailerons MUST be established," a check for "free and full travel of all control surfaces" was required, and that a placard was located in the plane in view of the pilot which advised that as part of the "START-CHECKLIST", the flight controls were required to be "Checked".

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

What happened, in order

  1. Preflight or dispatch event during prior to flight
  2. Flight control sys malf/fail during prior to flight
  3. Loss of control in flight during takeoff defining event
  4. Collision with terrain or object (not controlled flight into terrain) during uncontrolled descent

The NTSB's findings

  • cause Personnel issues › Task performance › Inspection › Preflight inspection › Pilot
  • Aircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability › Performance/control parameters › Lateral/bank control › Attain/maintain not possible
  • cause Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Flight control system › Aileron control system › Incorrect service/maintenance

Pilot

  • Certificate: commercial pilot
  • Ratings: single-engine land; instructor: airplane single-engine; instrument: airplane
  • Flight time: 1,600 hours in all; 3 in this make and model; 250 in the last 90 days; 150 in the last 30 days; 1,500 as pilot in command; 250 on instruments
  • Medical certificate: Class 1 (without waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: left
  • Injury: serious injuries

The aircraft

  • Airframe total time: 15 hours
  • Last inspection: condition inspection, January 8, 2009
  • Maximum gross weight: 1,320 lb
  • Seats: 2
  • Landing gear: fixed
  • Engine: Rotax 912 UL-S (piston); 0 hours total
  • Operator: Remos Aircraft Inc.

The flight

  • Departed from: SEF Sebring FL at 12:45 pm
  • Destination: SEF Sebring FL
  • Flight plan: none
  • Runway 18, 5,234 ft by 100 ft

Weather at the time

  • Light: daylight
  • Visibility: 5 statute miles
  • Sky: clear
  • Temperature: 46°F (8°C), dew point 45°F (7°C)
  • Altimeter: 30.19 inHg
  • Observation at 12:45 pm from OBE, 29 miles away

Injuries

FatalSeriousMinorNone
Flig1
Passengers1

Other NTSB records under N9GX the same tail number, which may have belonged to a different aircraft at the time

2006-04-24ATL06LA070 · accident near Charleston, SC · substantial damage · fatal

About this page

Everything above comes from the NTSB's public accident database: the narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words, and the coded tables behind its report (pilot, aircraft, flight, weather, injuries, sequence of events) are written out in plain English. Pilots' ages, home towns and medical details are left out on purpose. The docket at the NTSB holds the report as a PDF and the investigation's photographs and documents. This site never names pilots, passengers or anyone else involved. A preliminary report describes what is known soon after the event and can change; the final report, with the probable cause, usually follows one to two years later and this page is refreshed when it does. Case number ERA09FA141.