Boeing 747 incident near Atlanta, Georgia, September 21, 2014
On September 21, 2014 at about 6:05 pm local time, a 1990 Boeing 747, registered N669US, was involved in an incident during initial climb near Atlanta, Georgia (Hartsfield - Jackson Atlanta I). It was flown under scheduled airline rules (Part 121). No one was hurt; 333 people were on board or involved. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).
The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
Turbine Overhaul Service's aggressive grit blasting and incomplete masking of the blade root neck that allowed the no grit blast area being exposed during the overhaul of the blade resulting in blasting media being embedded in the blade root from which a fatigue crack developed. The fatigue crack propagated until separation of the blade occurred that resulted in a complete loss of engine power. The fire was caused by the B-nut on the hydraulic line from the fuel pump and pulsation damper loosening from engine vibration after the compressor blade separated spraying high pressure fluid into the engine compartment that ignited on the hot engine cases.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- September 21, 2014 · about 6:05 pm local time
- Place
- Atlanta, Georgia · Hartsfield - Jackson Atlanta I · map
- Type
- Incident
- Injuries
- No one was hurt; 333 people were on board or involved.
- Weather
- visual conditions (good weather)
- Aircraft
- Boeing 747 451, built 1990 · all 747s on the register
- Registration
- N669US · no longer on the register · serial 24224
- Damage
- Not recorded
- Flight
- Flight · scheduled airline rules (Part 121)
The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record
The airplane, a Boeing 747-451, had just taken off when the No. 4 engine, a Pratt & Whitney PW4056, lost power and then caught fire. The crew had to discharge two fire bottles into the engine's nacelle before the fire was extinguished. The airplane returned to the airport for a three-engine landing without further incident. The disassembly of the engine revealed one 5th stage compressor blade was fractured transversely across the blade neck. The metallurgical examination of the blade confirmed a fatigue fracture that had originated from the aft concave side corner of the blade neck. The metallurgical examination also revealed evidence of grit blasting with embedded aluminum oxide media on the blade neck that, per the overhaul instructions, is a no grit blast area. Grit blasting of the blade root's contact surfaces with aluminum oxide media is a preparatory step for the application of plasma spray material, which is one of the repairs that was accomplished to the fractured blade. The blade was overhauled by Turbine Overhaul Services (TOS), Singapore. TOS is an FAA-certificated Part 145 repair station for the overhaul and repair of turbine engine compressor blades and vanes. An audit of TOS's PW4000 5th stage compressor blade overhaul process showed that it conformed to the requirements except for the grit blasting operation that showed the grit blasting gun was being held to close to the blade. In addition, the masking process that was in use could result in no grit blast areas of the blade root being exposed to grit blasting. The fire was caused by hydraulic fluid that leaked from the pressure line to pulse damper B-nut at the pump that loosened due to vibration following the compressor blade separation.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
What happened, in order
- Loss of engine power (total) during initial climb defining event
- Powerplant sys/comp malf/fail during initial climb
- Fire/smoke (non-impact) during initial climb
The NTSB's findings
- cause Personnel issues › Task performance › Use of equip/info › Use of equip/system › Maintenance personnel
Pilot
- Certificate: airline transport pilot, commercial pilot
- Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; single-engine sea; instrument: airplane
- Flight time: 13,562 hours in all; 4,176 in this make and model; 142 in the last 90 days
- Last flight review: July 30, 2014
- Medical certificate: Class 1
- Seat: left
- Injury: no injuries
Co-pilot
- Certificate: airline transport pilot
- Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instrument: airplane
- Flight time: 12,998 hours in all; 293 in this make and model; 170 in the last 90 days
- Last flight review: May 1, 2014
- Medical certificate: Class 1
- Seat: rgt
- Injury: no injuries
The aircraft
- Airframe total time: 103,501 hours
- Maximum gross weight: 892,450 lb
- Seats: 403
- Landing gear: fixed
- Engine 1: P&W PW4056 (turbofan); 38,093 hours total
- Engine 2: P&W PW4056 (turbofan); 90,752 hours total
- Engine 3: P&W PW4056 (turbofan); 34,615 hours total
- Engine 4: P&W PW4056 (turbofan); 56,240 hours total
- Operator: Delta Air Lines
The flight
- Departed from: ATL Atlanta GA
- Destination: NRT Tokyo
- Flight plan: IFR
- Runway 27R, 12,390 ft by 150 ft
- A second pilot was aboard
Weather at the time
- Light: daylight
- Wind: from 300° at 7 knots
- Visibility: 10 statute miles
- Sky: scat at 5,000 ft
- Temperature: 86°F (30°C), dew point 63°F (17°C)
- Altimeter: 30.02 inHg
- Observation at 5:52 pm from ATL
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cabi | 13 | |||
| Flight crew | 4 | |||
| Passengers | 316 |
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
The docket, the folder of records gathered during an investigation (maintenance records, photographs, witness statements, examinations), has not been read from the NTSB for this case yet; the list appears here once it has. Open the docket at the NTSB.
Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.