Boeing MD-11F incident near Miami, Florida, May 21, 2008
On May 21, 2008 at about 10:45 pm local time, a Boeing MD-11F, registered EIUPO, suffered minor damage in an incident during landing (landing roll) near Miami, Florida. It was flown under foreign airline rules (Part 129). No one was hurt.
The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
The insufficient predicted fatigue life of the P/N KBE6-59 adjustable-length 3/8-inch rod end, and the inadequate fatigue margin at the transcowl CDU clevis assembly bracket attachment rivets for the one actuator out condition, which resulted in the failure of a second transcowl attachment during thrust reverser activation, leading to the partial liberation of the thrust reverser’s inboard transcowl.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- May 21, 2008 · about 10:45 pm local time
- Place
- Miami, Florida · map
- Type
- Incident · collision on the ground
- Injuries
- No one was hurt.
- Weather
- not recorded
- Aircraft
- Boeing MD-11F
- Registration
- EIUPO · no longer on the register · serial 48429
- Damage
- Minor damage
- Flight
- Flight · foreign airline rules (Part 129)
The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record
The airplane’s No. 3 engine thrust reverser lost a large section of its inboard translating cowling (transcowl) after thrust reverser deployment at landing. A postincident inspection found that two of the three transcowl attachments (the lower and the center) had failed. The lower ballscrew actuator attachment had failed in fatigue at its rod end. The center (CDU) attachment had failed in overload at the clevis assembly bracket attachment rivets. A fatigue analysis of the various rod ends qualified for use on CF6-80C2 series thrust reverser adjustable-length ballscrew actuators found that four of the 3/8-inch rod end part numbers (P/Ns), including P/N KBE6-59, which was on this thrust reverser, lacked sufficient predicted fatigue life. A design validation of the CF6-80C2 thrust reverser actuating system (TRAS) found that TRAS end-of-stroke impact loads can induce torque loading at the rod ends and clevis assembly bracket attachment rivets that result in bending loads not accounted for in the original design. The design validation also found that the fatigue tolerance capability of the CDU clevis bracket attachment fasteners was marginal for the “one actuator out” (OAO) condition under normal deploy loads.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
What happened, in order
- Part(s) separation from AC during landing (landing roll)
- Powerplant sys/comp malf/fail during landing (landing roll) defining event
The NTSB's findings
- Aircraft › Aircraft power plant › Engine exhaust › Thrust reverser › Fatigue/wear/corrosion
- cause Aircraft › Aircraft power plant › Engine exhaust › Thrust reverser › Design
- Aircraft › Aircraft power plant › Engine exhaust › Thrust reverser › Capability exceeded
The aircraft
- Landing gear: fixed
- Engine: (turbofan); 0 hours total
- Operator: Alitalia Airlines
The flight
- A second pilot was aboard
Weather at the time
- Temperature: 0°F (-18°C), dew point 0°F (-18°C)
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
The docket, the folder of records gathered during an investigation (maintenance records, photographs, witness statements, examinations), has not been read from the NTSB for this case yet; the list appears here once it has. Open the docket at the NTSB.
Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.