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Accidents · NTSB DCA95MA001 · Final report

Atr ATR-72-212 accident near Roselawn, Indiana, October 31, 1994

On October 31, 1994 at about 9:59 pm local time, a Atr ATR-72-212, registered N401AM, was destroyed in an accident near Roselawn, Indiana. It was a flight of an unrecorded kind under scheduled airline rules (Part 121). 68 people were killed. The weather was instrument conditions (cloud, fog or low visibility).

The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged

the loss of control, attributed to a sudden and unexpected aileron hinge moment reversal that occurred after a ridge of ice accreted beyond the deice boots while the airplane was in a holding pattern during which it intermittently encountered supercooled cloud and drizzle/rain drops, the size and water content of which exceeded those described in the icing certification envelope. The airplane was susceptible to this loss of control, and the crew was unable to recover. Contributing to the accident were: 1) the French Directorate General for Civil Aviation's (DGAC's) inadequate oversight of the ATR 42 and 72, and its failure to take the necessary corrective action to ensure continued airworthiness in icing conditions; and 2) the DGAC's failure to provide the FAA with timely airworthiness information developed from previous ATR incidents and accidents in icing conditions,3) the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA's) failure to ensure that aircraft icing certification requirements, operational requirements for flight into icing conditions, and FAA published aircraft icing information adequately accounted for the hazards that can result from flight in freezing rain, 4) the FAA's inadequate oversight of the ATR 42 and 72 to ensure continued airworthiness in icing conditions; and 5) ATR's inadequate response to the continued occurrence of ATR 42 icing/roll upsets which, in conjunction with information learned about aileron control difficulties during the certification and development of the ATR 42 and 72, should have prompted additional research, and the creation of updated airplane flight manuals, flightcrew operating manuals and training programs related to operation of the ATR 42 and 72 in such icing conditions.

Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.

What the record shows

Date
October 31, 1994 · about 9:59 pm local time
Place
Roselawn, Indiana
Type
Accident
Injuries
68 people were killed.
Weather
instrument conditions (cloud, fog or low visibility)
Aircraft
Atr ATR-72-212
Registration
N401AM · registry record · serial 401
Damage
Destroyed
Flight
Flight of an unrecorded kind · scheduled airline rules (Part 121)

The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record

The airplane was in a holding pattern and was descending to a newly assigned altitude of 8,000 feet when it experienced an uncommanded roll excursion and crashed during a rapid descent. The loss of ccontrol was attributed to a sudden and unexpected aileron hinge moment reversal that occurred after a ridge of ice accreted beyond the deice boots. The manufacturer failed to disseminate adequate warnings and guidance to operators about the adverse characteristics of, and techniques to recover from, ice-induced aileron hinge moment reversal events; and failed to develop additional airplane modifications, which led directly to this accident. The DGAC failed to require the manufacturer to take additional corrective actions, such as performing additional icing tests, issuing more specific warnings regarding the aileron hinge moment reversal phenomenon, developing additional airplane modifications, and providing specific guidance on the recovery from a hinge moment reversal, which led directly to this accident. The ability of the FAA to to monitor, on a real-time basis, the continued airworthiness of the ATR airplanes was hampered by the inadequately defined lines of communication, the inadequate means for the FAA to retrieve pertinent information, and the DGAC's failure to provide the FAA with critical airworthiness information., because of the DGAC's apparent belief that the information was not required to be provided under the terms of the Bilateral Airworthiness Agreement.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

Pilot

  • Certificate: airline transport pilot, flight instructor, commercial pilot
  • Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instructor: airplane multi-engine; instructor: airplane single-engine; instructor: instrument airplane; instrument: airplane
  • Flight time: 7,867 hours in all; 1,548 in this make and model; 190 in the last 90 days
  • Last flight review: June 8, 1994
  • Medical certificate: Class 1 (valid medical--no waivers/lim.)
  • Seat: left

Co-pilot

  • Certificate: commercial pilot
  • Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instructor: airplane multi-engine; instructor: airplane single-engine; instructor: instrument airplane; instrument: airplane
  • Last flight review: September 7, 1994
  • Medical certificate: Class 1 (without waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: rgt
  • Injury: fatal

The aircraft

  • Airframe total time: 1,352 hours
  • Last inspection: continuous airworthiness programme, March 29, 1994
  • Maximum gross weight: 47,400 lb
  • Seats: 68
  • Landing gear: retractable
  • Engine: P&W 127 (turboprop); 0 hours total
  • Operator: American Eagle Airlines

The flight

  • Departed from: IND Indianapolis IN at 8:55 pm
  • Destination: ORD Chicago IL
  • Flight plan: IFR
  • Runway 0
  • A second pilot was aboard

Weather at the time

  • Light: dusk
  • Visibility: 0.5 statute miles
  • Sky: overcast at 500 ft
  • Temperature: 39°F (4°C), dew point 0°F (-18°C)

Injuries

FatalSeriousMinorNone
Crew4
Passengers64

Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report

The docket, the folder of records gathered during an investigation (maintenance records, photographs, witness statements, examinations), has not been read from the NTSB for this case yet; the list appears here once it has. Open the docket at the NTSB.

Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.