Mcdonnell Douglas MD80 accident near Miami, Florida, June 21, 2022
On June 21, 2022 at about 9:38 pm local time, a 1990 Mcdonnell Douglas MD80, registered HI1064, was substantially damaged in an accident during landing (landing roll) near Miami, Florida (Miami Intl airport). It was flown under foreign airline rules (Part 129). 4 people had minor injuries; 136 others were unhurt. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).
The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
The structural failure of the left main landing gear downlock following ineffective shimmy dampening during the landing roll which caused the collapse of the left main landing gear, resulting in a runway excursion and post-flight fire.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- June 21, 2022 · about 9:38 pm local time
- Place
- Miami, Florida · Miami Intl · map
- Type
- Accident
- Injuries
- 4 people had minor injuries; 136 others were unhurt.
- Weather
- visual conditions (good weather)
- Aircraft
- Mcdonnell Douglas MD80, built 1990
- Registration
- HI1064 · no longer on the register · serial 54027
- Damage
- Substantial damage
- Flight
- Flight · foreign airline rules (Part 129)
The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record
The collapse of the left main landing gear during the landing roll resulted in a runway excursion due to a loss of controllability on the runway, during which the aircraft impacted a small equipment building, breaching the right-wing fuel tank and causing a post-crash fire. The performance of the crew was thoroughly evaluated during this investigation and found to be appropriate for the circumstances of the accident. The focus of this analysis is the cause of the left main landing gear collapse. Particularly (1) the left shimmy damper’s failure to adequately dampen vibration during landing and (2) the failure of the left main gear downlock mechanism due to excessive vibration. Figure 1 is a representation of how vibrations are typically dampened by a fully functioning shimmy damper. Figure 2 shows the rubber tire transfer markings that indicate the left main landing gear was shimmying down the runway. Figure 1. The blue line is a representation of vibrations from a normal landing dampened by normally operating shimmy dampers when both main landing gear are down and locked. Note: Figure is not to scale nor depicting actual data. Figure 2. Photos showing the left landing main landing gear tire transfer marks indicating shimming of the landing gear. Left Shimmy Damper Failure The left shimmy damper was examined and found to be assembled correctly. However, the check valve was found to be leaking and the cap for the check valve service port was missing. The damper requires sufficient hydraulic fluid to adequately dampen normal vibrations in the system. For a significant amount of fluid to leave the damper, there would have to be failure of both the check valve and the cap for the service port. If the leak in the check valve existed prior to the accident flight, there was potential for it to be discovered by maintenance when servicing the shimmy damper with hydraulic fluid. When a damper is serviced, documentation of that service must be made in the maintenance logs. The investigation’s review of maintenance logs revealed that the last time the left shimmy damper was serviced was in June of 2021, 12 months prior to the accident. Damage to check valves typically occur during servicing and any leaks would occur following a servicing event. Considering the last documented servicing of the shimmy damper occurred 1 year prior to the accident, it is likely that the check valve leak had silently developed and was sitting latent until a problem with the service port cap occurred. The shimmy damper was checked the day before the accident per the “S” check. There was no record of the damper being serviced during this “S” check suggesting that the service port cap was present and hydraulic fluid levels were above minimums. Therefore, the investigation deduced that the cap went missing or was compromised at some point in the 2 flights and 24 hours between the last “S” check and the accident touchdown. After the service port cap failed, sufficient fluid likely leaked from the damper through the leaking check valve and the uncovered service port in the hours prior to the accident, ultimately compromising the functionality of the shimmy damper. Unfortunately, the physical breach of the reservoir inflicted during the gear collapse resulted in the release of hydraulic fluid and precluded evaluation of whether the damper was properly serviced. This limited the investigation’s ability to definitively determine the root causes behind the apparent check valve and service port cap failure. The investigation explored potential contributions of operator organizational oversight and regulatory oversight of operator’s maintenance, however insufficient evidence existed to establish a direct link between any of these factors and the accident. Left Main Gear Downlock Failure Facing severe undampened axial vibration on rollout, the left main gear lower torque link (downlock) failed due to overload. When the downlock failed, the side braces were free to, and did, fold in the opposite direction from normal as the gear folded inboard and collapsed.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
What happened, in order
- Landing gear collapse during landing (landing roll) defining event
- Abnormal runway contact during landing (landing roll)
- Runway excursion during landing (landing roll)
- Fire/smoke (post-impact) during post (impact)
- Evacuation during post (impact)
The NTSB's findings
- Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Landing gear system › Shimmy damper › Failure
Pilot
- Certificate: airline transport pilot
- Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instrument: airplane
- Flight time: 14,388 hours in all; 1,400 in this make and model; 30 in the last 90 days; 15 in the last 30 days; 9,159 as pilot in command
- Last flight review: May 17, 2022
- Medical certificate: Class 1 (without waivers/limitations)
- Seat: left
Co-pilot
- Certificate: commercial pilot
- Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instructor: airplane multi-engine; instructor: airplane single-engine; instrument: airplane
- Flight time: 822 hours in all; 269 in this make and model; 44 in the last 90 days; 497 as pilot in command
- Medical certificate: Class 1 (without waivers/limitations)
- Seat: rgt
- Injury: minor injuries
The aircraft
- Airframe total time: 69,529 hours
- Last inspection: continuous airworthiness programme, March 3, 2022
- Maximum gross weight: 150,500 lb
- Landing gear: retractable
- Engine 1: Pratt And Whitney JT8D-219 (turbojet); 39,266 hours total
- Engine 2: Pratt And Whitney JT8D-219 (turbojet); 69,929 hours total
- Fire on the ground
- Operator: Red Air, SA
The flight
- Departed from: MDSD Santo Domingo OF at 7:00 pm
- Flight plan: IFR
- Runway 9, 13,016 ft by 150 ft
Weather at the time
- Light: daylight
- Wind: from 050° at 10 knots, gusting 18
- Visibility: 10 statute miles
- Sky: broken clouds at 25,000 ft; a few clouds at 3,000 ft
- Temperature: 86°F (30°C), dew point 66°F (19°C)
- Altimeter: 30.08 inHg
- Observation at 4:53 pm from KMIA, 2 miles away
Weather report (METAR): KMIA 212053Z COR 05010G18KT 10SM FEW030 BKN250 30/19 A3008 RMK AO2 SLP187 CB DSNT SE AND SW MOV S T03000194 $
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Flight crew | 10 | |||
| Passengers | 4 | 126 |
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
31 documents, released by the NTSB on July 31, 2023. View them here, or download them; the NTSB redacts some personal details before release, and this site shows the NTSB's own titles rather than its file names.
The same docket at the NTSB · documents without a copy here are fetched from the NTSB when you open them.
Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.
