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Accidents · NTSB DCA20IA081 · Final report

Aerospatiale AS350BA and DJI Mavic mid-air collision near Johnson Valley, California, February 6, 2020

On February 6, 2020 at about 8:00 pm local time, 2 aircraft, Aerospatiale AS350BA (N611TC) and DJI Mavic (FA37NAYXP9), were involved in a mid-air collision near Johnson Valley, California. No one was hurt; 3 people were on board or involved. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).

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The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged

the failure of the small UAS remote pilot to give way to the helicopter, resulting in an inflight collision. Contributing to the incident was the sUAS remote pilot’s failure to assess and mitigate the risks of operations in close proximity to other aircraft. Also contributing to the incident was the lack of inclusion of the sUAS operations as a part of the aviation activity and risk mitigation.
the failure of the small UAS remote pilot to give way to the helicopter, resulting in an inflight collision. Contributing to the incident was the sUAS remote pilot’s failure to assess and mitigate the risks of operations in close proximity to other aircraft. Also contributing to the incident was the lack of inclusion of the sUAS operations as a part of the aviation activity and risk mitigation.

Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 4, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.

What the record shows

Date
February 6, 2020 · about 8:00 pm local time
Place
Johnson Valley, California · map
Type
Incident · mid-air collision
Injuries
No one was hurt; 3 people were on board or involved.
Weather
visual conditions (good weather)
Aircraft 1
Aerospatiale AS350BA No Series, built 1988 · all AS350BAs on the register
Registration
N611TC · registry record · serial 2123
Damage
Minor damage
Flight
Aerial observation flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)
Aircraft 2
DJI Mavic 2
Registration
FA37NAYXP9 · no longer on the register · serial Unknown
Damage
Substantial damage
Flight
Aerial observation flight · small-drone rules (Part 107)

The NTSB's narrative for the Aerospatiale AS350BA final · quoted from the NTSB record

The helicopter was operating under the provisions of 14 CFR Part 91, with an FAA certificate of authorization or waiver to 91.119 (minimum altitudes) to provide videography of an off-road race, under visual flight rules, within Class G airspace in a remote and unpopulated area. The small unmanned aircraft system (sUAS) was operated under the provisions of 14 CFR Part 107, for the same purpose. The sUAS pilot knew helicopters were operating in close proximity to his position as he was closely following one of the race competitors. Review of video logs indicate the incident helicopter was clearly in view in the sUAS telemetry, however, the remote pilot continued to follow the race vehicle. The remote pilot did not use the service of a visual observer to assist with avoidance of other air traffic. The helicopter pilot avoided the sUAS, and assumed he was far enough away, when he returned to the racecourse. The sUAS, continuing to follow the racecourse, struck the helicopter on the right side of the windscreen. Maps of the race layout were provided to the helicopter pilots, but not the sUAS remote pilots, who were also not included in a pre-race organizational meeting for the helicopter pilots. Locations of the remote pilots on the maps were for general orientation, and there was no procedure to provide any sort of separation between the helicopters and sUAS, nor were the sUAS pilots monitoring the helicopter air-to-air frequency. 14 CFR 107.37 Operation near aircraft; right-of-way rules. States that (a) Each small unmanned aircraft must yield the right of way to all aircraft, and (b) No person may operate a small unmanned aircraft so close to another aircraft as to create a collision hazard. The nature of the race videography brings the aircraft into close proximity with each other. There did not appear to be an appreciation by the race organizers or the sUAS remote pilot of the significance of the sUAS operations as a collision risk to be mitigated. Such tools as defined operating areas, the use of visual observer(s), and/or specified wave-off criteria could have been used to help reduce the risk. Although the race organizers could have provided such an operating framework, it is also incumbent on the certificated remote pilot in command to understand the risks of this operation.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The NTSB's narrative for the DJI Mavic final · quoted from the NTSB record

The helicopter was operating under the provisions of 14 CFR Part 91, with an FAA certificate of authorization or waiver to 91.119 (minimum altitudes) to provide videography of an off-road race, under visual flight rules, within Class G airspace in a remote and unpopulated area. The small unmanned aircraft system (sUAS) was operated under the provisions of 14 CFR Part 107, for the same purpose. The sUAS pilot knew helicopters were operating in close proximity to his position as he was closely following one of the race competitors. Review of video logs indicate the incident helicopter was clearly in view in the sUAS telemetry, however, the remote pilot continued to follow the race vehicle. The remote pilot did not use the service of a visual observer to assist with avoidance of other air traffic. The helicopter pilot avoided the sUAS, and assumed he was far enough away, when he returned to the racecourse. The sUAS, continuing to follow the racecourse, struck the helicopter on the right side of the windscreen. Maps of the race layout were provided to the helicopter pilots, but not the sUAS remote pilots, who were also not included in a pre-race organizational meeting for the helicopter pilots. Locations of the remote pilots on the maps were for general orientation, and there was no procedure to provide any sort of separation between the helicopters and sUAS, nor were the sUAS pilots monitoring the helicopter air-to-air frequency. 14 CFR 107.37 Operation near aircraft; right-of-way rules. States that (a) Each small unmanned aircraft must yield the right of way to all aircraft, and (b) No person may operate a small unmanned aircraft so close to another aircraft as to create a collision hazard. The nature of the race videography brings the aircraft into close proximity with each other. There did not appear to be an appreciation by the race organizers or the sUAS remote pilot of the significance of the sUAS operations as a collision risk to be mitigated. Such tools as defined operating areas, the use of visual observer(s), and/or specified wave-off criteria could have been used to help reduce the risk. Although the race organizers could have provided such an operating framework, it is also incumbent on the certificated remote pilot in command to understand the risks of this operation.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The factual record for the Aerospatiale AS350BA from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

What happened, in order

  1. Midair collision during enroute defining event

The NTSB's findings

  • cause Personnel issues › Action/decision › Info processing/decision › Decision making/judgment › Pilot of other aircraft
  • factor Organizational issues › Development › Design › Policy/procedure development › Other institution/organization

Pilot

  • Certificate: commercial pilot
  • Ratings: instrument: helicopter; rotorcraft: helicopter
  • Flight time: 4,200 hours in all; 4,200 in this make and model
  • Medical certificate: Class 2 (without waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: left
  • Injury: no injuries

The aircraft

  • Seats: 6
  • Landing gear: fixed
  • Operator: Icon Helicopters Llc

The flight

  • Departed from: Johnson Valley CA
  • Destination: Johnson Valley CA
  • Flight plan: none

Weather at the time

  • Light: daylight
  • Wind: from 290° at 10 knots
  • Visibility: 10 statute miles
  • Sky: clear
  • Temperature: 64°F (18°C), dew point 19°F (-7°C)
  • Altimeter: 30.10 inHg
  • Observation at 7:50 pm from DAG, 25 miles away

Injuries

FatalSeriousMinorNone
Flig1
Passengers1

The factual record for the DJI Mavic from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

What happened, in order

  1. Midair collision during enroute defining event

The NTSB's findings

  • cause Personnel issues › Action/decision › Info processing/decision › Decision making/judgment › Pilot
  • factor Organizational issues › Development › Design › Policy/procedure development › Operator
  • factor Organizational issues › Development › Design › Policy/procedure development › Other institution/organization

Pilot

  • Certificate: remote
  • Ratings: rotorcraft: unmanned (suas)
  • Flight time: 90 hours in all; 16 in this make and model; 90 as pilot in command
  • Medical certificate: None
  • Seat: none
  • Injury: no injuries

The aircraft

  • Seats: 0
  • Landing gear: fixed

The flight

  • Departed from: Johnson Valley CA
  • Destination: Johnson Valley CA
  • Flight plan: none

Injuries

FatalSeriousMinorNone
Flig1

About this page

Everything above comes from the NTSB's public accident database: the narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words, and the coded tables behind its report (pilot, aircraft, flight, weather, injuries, sequence of events) are written out in plain English. Pilots' ages, home towns and medical details are left out on purpose. The docket at the NTSB holds the report as a PDF and the investigation's photographs and documents. This site never names pilots, passengers or anyone else involved. A preliminary report describes what is known soon after the event and can change; the final report, with the probable cause, usually follows one to two years later and this page is refreshed when it does. Case number DCA20IA081.