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Accidents · NTSB DCA19CA170 · Final report

Boeing CV2 accident near Beeville, Texas, June 21, 2019

On June 21, 2019 at about 1:42 pm local time, a 2018 Boeing CV2 (helicopter), registered N243XT, was substantially damaged in an accident during enroute near Beeville, Texas (Beeville airport). It was a flight test under general aviation rules (Part 91). The NTSB record does not give the injuries. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).

The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged

A higher than expected and accounted for crosswind which initiated a lateral deviation, and resulted in the aircraft reaching the limits of the geo-fence area triggering a contingency forced landing.

Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.

What the record shows

Date
June 21, 2019 · about 1:42 pm local time
Place
Beeville, Texas · Beeville · map
Type
Accident
Injuries
The NTSB record does not give the injuries.
Weather
visual conditions (good weather)
Aircraft
Boeing CV2, built 2018
Registration
N243XT · registry record · serial 004
Damage
Substantial damage
Flight
Flight test · general aviation rules (Part 91)

The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record

On June 21, 2019, at 0842 central daylight time (CDT), N243XT a Boeing CV2-Cargo Air Vehicle (CAV), unmanned aircraft system (UAS), sustained substantial damage during a contingency landing during a test flight at Chase Industrial airport (TX2), Beeville, TX. This aircraft is a large UAS with 12 electric motors and 12 propellers mounted in the horizontal or near-horizontal plane.  It is a developmental platform for unmanned cargo operations. The pilot does not control the flight path, speed or attitude of the aircraft in flight, all flights are preprogrammed.  The only ability the pilot or ground control station operator has to affect the flight is through contingency management via the "abort to planned zone" (APZ), "land now" or "cut power" (terminate the flight) commands.  Flight testing of the aircraft had been going on for several weeks, with approximately 45 flights completed.  Test flights were very short in duration, no longer than 4 minutes. According to the manufacturer/operator, the accident flight was a planned 30 knot flight over the grass area between the runway and the taxiway. All preparations for the flight were normal. After takeoff and turning on course to parallel the runway/taxiway, the aircraft started to deviate from the programmed flight profile. The flight test area included a two-level geo-fence boundary to keep the aircraft contained within a safe area. The aircraft identified the deviation and autonomously triggered an "abort to planned zone" (APZ).  The APZ is a contingency plan where the aircraft stops the current flight and immediately turns towards the closest planned landing zone (in this case, the taxiway) and begins the approach. However, the aircraft continued the lateral deviation. The aircraft reached the first geo-fence boundary and then autonomously executed a "land now" command where the aircraft immediately begins a landing regardless of its position.  The aircraft appeared to adjust pitch attitude for the abort to planned zone landing and drifted towards the second geo-fence boundary. Upon reaching the outer geo-fence, the aircraft autonomously cut power to all motors and dropped to the ground, as designed. The aircraft was substantially damaged, there were no injuries. The aircraft remained within the test area. A review of the flight data by the manufacturer/operator revealed that the lateral deviation initiated due to higher than expected and accounted for wind, which resulted in high vibration within the aircraft navigation system. The contingency logic was unable to return the aircraft to the planned abort zone prior to reaching the outer geo-fence. The manufacturer/operator determined that there had been insufficient tests related to high crosswinds, and insufficient ability to determine winds during test flights. Additionally, the manufacturer/operator determined that the physical separation between the abort to planned zone (APZ) and geo-fence locations was inadequate for the aircraft to maneuver considering the wind and other environmental factors.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

What happened, in order

  1. Nav system malfunction/failure during enroute defining event
  2. Off-field or emergency landing during emergency descent

The NTSB's findings

  • cause Aircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability › Aircraft capability › Maximum crosswind component › Capability exceeded
  • cause Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Navigation system › Global positioning sys (GPS) › Capability exceeded

Pilot

  • Certificate: flight instructor, commercial pilot
  • Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instructor: gyroplane; instructor: helicopter; instructor: instrument helicopter; instrument: airplane; instrument: helicopter; rotorcraft: gyroplane; rotorcraft: helicopter
  • Flight time: 5,662 hours in all; 1 in this make and model; 14 in the last 90 days; 5,326 as pilot in command; 1,402 on instruments
  • Last flight review: March 28, 2019
  • Medical certificate: Class 2 (with waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: none
  • Injury: no injuries

The aircraft

  • Airframe total time: 4.5 hours
  • Last inspection: type not recorded, March 20, 2019
  • Maximum gross weight: 1,200 lb
  • Seats: 0
  • Landing gear: fixed

The flight

  • Departed from: TX2 Beeville TX
  • Destination: TX2 Beeville TX
  • Flight plan: none
  • Runway 13, 8,000 ft by 200 ft

Weather at the time

  • Light: daylight
  • Wind: at 10 knots, gusting 6
  • Sky: scat at 2,000 ft
  • Temperature: 0°F (-18°C), dew point 0°F (-18°C)

Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report

1 document, released by the NTSB on March 31, 2020. View them here, or download them; the NTSB redacts some personal details before release, and this site shows the NTSB's own titles rather than its file names.

The same docket at the NTSB · documents without a copy here are fetched from the NTSB when you open them.

Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.