Boeing 777 incident near Bozeman, Montana, November 26, 2008
On November 26, 2008 at about 7:25 pm local time, a Boeing 777, registered N862DA, was involved in an incident during enroute (cruise) near Bozeman, Montana (Bozeman airport). It was flown under scheduled airline rules (Part 121). No one was hurt; 263 people were on board or involved. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).
The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
An accumulation of ice in the fuel system, which formed from the water normally present in jet fuel during commonly encountered flight conditions, which accreted and released, restricting the fuel flow at the right engine fuel-oil heat exchanger inlet face. Contributing to the incident were certification requirements (with which the aircraft and engine fuel systems were in compliance), which did not account for the possibility of ice accumulating and subsequently releasing in the aircraft and engine fuel feed system upstream of the fuel-oil heat exchanger.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- November 26, 2008 · about 7:25 pm local time
- Place
- Bozeman, Montana · Bozeman · map
- Type
- Incident
- Injuries
- No one was hurt; 263 people were on board or involved.
- Weather
- visual conditions (good weather)
- Aircraft
- Boeing 777 200 · all 777s on the register
- Registration
- N862DA · registry record · serial 29734
- Damage
- Not recorded
- Flight
- Flight · scheduled airline rules (Part 121)
The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record
About flight level 390 (about 39,000 feet), the airplane experienced an uncommanded thrust reduction (or “rollback”) of the right engine. The flight crew actions did not initiate or exacerbate the engine rollback. Although the flight crew expressed some questions about the applicable procedures, they reduced thrust as required and the right engine recovered and responded normally for the remainder of the flight. (Following the Delta incident, Boeing revised its engine response non normal procedure.) The flight did not encounter any severe weather or abnormally low temperatures aloft, and the fuel did not reach a low enough temperature to freeze or solidify. All relevant systems on the airplane were operating as designed and certified. The water content and chemical makeup of the fuel met all international test standards. Flight crew statements and recorded flight data indicated that the flight was normal from the departure from Shanghai until about 55 minutes before the engine rollback occurred; at which time, the right engine oil temperature began to increase relative to that of the left engine oil temperature with no corresponding thrust increase or other potential explanation. (A consistent small difference existed between the left and right engine oil temperatures, which was attributed to manufacturing tolerance variances.) This period of elevated oil temperature occurred because the inlet face of the fuel-oil heat exchanger (FOHE) was partially obstructed by ice, resulting in the fuel flowing through a reduced number of tubes in the FOHE, which reduced the oil cooling efficiency of the FOHE before and during the rollback. When the right engine fuel flow returned to normal after the ice blockage cleared, the engine oil temperature dropped, indicating that the FOHE oil cooling effectiveness was restored. Therefore, the oil temperature excursion is evidence that the FOHE was partially restricted for about 55 minutes before and during the engine rollback. The investigation determined that the following sequence of events occurred during the incident flight: ice formation from the normal amounts of entrained water in the fuel, ice accretion and subsequent release from the area of accretion (possibly at more than one distinct time), and ice travel through the fuel system to collect on, and obstruct the flow through, the FOHE inlet face. The recorded fuel temperature during the time period leading up to the engine rollback was -22° C. Extensive testing using Boeing 777 components in a cold fuel laboratory concluded that, jet fuel with normal amounts of entrained water could form ice crystals and that, when localised fuel temperatures are in the ‘sticky range’ (-5 to -20 °C), ice can accumulate along the internal components of the fuel system and that this ice could be released during higher fuel flows and subsequently travel downstream through the system. The testing further concluded that the Rolls-Royce Trent 800 FOHE inlet face could be obstructed by a concentration of ice sufficient to restrict the fuel flow to a value similar to that recorded during the incident flight. Testing also demonstrated that reducing the volume of the fuel flow through the FOHE allows the heat of the oil to melt the ice, allowing for a recovery to normal operation. Although the fuel system met certification requirements, the FAA determined that neither the FAA nor applicants anticipated ice accumulating in the aircraft and engine fuel feed system upstream of the FOHE or that, under certain conditions, the ice could release and cause a restriction at the FOHE that would limit fuel flow to the engines. Therefore, the FAA and European Aviation Safety Agency provided applicants revised acceptable methods of compliance to those applicable regulations to ensure that future designs are tolerant to the threat of ice concentrations.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
What happened, in order
- Loss of engine power (partial) during enroute (cruise) defining event
The NTSB's findings
- cause Aircraft › Aircraft power plant › Engine fuel and control › Fuel oil cooler › Capability exceeded
- factor Organizational issues › Development › Selection/certification/testin › Equip certification/testing › FAA/Regulator
- cause Aircraft › Fluids/misc hardware › Fluids › Fuel › Fluid condition
Pilot
- Certificate: airline transport pilot
- Ratings: multi-engine land; instrument: airplane
- Flight time: 13,409 hours in all; 87 in this make and model; 87 in the last 90 days; 5,793 as pilot in command
- Last flight review: September 25, 2008
- Medical certificate: Class 1
- Seat: left
- Injury: no injuries
Co-pilot
- Certificate: airline transport pilot
- Ratings: multi-engine land; instrument: airplane
- Flight time: 10,412 hours in all; 1,896 in this make and model; 117 in the last 90 days
- Last flight review: July 18, 2008
- Medical certificate: Class 1
- Seat: rgt
- Injury: no injuries
The aircraft
- Airframe total time: 41,222 hours
- Last inspection: continuous airworthiness programme, February 29, 2008
- Maximum gross weight: 545,000 lb
- Seats: 284
- Landing gear: retractable
- Engine: Rolls-Royce Trent 895 (turbofan); 0 hours total
- Operator: Delta Air Lines
The flight
- Departed from: ZSPD Shanghai at 4:45 pm
- Destination: KATL Atlanta GA
- Flight plan: IFR
- A second pilot was aboard
Weather at the time
- Light: daylight
- Temperature: -71°F (-57°C), dew point 0°F (-18°C)
- Altimeter: 29.92 inHg
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cabi | 10 | |||
| Flight crew | 4 | |||
| Passengers | 249 |
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
The docket, the folder of records gathered during an investigation (maintenance records, photographs, witness statements, examinations), has not been read from the NTSB for this case yet; the list appears here once it has. Open the docket at the NTSB.
Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.
