Airbus Industrie A330 incident near Miami, Florida, October 5, 2003
On October 5, 2003 at about 4:00 am local time, a Airbus Industrie A330, registered HBIQZ, suffered minor damage in an incident near Miami, Florida. It was flown under non-U.S. commercial rules. No one was hurt; 183 people were on board or involved. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).
The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
an uncontained engine failure that resulted from the coking (carbon build-up) in a vent tube which led to a fire and the subsequent liberation of the IP turbine blades. Contributing to the cause of the uncontained engine failure was the absence of measures to adequately monitor the in-service performance of a new engine/oil combination.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- October 5, 2003 · about 4:00 am local time
- Place
- Miami, Florida · map
- Type
- Incident
- Injuries
- No one was hurt; 183 people were on board or involved.
- Weather
- visual conditions (good weather)
- Aircraft
- Airbus Industrie A330 · all A330s on the register
- Registration
- HBIQZ · no longer on the register
- Damage
- Minor damage
- Flight
- Flight · non-U.S. commercial rules
The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record
Climbing through FL 230, an Edelweiss Airbus 330-243 experienced an uncontained engine failure of the No. 1 engine. The flight crew declared an emergency and returned to Miami International Airport, Miami, Florida, to execute an uneventful single-engine landing. Postincident examination revealed that an oil fire in the high pressure (HP)/intermediate pressure (IP) turbine bearing chamber internal oil vent tube of the No. 1 engine burned through the tube, allowing hot gases into the HP/IP turbine bearing chamber. The hot gases blew the oil past the oil seals, igniting the rear area of the bearing chamber and providing enough heat to fracture the IP turbine disk drive arm, which caused the disk to overspeed and release its blades through the IP turbine case. Some of the blades impacted the left wing and a portion of the fuselage. Due to the fire damage to the No. 1 engine and the loss of a significant portion of the internal vent tube and associated heat shield, the exact cause of the vent tube oil fire initiation is unknown. However, examination of the No. 2 engine's vent tube revealed that it was blocked with carbon deposits. Because both engines had the same operating time and history, it is likely that the event engine had a similar blockage of its vent tube and that the blockage contributed to the initiation of the oil fire. At the time of the uncontained engine failure, Mobil Jet Oil (MJO) 291 was being used in the incident engines. MJO 291 was approved for use in Trent 700 engines in 1996 but Edelweiss was the only operator using that type of oil. The incident investigation revealed that the use of MJO 291 produced coking in the sister engine and, by inference, the incident engine's HP/IP bearing chamber internal oil vent tube which resulted in a catastrophic engine failure. There had been a demonstrated coking problem in the same area with another previously approved oil. A 1999 Rolls-Royce service bulletin (SB) removed ASTO 560 from the list of oils approved for use in Trent series 700 and 800 engines after it was found that significant carbon accumulation was confined to operations using ASTO 560. After the deletion of ASTO 560 from the list of approved oils, no significant buildup of carbon was found in engines over 10,000 hours. As a result, CAA and Rolls-Royce, based upon data available and mindful of the additional threat of a maintenance error associated with such inspections, deleted the 3,000-hour requirement for the on-wing inspection of the HP/IP bearing chamber internal oil vent tube for coking. If the 3,000-hour requirement to inspect for coking had remained in place, it is likely that the coking in the incident engines would have been found and the engine would not have suffered a failure. Each time a new oil is introduced, procedures should be developed and implemented to inspect those areas where engine testing or in-service experience has indicated carbon formation is possible - until such time as there is sufficient in-service engine data to support the case for no longer doing so. The incident flight was on an ETOPS route, which, in the event of an engine shutdown, allows one engine operation for up to 180 minutes. It is recognized that if the flight crew did shut down one engine, the flight could have continued for that time with an unspecified risk for the remaining engine to fail. Since the sister engine had an unusual coke formation also, by both engines not being monitored after the induction of the new oil, it allowed for the potential of an erosion into the safety margin allowed by ETOPS. This investigation highlights that engine manufactures should take into account the level of risk associated with approving new engine/oil combinations. Operators also need to take into account the introduction of new oils into their fleets and ensure that sufficient evidence exists to support their use.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
Pilot
- Injury: no injuries
Crew member
No details recorded.
The aircraft
- Landing gear: retractable
- Engine 1: Rolls-Royce Trent 700 (turbofan); 0 hours total
- Engine 2: Rolls-Royce Trent 700 (turbofan); 0 hours total
- Operator: Edelweiss Air AG
The flight
- Departed from: MIA Maimi FL at 4:00 am
- Destination: Zurich
- Flight plan: IFR
Weather at the time
- Wind: from 280° at 15 knots
- Temperature: 0°F (-18°C), dew point 0°F (-18°C)
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Crew | 12 | |||
| Passengers | 171 |
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
The docket, the folder of records gathered during an investigation (maintenance records, photographs, witness statements, examinations), has not been read from the NTSB for this case yet; the list appears here once it has. Open the docket at the NTSB.
Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.
