Boeing 737-7H4 accident near Chicago, Illinois, July 8, 2005
On July 8, 2005 at about 2:15 pm local time, a Boeing 737-7H4, registered N494WN, was substantially damaged in an accident near Chicago, Illinois (Chicago Midway airport). It was flown under scheduled airline rules (Part 121). No one was hurt; 110 people were on board or involved. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).
The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
The pushback tow driver not maintaining visual lookout for the wing walker's visual signal, and the driver not maintaining clearance from the vehicle during the pushback for taxi. Factors to the accident were the standing vehicle behind the airplane, the inadequate group/crew coordination for the pushback, and the lack of guidance in the company's manuals to stop the tow when visual lookout is not maintained.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- July 8, 2005 · about 2:15 pm local time
- Place
- Chicago, Illinois · Chicago Midway · map
- Type
- Accident
- Injuries
- No one was hurt; 110 people were on board or involved.
- Weather
- visual conditions (good weather)
- Aircraft
- Boeing 737-7H4 · all 737-7H4s on the register
- Registration
- N494WN · registry record · serial 33868
- Damage
- Substantial damage
- Flight
- Flight · scheduled airline rules (Part 121)
The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record
The scheduled domestic passenger flight sustained substantial damage when the airplane impacted a food service truck during the flight's pushback. The food service truck tipped on its side after the impact. The operator stated that an additional provisioning (provo) truck was parked behind the aircraft so that the additional driver could assist the driver of the assigned provisioning truck. The captain was informed by the pushback driver of the "provo truck" at the rear galley and the captain told the driver to push at his discretion. The assigned truck servicing the flight completed its service and was marshaled back from the aircraft and departed. The pushback driver, unaware of the second truck behind the aircraft, began to push the aircraft out. During pushback, as the flight crew initiated engine start, the APU stopped running, the engine start was terminated, and the push sequence was stopped. The pushback driver stated that he experienced "difficulty with going forward" and stopped the push. The pushback driver stated that he "did not see anyone telling me to stop pushing that my zone was not clear." The wing walker took his position at the taxiway to walk out the flight and was aware of the truck behind the aircraft. The wing walker stated that "I put up the stop signal and yelled stop but the plane kept on being pushed." The operator's ground operations manual stated that the pushback driver "is ultimately responsible for ensuring that the aircraft has been secured, all personnel involved in the push are in proper position, and the pushback is conducted in a safe manner." The manual did not list, note, caution, or warn the pushback driver to stop the pushback when the driver's visual contact with the guide agent (wing walker) is not maintained. The manual told the guide agent to "always be in visual range of the pushback driver ... ." The operator was asked if there was a back up aural signal to the visual stop signals. The operator indicated that there was none and "since this event we are testing headset communication systems." When asked where the supervisor was, the operator responded that "the supervisor was within visual range but his attempts to stop the push were not heard or seen."
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
Pilot
- Certificate: airline transport pilot
- Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instructor: airplane multi-engine; instructor: airplane single-engine; instructor: instrument airplane; instrument: airplane
- Flight time: 12,000 hours in all; 12,000 in this make and model; 180 in the last 90 days; 120 in the last 30 days; 11,700 as pilot in command; 2,147 on instruments
- Last flight review: March 1, 2005
- Medical certificate: Class 1 (without waivers/limitations)
- Seat: left
- Injury: no injuries
Co-pilot
- Certificate: airline transport pilot
- Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instructor: airplane multi-engine; instructor: airplane single-engine; instructor: instrument airplane; instrument: airplane
- Flight time: 7,900 hours in all; 720 in this make and model; 270 in the last 90 days; 90 in the last 30 days; 4,400 as pilot in command; 3,800 on instruments
- Medical certificate: Class 1 (without waivers/limitations)
- Seat: rgt
- Injury: no injuries
The aircraft
- Airframe total time: 2,181 hours
- Last inspection: continuous airworthiness programme, July 1, 2005; 35.3 hours since
- Maximum gross weight: 154,500 lb
- Seats: 145
- Landing gear: retractable
- Engine 1: General Electric CFM-56 (turbofan); 0 hours total
- Engine 2: General Electric CFM-56 (turbofan); 0 hours total
The flight
- Departed from: MDW Chicago IL
- Destination: TPA Tampa FL
- Flight plan: IFR
- A second pilot was aboard
Weather at the time
- Light: daylight
- Wind: at 3 knots
- Visibility: 10 statute miles
- Sky: clear
- Temperature: 75°F (24°C), dew point 61°F (16°C)
- Altimeter: 30.12 inHg
- Observation at 1:53 pm from MDW
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Crew | 5 | |||
| Passengers | 105 |
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
The docket, the folder of records gathered during an investigation (maintenance records, photographs, witness statements, examinations), has not been read from the NTSB for this case yet; the list appears here once it has. Open the docket at the NTSB.
Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.