Cessna 560XL accident near Wheeling, Illinois, November 11, 2003
On November 11, 2003 at about 7:42 pm local time, a Cessna 560XL, registered N789CN, was substantially damaged in an accident near Wheeling, Illinois (Palwaukee Muni airport). It was flown under charter and air-taxi rules (Part 135). No one was hurt; 5 people were on board or involved. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).
The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
The flight crew's intentional operation with know deficiencies in the aircraft and their delay in aborting the takeoff when a no-takeoff warning was presented. An additional cause was the crew's failure to comply with flight manual procedures concerning stabilizer miscompare and no-takeoff indications. Contributing factors were the inoperative two-position horizontal stabilizer system due to the intermittent electrical connection at the aft fairing connector, as well as the runway approach lights impacted during the overrun.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- November 11, 2003 · about 7:42 pm local time
- Place
- Wheeling, Illinois · Palwaukee Muni · map
- Type
- Accident
- Injuries
- No one was hurt; 5 people were on board or involved.
- Weather
- visual conditions (good weather)
- Aircraft
- Cessna 560XL · all 560XLs on the register
- Registration
- N789CN · no longer on the register · serial 560-5070
- Damage
- Substantial damage
- Flight
- Flight · charter and air-taxi rules (Part 135)
The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record
The airplane was substantially damaged when it overran the departure end of the runway during an aborted takeoff. The crew attempted to reject the takeoff when the pilot flying could not rotate normally. The aircraft is equipped with a two-position horizontal stabilizer system, which acts to reduce elevator control forces by repositioning the stabilizer two-degrees down for takeoff or landing. The normal (cruise) position corresponds to one-degree up. There are no intermediate positions. The stabilizer is commanded to move to the takeoff position when the crew moves the cockpit flap handle out of the 0-degree (flaps up) detent. The stabilizer was observed in the cruise position during the post-accident inspection. Two independent warning systems are designed to alert the flight crew in the event that the horizontal stabilizer is not properly positioned for takeoff or landing. A stabilizer mis-compare (STAB MIS COMP) annunciator warning is displayed when the flap handle and horizontal stabilizer are not in corresponding positions. In addition, a no-takeoff warning (NO TAKEOFF) will be displayed when the aircraft is on the ground and the horizontal stabilizer is not in the proper position for takeoff. As the throttles are advanced forward of the climb thrust setting, the no-takeoff annunciator light (NO TAKEOFF) will begin to flash and a master caution will be displayed. A warning horn will sound associated with the no takeoff indication. During the post-accident investigation, electrical power was applied to the aircraft. Without changing any cockpit control settings, the STAB MIS COMP and NO TAKEOFF lights on the annunciator panel were illuminated. Initial attempts to reposition the horizontal stabilizer were not successful. Subsequent inspection of the aft fairing feedthru connector revealed an unseated (pushed-back) pin. The pin provided electrical power to the hydraulic arming valve in order to allow repositioning of the horizontal stabilizer. Further examination of the pin showed black marks near the tip consistent with electrical arcing. When a new pin was installed, the horizontal stabilizer repositioned from cruise to takeoff/landing position as expected. The stabilizer miscompare and no-takeoff warning systems were subsequently tested and performed in accordance with the flight and operating manual parameters. The warning horn associated with the no-takeoff indication was heard over the cockpit speaker when the thrust levers were brought above the climb thrust setting. The flight manual BEFORE TAKEOFF checklist noted that all annunciator lights should be extinguished except the ground idle light prior to initiating a takeoff. The flight manual abnormal procedures checklist stated that when illuminated on the ground a STAB MISCOMP indication must be corrected prior to flight. In addition, a no-takeoff indication required the takeoff be aborted. The cockpit voice recorder was downloaded and transcribed. The transcript revealed that the crew was aware that the horizontal stabilizer was not in the takeoff position prior to initiating the takeoff roll. In addition, a sound similar to the no-takeoff warning horn was recorded over the cockpit area microphone during the takeoff roll and sounded for approximately twelve seconds before a rejected takeoff was initiated.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
Pilot
- Certificate: airline transport pilot, flight instructor
- Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instructor: airplane multi-engine; instructor: airplane single-engine; instructor: instrument airplane; instrument: airplane
- Flight time: 8,400 hours in all; 850 in this make and model; 150 in the last 90 days; 50 in the last 30 days; 7,000 as pilot in command; 1,600 on instruments
- Last flight review: June 16, 2003
- Medical certificate: Class 1 (valid medical--no waivers/lim.)
- Seat: left
- Injury: no injuries
Co-pilot
- Certificate: airline transport pilot
- Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instructor: airplane single-engine; instrument: airplane; rotorcraft: glider
- Flight time: 2,400 hours in all; 670 in this make and model; 145 in the last 90 days; 48 in the last 30 days; 1,100 as pilot in command; 800 on instruments
- Last flight review: August 28, 2003
- Medical certificate: Class 1 (valid medical--no waivers/lim.)
- Seat: rgt
- Injury: no injuries
The aircraft
- Airframe total time: 1,060.5 hours
- Last inspection: continuous airworthiness programme, August 30, 2003; 121.4 hours since
- Maximum gross weight: 20,000 lb
- Seats: 11
- Landing gear: retractable
- Engine 1: Pratt & Whitney Canada PW545A (turbofan); 0 hours total
- Engine 2: Pratt & Whitney Canada PW545A (turbofan); 0 hours total
- Operator: West Coast Charters INC
The flight
- Departed from: PWK Wheeling IL at 7:42 pm
- Destination: SNA Santa Ana CA
- Flight plan: IFR
- Runway 34, 5,000 ft by 150 ft
- A second pilot was aboard
Weather at the time
- Light: daylight
- Wind: from 240° at 9 knots
- Visibility: 4 statute miles
- Sky: overcast at 900 ft
- Temperature: 54°F (12°C), dew point 50°F (10°C)
- Altimeter: 29.86 inHg
- Observation at 7:53 pm from PWK
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Crew | 2 | |||
| Passengers | 3 |
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
The docket, the folder of records gathered during an investigation (maintenance records, photographs, witness statements, examinations), has not been read from the NTSB for this case yet; the list appears here once it has. Open the docket at the NTSB.
Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.